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Abstract 
 
Understanding climate change as a knowledge controversy, this thesis provides new 
insights into the form, value and impact of the climate change debate on science and 
policy processes. Based on 99 interviews in New Zealand and the United Kingdom as 
well as social network analysis, it provides an original contribution to knowledge by 
identifying previously unknown sites of knowledge contestation within the climate 
change debate, in addition to contributory factors, and potential solutions to, debate 
polarisation. It also addresses a fundamental gap in the literature regarding the impact 
of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge and policy decision-making. 
 
This thesis comprises five standalone papers (Chapters 2-6) which together explore 
climate change as a knowledge controversy using frameworks from science and 
technology studies, sociology and geography. Chapter 2 finds that the most central 
blogs within the climate sceptical blogosphere predominantly focus on the scientific 
element of the climate debate. It argues that by acting as an alternative public site of 
expertise, the blogosphere may be playing a central role in perpetuating doubt 
regarding the scientific basis for climate change policymaking. Chapter 3 suggests that 
the binary and dualistic format of labels used within the climate debate such as 
“denier” or “alarmist” contribute towards polarisation by reducing possibilities for 
constructive dialogue. Chapter 4 investigates rationales for debate participation and 
argues that identifying and emphasising commonalities between previously polarised 
individuals may serve to reduce antagonism within the climate change debate. Chapter 
5 investigates the impact of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge and 
finds that climate scientists identify substantial impacts on their agency as scientists, 
but not on scientific practice. It argues that this distinction indicates that boundary-
making may be understood as a more active and explicit process under conditions of 
controversy. Finally, Chapter 6 introduces the concept of post-decisional logics of 
inaction, emphasising the role of place in determining the influence of controversial 
knowledge claims on climate change policymaking.  
 
These findings make explicit the underlying politics of knowledge inherent within the 
climate change debate, and emphasise the need for a more attentive consideration of 
the role of knowledge, place and performativity in contested science and policy 
environments.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1 Section 
1.1 Introduction 
More often than not, science produces more questions than answers. This is an innate 
characteristic of scientific endeavour as a whole, the goal of which is to seek ‘insight 
and knowledge about nature through an ongoing process of questioning, 
hypothesizing, validation, and refutation’ (Sarewitz, 2000: 84). As science is carried 
out, new research questions continually emerge, creating an ever-increasing web of 
potential avenues for examination—as well as concomitant possibilities for dispute 
between scientific actors. These disputes, or scientific controversies, may erupt at any 
point in the research process (Pinch, 2001), but are also able to transcend the confines 
of academia and influence public decision-making (Martin and Richards, 1995). These, 
now public, scientific controversies involving both science and policy are likely when 
the issue in question is at the cutting edge of research endeavour and either where 
social values are unclear, such as the use of genetically modified organisms outside 
controlled laboratory environments (Lacey, 2015), or where it is of significant interest 
to the wider, non-scientific, community, such as alcohol consumption or vaccination 
policy (Martin, 2014; Naylor et al., 2014; Veselková, 2014). In such cases, scientific, and 
other, evidence is gathered by participants to support their position or intended policy 
outcome (Roosth and Silbey, 2009; Pfister and Horvath, 2014). Yet this assemblage of 
evidence is not always straightforward as actors dispute the legitimacy of claims and 
their authority in public decision-making. 
 
Within the geography and sociology literatures, a strong tradition has been established 
examining public scientific controversies in the environmental realm. Whatmore 
(2009: 588) defines these as ‘events in which the knowledge claims and technologies of 
environmental science, and the regulatory and policy practices of government agencies 
that they inform, become subject to public interrogation and dispute’. Whatmore’s 
definition is particularly pertinent as it foregrounds the notion of knowledge. 
Following Martin and Richards (1995), Nowotny et al. (2001), Sarewitz (2004), Collins 
(2014) and others, this thesis argues that disputes over knowledge are a defining 
feature of public scientific controversies. A knowledge controversy is understood here 
as a situation whereby conflicting knowledge claims and valuations of evidence and 
expertise are assembled to support different points of view within contentious public 
debate. This definition extends the notion of public scientific controversy as it 
1. Introduction 
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recognises that whereas scientific claims may be frequently employed in contentious 
situations, claims based on other types of knowledge, such as debates regarding the 
likely economic consequences of a policy choice, may also enter into and be influential 
in particular contexts. It further extends Whatmore’s definition by explicitly 
highlighting the knowledge-related elements of controversy, specifically the 
assemblage of knowledge claims, and the different authority and legitimacy that is 
accorded to evidence and expertise. 
 
Climate change is a knowledge controversy of unprecedented global significance. Not 
only is the scientific basis of climate change vigorously disputed, both in terms of its 
reality and severity (Reddy and Assenza, 2009; Schmidt, 2010; Hoffman, 2011a; 
Capstick and Pidgeon, 2013; Kane, 2013), but more policy-based or politically-oriented 
factors are also debated, such as the necessity of carbon taxes or other regulatory 
mechanisms (Kelly, 2010; Boykoff and Olson, 2013; Lockwood, 2013; Martin and Rice, 
2014). Policy-focused contestation is not unexpected, particularly given the 
behavioural or cost implications of certain types of climate change policies (Stoll-
Kleemann et al., 2001; Whitmarsh, 2009; Fudge and Peters, 2011). Science-based 
disagreement is also well-documented, whereby framings such as “sound” science 
versus “junk” science (McCright and Dunlap, 2003; McGarity, 2003-2004) are 
employed in what Latour (1987) refers to as “trials of strength”; pitting evidence 
against evidence in battles of cognitive legitimacy. Knowledge controversy is therefore 
also fundamentally about whose evidence, opinions, arguments and framings are 
influential—whose politics and science come to have authority within a contested 
domain. But despite recognition that science and policy contestation exists in the 
context of climate change, much less is known about its form, value and, especially, 
impact. Climate change is a particularly enlightening case study with which to examine 
these aspects of knowledge controversy because of its nature as a problem of such 
“wicked” complexity (Rittel and Webber, 1973) that is exceptional in terms of scale, 
uncertainty and international relevance. Whilst it has some similarities to previous 
scientific controversies, such as the relationship between chlorofluorocarbons and 
atmospheric ozone degradation in the 1980s, including the existence of outspoken 
scientists who were supported by authoritative scientific and media institutions 
(Grundmann, 2009), several key differences exist. Below (2008: 2) shows that not only 
was the underlying science of ozone degradation ‘largely conclusive and universally 
accepted’ but that crucially, ‘alternatives to ozone depleting substances had already 
been developed and were ready to use’ (Below, 2008: 2). In the case of climate change, 
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scientific contestation remains visible despite decades of scientific enquiry, and its 
dispersed and interconnected nature means that no “silver bullet” solution is available. 
 
The next section presents the overarching motivation for this thesis, and is followed by 
an outline of the research aims and thesis structure. An explanation of the format of 
this thesis is provided in Section 1.3, followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
 
1.1.1 Research motivation 
Hoffman (2011b: 4) argues that the climate change debate, specifically the 
perspectives and logics of those who challenge consensus framings, has been subject to 
‘significant oversight’ on behalf of social science researchers. While the majority, 
particularly those within academic or political circles (Bolsen et al., 2015) consider 
that climate change exists and is predominantly anthropogenic in origin (see however 
Unsworth and Fielding (2014) for an interesting discussion of the salience of political 
beliefs and climate change opinion), a small, yet often vocal minority challenges this 
viewpoint. Hoffman contends that social science does ‘not yet have a framework to talk 
about the climate debate in the social realm’ and calls for ‘more social science research 
on the conflict over climate change at the individual and organizational levels of 
analysis’ (2011b: 5). This thesis thus directly responds to this call for action to better 
understand not only the nature of the ‘logic schism’ (2011b: 5) evident within the 
climate change debate, but also its impact on processes of science and policy using the 
paradigm of knowledge controversy.  
 
This research was also initially motivated by curiosity regarding how decisions are 
made about climate change within the context of contentious public debate. If, as 
Rayner (2009: xxiii) argues, ‘debate around climate has succeeded debate around 
capital and social class as the organising theme of political discourse in contemporary 
society’, understanding more about the nature of this contestation as well as its 
influence in society is critical. While the notion of scientific controversy more generally 
was an original guiding framework, what became apparent as research progressed was 
the central theme of knowledge as a critical element of the climate change debate, 
including fascinating questions regarding the instrumental use of knowledge claims 
within debates over science and policy, as well as how different individuals were 
positioned (or positioned themselves) as experts in order to hold cognitive legitimacy 
within contested domains. 
1. Introduction 
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Climate change has long been recognised as a “post-normal” problem (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993; Lorenzoni et al., 2007), with climate scientists, policy officials, politicians 
and other actors drawn into a debate that is not just about technical data and its 
myriad interpretations, but one which is also fundamentally about how knowledge 
claims interact with worldviews, risk perceptions and values (Demeritt, 2000; 
Leiserowitz, 2006; Douglas, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Douglas, 2015; Tangney and Howes, 
2015). Indeed, Demeritt (2006: 472) identifies a critical paradox whereby a neat 
separation between objective facts and contestable values is idealised in the context of 
climate change, whilst in parallel it is ‘habitually breached in ordinary practice’. This 
research therefore builds on more social constructionist ideas of knowledge (Pinch and 
Bijker, 1984; Rayner, 2012) that recognise that controversy is not about ‘an absence of 
certainty, but rather of contradictory certainties: several divergent and mutually 
irreconcilable sets of convictions both about the difficulties we face and the available 
solutions’ (Hannigan, 2006: 29, emphasis in the original). In so doing, it recognises 
both the explicit (such as the arguments expressed) and latent (such as the rationales 
and values that underpin opinions) elements at play within the climate change debate, 
as well as highlighting more liminal disputes occurring at the science-policy interface.  
 
This research is situated within a number of different academic fields, namely science 
and technology studies (STS), the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
environmental sociology and geography. It is theoretically grounded in what Collins 
and Evans (2002) refer to as the second wave of science studies as it is preoccupied not 
with what the dispute in question is, but how knowledge is both valued within 
controversial contexts and how it contributes to the formation of opinions and 
judgements. In so doing it continues the STS tradition of highlighting the ‘co-
production of scientific claims, political decisions and social order’ (Grundmann, 2009: 
399). It also aims to avoid the normative criticisms frequently observed as part of the 
climate change debate (Dunlap, 2013), and therefore does not consider or comment on 
the validity of the knowledge claims and opinions expressed by the actors involved. 
 
Key issues of attention surrounding the interplay of science and policy include theories 
of expertise, rationales for debate engagement, and how arguments and opinions are 
brought to, and framed within, contentious environments (Collins and Evans, 2002; 
Hoppe, 2005; Demeritt, 2006; Hoffman, 2011b; Knight and Greenberg, 2011; Longino, 
2013; Collins, 2014). Many of these issues, particularly definitions of expertise as well 
as the role of experts in society remain open topics of debate in both the broader social 
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science literature (Rip, 1985; Turner, 2001; Sarewitz, 2004; Stehr and Grundmann, 
2011; Nisbet and Markowitz, 2014; Pfister and Horvath, 2014; Spruijt et al., 2014; 
Evans, 2015; Lave, 2015; Turner, 2014) as well as in research directly focused on the 
topic of climate change (Grundmann, 2009; Anderegg et al., 2010; Berkhout, 2010; 
Rehg, 2011; Beck et al., 2014; Besel et al., 2012; Hess, 2014; Shapiro, 2011; Solli and 
Ryghaug, 2014). As an overarching motivation, the research contained within this 
thesis therefore aims to contribute towards wider understandings of knowledge 
utilisation, value and impact within contentious situations. 
 
 
1.2 Research aims and thesis structure 
While specific elements of the climate change debate have been extensively analysed 
within the literature, such as taxonomies of arguments opposing mainstream climate 
science1 and climate policy decisions (Rahmstorf, 2005; Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012), 
or the ways in which dispute is framed by the media (Akerlof et al., 2012; Boykoff, 
2013)2, explicit analyses of climate change as a knowledge controversy are lacking. In 
particular, there is limited understanding regarding the impact of contested knowledge 
claims on climate change science and policymaking processes, as well as the ways in 
which knowledge claims are both produced by, and resonate with different actors in 
specific contexts. At its heart therefore this research is concerned with the underlying 
epistemological basis of climate change (Forsyth, 2003) and examining the ‘politics of 
knowledge’ (Beck, 1992: 51; see also Grundmann and Stehr, 2003; Grundmann, 2007; 
Grundmann, 2013) that are inherent within the climate change debate. Such 
knowledge politics are defined by Grundmann and Stehr (2003: 184) as ‘the use of 
knowledge to advance not only specific political goals and economic interests but also 
certain norms, values and worldviews’. Building on this conceptual framework, the 
overarching aim of this thesis therefore is to investigate climate change as a knowledge 
controversy. This aim is purposefully broad in order to respond to the nature of this 
thesis as a paper-based research project (see Section 1.3 below for an explanation of 
the format of this thesis) but prioritises the core notion of knowledge as the dominant 
topic of investigation. 
 
Underneath this broad topic are myriad potential research avenues. Two sub-topics in 
particular however have been under-examined in the literature and are thus 
considered especially worthy of further attention. The first is the relationship between 
the form of the climate change debate and the value placed on particular knowledge 
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claims.  While, as noted above, much of the literature examining the climate change 
debate has focused on the communication of arguments and opinions via the media, 
several gaps exist in the literature in terms of understanding more about alternative 
knowledge networks and how the positioning of actors within knowledge 
controversies not only creates identity and positioning within particular contexts, but 
can also influence the very nature of the controversy itself. Three individual research 
papers address this sub-topic. The first asks where knowledge is contested and is 
concerned with understanding whether the location of knowledge controversy 
influences the valuing of knowledge claims. The second asks how the framing of the 
climate change debate contributes towards knowledge contestation and is specifically 
interested in the discursive labels applied to individual actors within the debate. The 
third asks how the valuing of knowledge claims contributes towards rationales for 
debate participation, or whether other rationales such as underlying values or 
motivations may play a more critical role. The second and third papers are thus 
particularly interested in the specific actors and their identities within the climate 
change debate. Together, they are also preoccupied with the polarisation that is 
evident within the climate change debate and thus seek to comment on its causes and 
potential solutions.  
 
The second sub-topic investigates the impact of knowledge contestation. While many 
attempts have been made to identify and describe the climate change debate, an 
important gap in the literature remains in terms of understanding how, if at all, 
knowledge contestation influences processes of science and policy. Two individual 
research papers address this sub-topic. The first explores the impact of knowledge 
controversy on the production of scientific knowledge, and the second investigates the 
impact of knowledge controversy on policy decision-making. Taken together, these two 
sub-topics aim to provide a multi-faceted investigation into climate change as a 
knowledge controversy, bringing to light issues directly relevant to climate change 
specifically, but also to comment more broadly and conceptually on the notion of 
knowledge controversy in general. The nested nature of the overarching aim, sub-
topics, and specific research questions is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Research aims 
 
In order to answer these research questions, this thesis is composed of seven chapters 
divided into four main parts (Table 1.1). Part 1 comprises this chapter and provides an 
introduction to, and an outline of, this thesis. It presents the analytical framework of 
knowledge contestation which underpins this research and discusses the original 
contribution to knowledge of each individual paper comprising this thesis. 
 
Table 1.1: Thesis structure 
Part Focus Chapter and paper title 
1 Introducing this thesis and the overarching 
analytical framework of knowledge 
controversy that guides the constituent 
chapters 
1. Introduction 
2 The relationship between the form of the 
climate change debate and the value placed on 
particular knowledge claims: 
- Where is knowledge contested? 
2. Mapping the climate sceptical 
blogosphere 
- How does the framing of the climate 
change debate contribute towards 
contestation?  
3. Labelling opinions in the climate 
debate: A critical review 
- How does the valuing of knowledge 
claims contribute towards rationales for 
debate participation? 
4. Climate stories: Why do climate 
scientists and sceptical voices 
participate in the climate debate? 
3 The impact of knowledge contestation: 
- How does knowledge controversy impact 
the production of scientific knowledge? 
5. The impact of controversy on the 
production of scientific knowledge 
- How does knowledge controversy impact 
policy decision-making? 
6. Post-decisional logics of inaction: 
The impact of climate controversy 
on policy decision-making 
4 Critical discussion of, and conclusion to, this 
thesis 
7. Conclusion 
Overarching aim:  
To investigate climate change as a knowledge controversy 
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Chapter 2: Mapping the climate sceptical blogosphere, presents the first of the five 
individual research papers collated together to form this thesis and focuses on 
understanding where knowledge is contested in the climate change debate. It identifies 
a gap in the literature in terms of what is known about alternative networks of 
scientific knowledge production, i.e. those beyond the realm of mainstream science. In 
the context of climate change, online sources are regarded as particularly relevant sites 
of alternative knowledge production (Schäfer, 2012). Accordingly, this paper identifies 
and critically examines the climate sceptical blogosphere and investigates whether a 
focus on particular themes contributes to the positioning of the most central blogs. It 
identifies a network of 171 individual blogs and finds that the most central blogs 
predominantly focus on the scientific element of the climate change debate. The paper 
suggests that not only is this overt scientific framing a key factor in the positioning of 
these central blogs, but that in so doing, they are also acting as alternative public sites 
of expertise for a climate sceptical audience. It is innovative methodologically in its 
application of social network analysis to the online climate change debate, as well as 
empirically by not only identifying the climate sceptical blogosphere, but also 
examining its role as a public site of knowledge contestation. It thus contributes 
directly to the nascent literature on the role of virtual spaces as key sites of alternative 
knowledge production as well as to wider discussions regarding the types of 
knowledge considered valuable within public scientific controversies.  
 
Chapter 3: Labelling opinions in the climate debate: A critical review, investigates how 
the framing of the climate change debate contributes to debate polarisation and 
contestation and argues for a re-conceptualisation of how labels are used within this 
context. A substantial amount of academic research has been directed towards 
identifying and categorising different perspectives on climate change. However, a 
comprehensive literature review of both the form of these climate opinion labels, such 
as how terms including “sceptic” or “alarmist” become attributed to holders of different 
knowledge claims, as well as their impact in terms of framing the climate change 
debate, was missing from the literature. This paper identifies the existing labelling 
constructs presented in the academic literature, including the ways in which 
researchers have aimed to better understand particular categories of labels such as 
dividing the overarching category of climate scepticism into more detailed taxonomies, 
or via the use of new labels. In addition to this critical literature review, the key original 
contribution to knowledge provided by this paper is its assessment of the ways in 
which these labelling constructs, both in terms of their use in academic contexts and in 
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their broader use within science and policy debates, are reflecting and helping to frame 
the climate change debate as antagonistic and combative. It suggests that the use of and 
unique emphasis on labels within the climate change debate is accentuating 
polarisation and diverting attention away from a focus on the motivations underlying 
different knowledge claims which is argued to be more conducive towards encouraging 
constructive dialogue. 
 
Chapter 4: Climate stories: Why do climate scientists and sceptical voices participate in 
the climate debate?, investigates how the valuing of knowledge claims contributes 
towards rationales for debate participation. It presents results from 22 interviews with 
climate scientists and sceptical voices3 on their experience within the climate change 
debate. It is empirically novel as it actively includes the direct perspectives of sceptical 
voices active in the climate change debate, rather than solely theorising about their 
rationales and opinions. It is also methodologically novel in its use of a visual spectrum 
onto which interviewees placed their own opinion and their perspective of the 
opinions of others. Several overlapping rationales are identified across climate 
scientists’ and sceptical voices’ opinions and experiences, including a sense of duty to 
publicly engage, agreement that complete certainty about the complex assemblage of 
climate change is unattainable, and that political factors are a central focus in the 
climate change debate. It provides a critical analysis of the motivations behind the 
different actors’ experiences and suggests areas where self-reflexivity, as well as 
identifying common motivations, may engender dialogue across areas of both scientific 
and political debate. Through the use of narrative interview methods and the 
subsequent identification of commonalities, it also directly contributes towards 
understandings of strategies to diffuse antagonism and polarisation within 
controversial situations. 
 
Chapter 5: The impact of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge, is the 
first of the two papers investigating the impact of knowledge contestation. While 
controversy is recognised as influencing the science-policy interface, a significant gap 
in the literature exists regarding how controversy may fundamentally shape the 
production of scientific knowledge itself. In other words, while there have been several 
attempts to describe the disagreements that comprise the climate change debate, scant 
attention has been given to the fundamental question of whether this knowledge 
controversy actually matters. Accordingly, this paper focuses on both the impact of 
controversy on scientific practice and on scientific agency, defined respectively as 
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agency in the choice and employment of the ‘material practices that embody the work 
of doing science’ (Roosth and Silbey, 2009: 459, emphasis in the original). Based on 
interviews with 63 climate scientists, sceptical voices and others, it finds that whereas 
the majority of climate scientists do not consider sceptical voices to have an impact on 
scientific practice, the vast majority do identify impacts on scientific agency. The most 
commonly identified agency-related impact is increased caution, followed by 
disruption, a greater focus on communication, defensiveness and reluctance to publicly 
engage. Using Gieryn’s (1983; 1999) concept of boundary work, the paper argues that 
the ability of scientists to distinguish between impacts on agency and practice is a 
performative process to maintain the epistemic authority of science (specifically, the 
outputs of scientific practice) as a distinct form of knowledge production. It also 
suggests that this delineation can be seen as a function of controversy, with the greater 
the impact of controversy, the less fluid and contingent the boundary between the two. 
This paper is theoretically novel as it provides a conceptual extension to Gieryn’s 
theory, namely that boundary work may be understood as a more active and explicit 
process under conditions of public scientific controversy as scientists work to ensure 
the independence and unassailability of their cognitive authority in contested domains. 
In addition to uncovering the specific impacts experienced by climate scientists, it 
provides an important contribution to knowledge by providing a conceptual 
framework identifying the ways in which controversy may influence the scientific 
knowledge production process, focusing on the responses of individual scientists.  
 
Chapter 6: Post-decisional logics of inaction: The impact of climate controversy on 
policy decision-making, aims to understand how knowledge controversy impacts 
policy decision-making. Combining the frameworks of knowledge controversy and 
Puchala’s (1975) post-decisional politics, it identifies an important gap in the literature 
in terms of understanding how controversy may influence policy implementation. 
Thus, related to the work carried out in Chapter 5, it asks does knowledge controversy 
actually matter to policy decision-making? Emphasis has traditionally been placed on 
understanding the impact of controversy at the moment of policy development, but this 
research identifies place-based post-decisional logics of inaction that impact the post-
implementation effectiveness of climate change policy in two case study locations, New 
Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK). Based on thematic coding of interviews 
with 99 politicians, policy officials, climate scientists, sceptical voices and others, it 
finds distinct and highly-context specific post-decisional logics of inaction occurring in 
each location. In NZ, the protection of the country’s current national economic interest 
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is the overwhelmingly dominant post-decisional logic of inaction, whereas in the UK 
scientifically-based arguments are found to be an influential feature of the policy 
environment. Potential explanations for the continued cognitive authority of 
scientifically-based contestation in the UK include the comparatively higher value of 
science as an input to policymaking as well as the ability for scientifically-based 
arguments to be politically resonant due to political economy considerations. This 
paper makes three key contributions. First, and fundamentally, it identifies how 
knowledge controversy may impact public decision-making processes. Second, 
whereas much of the literature on contentious politics generalises from studies carried 
out in the United States of America (USA) this research emphasises the importance of 
being attentive to both the temporal and spatial nuances of how policy can be subtly 
undermined in the post-implementation phase in different geographic contexts. Third, 
the introduction of the concept of post-decisional logics of inaction unpacks the 
dynamics of policy implementation and highlights the strongly post-decisional nature 
of climate change policy in particular. 
 
Finally, the conclusion provided in Chapter 7 presents the main findings of this thesis 
as a whole. It summarises and critically discusses each of the five papers presented in 
Chapters 2-6 and then presents the key cross-cutting conclusions arising from this 
research. It also identifies limitations and associated avenues for further research. 
 
 
1.2.1 Research location 
A key starting premise for this research was that controversy about climate change 
may be understood as a largely Anglo-Saxon phenomenon (Painter, 2011). This is not 
to say that debates about climate change science and policy do not exist in other 
contexts; indeed, recent research has demonstrated its existence more widely 
(Austgulen and Sto, 2013; Soentgen and Bilandzic, 2014; Kaiser and Rhomberg, 2015; 
Liu, 2015). However, the visible antagonism that has been well-documented in Anglo-
Saxon countries (Antilla, 2005; McCright and Dunlap, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 
2011a; McCright and Dunlap, 2011b; Young and Coutinho, 2013) provides a strong 
rationale for basing this research within a similar domain. Accordingly, the entirety of 
the research for this thesis was carried out using English-language academic literature, 
online information (such as blog posts) and other texts, and the interviews used in the 
research presented in Chapters 4-6 occurred in NZ and the UK.  
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Two case study locations were chosen to aid in the triangulation of the perspectives 
gathered (Stake, 2005) but also, in Chapters 5 and 6, to provide opportunities for 
comparative analysis. Ragin (1987) suggests that the aim of most comparative studies 
is to provide historically interpretive and/or causally analytic accounts. Chapters 5 and 
6 respond to both aims, using the framework of a comparative case study both because 
of the ‘intrinsic value’ (1987: 35) accorded by a historically-attentive investigation that 
is sensitive to context, but also because of the ability it provides to suggest why 
particular conditions arise in particular geographic contexts.  
 
NZ and the UK were chosen for four main reasons, the first three of which arise from 
key similarities found in both contexts. First, both locations are considered to have 
active debate about climate change (Painter, 2011; Sibley and Kurz, 2013; Tranter and 
Booth, 2015), yet are (respectively) under-examined compared to other comparable 
locations such as the USA or Australia (McCright and Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes and 
Conway, 2010; Buettner, 2012; Dunlap and McCright, 2015). Second, both have 
recently been home to important events in the climate change debate. In the UK in 
2009, more than 1,000 emails and documents were released without authorisation 
from the University of East Anglia immediately prior to the 2009 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in an event known 
colloquially as “Climategate”. This event has been well examined in the literature 
(Nerlich, 2010; Ryghaug and Skjolsvold, 2010; Ravetz, 2011; Koteyko et al., 2012; 
Grundmann, 2012; Skrydstrup, 2013; Leiserowitz et al., 2013) and so while it is not the 
central focus of this research, serves as an important contributory factor to the analysis 
undertaken. In NZ in 2010, a group called the NZ Climate Science Coalition (NZCSC) 
formed the NZ Climate Science Education Trust (NZCSET) and took a case in the NZ 
High Court seeking to invalidate the official NZ temperature record. The judgement and 
costs were made against the NZCSET. Very limited analyses of this event have occurred 
to date in the literature (Hardcastle, 2014) and so the research contained within this 
thesis is an important contribution towards understanding its implications. Third, both 
countries have implemented major climate change policies which have been subject to 
public criticism (Bullock, 2012; Lockwood, 2013; Mason, 2013). In the UK the 2008 
Climate Change Act mandates an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
compared to 1990 levels by 2050 and in NZ, the 2008 Climate Change Response 
(Emissions Trading) Amendment Act established an all-sectors, all-gases emissions 
trading scheme. Finally, as this research is partly concerned with the implementation 
of policy, pre-existing networks within the policy environments of both countries were 
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able to be exploited in order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding 
of actual decision-making processes undertaken (Duke, 2002). 
 
 
1.3 Notes on thesis format 
This thesis follows the route of providing a set of publishable-quality papers on a set of 
related topics, framed by an original introduction, critical discussion and conclusion. 
For theses where co-authored work is included, the requirements of the Department of 
Geography and Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
state that a minimum of two single-authored papers, plus at least two jointly-authored 
papers (to which the candidate has made a major contribution), are required. Chapters 
2 and 5 are single-authored papers. Chapters 3 and 4 are co-authored with Dr Candice 
Howarth with each author contributing 50% of the work of each paper. Chapter 6 is co-
authored with Dr Richard Perkins, with Dr Perkins contributing 50% of the work of the 
paper. Chapters 2 and 3 have been published and are also referred to within this thesis 
as Sharman (2014), and Howarth and Sharman (2015). Chapter 4 has been published 
as a working paper and is also referred to within this thesis as Sharman and Howarth 
(2015). 
 
Where relevant, the text, figures and tables in each published paper remain as 
published, notwithstanding small editorial changes such as updates to spelling, figure 
numbering or citation formats to provide a coherent format throughout this thesis as a 
single document. References are presented at the end of each chapter.  
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The overarching goal of this thesis is to investigate climate change as a knowledge 
controversy. In order to achieve this goal, the form, value and impact of contested 
knowledge in the climate change debate are addressed, with five separate research 
papers exploring different yet interrelated elements within this overarching area of 
focus. It provides an original contribution to knowledge by identifying previously 
unknown sites of knowledge contestation within the climate change debate, in addition 
to contributory factors, and potential solutions to, debate polarisation. It also addresses 
a fundamental gap in the literature regarding the impact of controversy on the 
production of scientific knowledge and policy decision-making. The following five 
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chapters present each individual research paper, followed by a critical discussion of 
and conclusion to this thesis as a whole in Chapter 7. 
 
 
1.5 Notes 
1. Mainstream climate science is defined the scientific position on climate change as 
expressed in the fourth and fifth assessment reports of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2007; IPCC 2013).  
2. In recognition of its vital role as a conduit between publics, scientists and 
policymakers, a vast and expanding literature investigates the role of the media in 
contributing to public opinion about climate change (Moser, 2010; Elsasser and 
Dunlap, 2013; Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014; Boykoff, 2014; Dahl, 2014; 
Poberezhskaya, 2014; Schmidt et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2014). This thesis recognises 
the important contribution of communications-based studies to examine climate 
change controversy, and aims to build on their findings by examining how other 
complementary factors such as language or direct interactions within the political 
process may influence climate change science and policy processes. 
3. “Sceptical voice” is used in an attempt to move away from the problematic labelling 
constructs evident in the climate debate. The emphasis on the idea of a “voice” re-
focuses on the human (the “who” someone is, rather than the “what”) whilst also 
recognising the need for a pragmatic descriptor. 
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Chapter 2. Mapping the climate sceptical 
blogosphere 
2 Section 
Abstract 
While mainstream scientific knowledge production has been extensively examined in 
the academic literature, comparatively little is known about alternative networks of 
scientific knowledge production. Online sources such as blogs are an especially under-
investigated site of knowledge contestation. Using degree centrality and node 
betweenness tests from social network analysis, and thematic content analysis of 
individual posts, this research identifies and critically examines the climate sceptical 
blogosphere and investigates whether a focus on particular themes contributes to the 
positioning of the most central blogs. A network of 171 individual blogs is identified, 
with three blogs in particular found to be the most central: Climate Audit, JoNova and 
Watts Up With That. These blogs predominantly focus on the scientific element of the 
climate debate, providing either a direct scientifically-based challenge to mainstream 
climate science, or a critique of the conduct of the climate science system. This overt 
scientific framing, as opposed to explicitly highlighting differences in values, politics, or 
ideological worldview, appears to be an important contributory factor in the 
positioning of the most central blogs. It is suggested that these central blogs are key 
protagonists in a process of attempted expert knowledge de-legitimisation and 
contestation, acting not only as translators between scientific research and lay 
audiences, but, in their reinterpretation of existing climate science knowledge claims, 
are acting themselves as alternative public sites of expertise for a climate sceptical 
audience.  
 
Keywords: climate scepticism, knowledge, network, blog, social network analysis 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Outside the paradigm of mainstream climate science, and particularly in online 
environments, the validity of an accepted body of research underlying the scientific 
case for anthropogenic climate change (defined here as agreement with Section 2 
(Causes of change) of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007) is 
actively disputed (Jacques et al., 2008; Poortinga et al., 2011; Washington and Cook, 
2011; Corner et al., 2012; Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012). Arguments that may be 
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considered as “climate sceptical” include, inter alia, that climate science is factually 
incorrect in terms of its scientific basis, a conspiracy among scientists to maintain or 
increase funding opportunities, or a politically-based rationale to increase regulation 
or taxes (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). This debate about climate science, as well as 
controversy regarding mitigation or adaptation policies, provides fertile ground for 
blogs. While most previous research has focused on the expression of climate 
scepticism in traditional media outlets (Antilla, 2005; Hoffman, 2011b; Painter and 
Ashe, 2012), this research contributes towards the small but growing body of literature 
addressing the role of virtual spaces in climate sceptical knowledge production (Gavin 
and Marshall, 2011; Koteyko et al., 2012; Cormick, 2011). It maps the climate sceptical 
blogosphere and uses social network analysis (SNA) to identify those blogs which are 
the most central within the overall blog network. It also uses thematic analysis to 
understand why those blogs identified as the most central occupy such positions of 
importance.  
 
Over a decade ago, Rogers and Marres (2000) mapped the online climate change 
debate issue network, focusing on websites with URLs ending with .org or .gov. 
However, this analysis excluded the then nascent field of blogs (internet pages 
comprising a series of entries or chunks of information known as posts, most often 
arranged in reverse chronological order, either authored by a single author known as a 
“blogger” or by multiple contributors (Bar-Ilan, 2005)). In 2000 there were fewer than 
30,000 blogs in the United States of America (USA), but by 2005 this had increased to 
over 5.3 million (Hsu and Lin, 2008) and by 2011, there were an estimated 181 million 
blogs globally (NM Incite, 2012) (please note that due to the lack of a single time-series 
record of global blog numbers, these statistics are not directly comparable). 
Technorati, a blog search engine and directory, estimates there to be approximately 
16,300 science blogs worldwide (Technorati, 2013); however how these blogs are 
categorised as such is unknown. Furthermore, there appears to be no publicly available 
count of the total number of blogs addressing climate change (regardless of 
perspective). As a result, little is known about the climate sceptical blogosphere. The 
blogosphere—a ‘densely interconnected conversation’ (Herring et al., 2005: 1)—is the 
network of blogs and their linkages to one another, such as through hyperlinks, 
references to other blogs or bloggers within posts, or by commenting on others’ blogs. 
Climate sceptics are perceived to be ‘very present online and particularly in the 
blogosphere’ (Schäfer, 2012: 529) yet this perception has yet to be adequately 
addressed with empirical research. Understanding blogs as sites of knowledge 
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formation and contestation is critical because, as Hsu and Lin (2008: 65) note, blogs 
can ‘attract tremendous attention and exert great influence on society’, resonating with 
different groups according to their content, format and authorship (Bar-Ilan, 2005). 
Furthermore, while blogs may have low overall visitor numbers as compared to 
traditional media outlets such as television news or radio broadcasts, their relatively 
high readership by so-called ‘elite’ actors such as journalists enables a much higher 
penetration of blog-generated or transmitted ideas to the general public than may 
otherwise be expected (Farrell and Drezner, 2008). For example, in a study of 300 
journalists, Dautrich and Barnes (2005a; 2005b) find that 83% reported having used 
blogs (with 41% reporting using them at least once per week) as compared to only 7% 
of the general population. 
 
Focusing on the blogosphere as a network also enables key sites of influence to be 
identified and to understand whether information or viewpoints are widely generated 
and dispersed, or shaped by a smaller number of attitudinal influencers. As blogs 
become an increasingly important contributor to public discourse (Carlson, 2007) and 
inspire reflection on the use of knowledge in decision-making (Ravetz, 2012), 
identifying the main sites of sceptical opinion formation and the arguments employed 
is also valuable to those engaged in science communication or climate policy decision-
making. Finally, this paper aims to make a wider contribution to the literature on 
alternative knowledge networks by highlighting the potentially significant role of 
central blogs as knowledge gatekeepers, and also how attempts are made to disrupt 
traditional understandings of how knowledge is both formed and accepted as 
legitimate. 
 
 
2.2 Knowledge, networks and contestation 
Traditional frameworks of scientific knowledge production limited its creation to 
official spaces such as universities, and as the domain of those who were formally 
qualified as arbiters of knowledge by virtue of their academic credentials (Martin and 
Richards, 1995). These actors, closely networked within small epistemic communities 
of practice, were perceived as creating scientific knowledge that was ‘objective and 
context-free’ (Wynne, 1992: 282), with a clear distinction between the legitimacy of 
the knowledge created by the scientist and the ‘man-in-the-street’ [sic] (Merton, 1973 
[1942]: 277). Insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge have challenged these 
frameworks, with theories such as Mode-2 knowledge production or post-normal 
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science explaining that knowledge is created across multiple sites and by multiple 
actors (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2003). 
Crompton (2007) explains that these new knowledge networks involve the public 
speaking back to science, creating new public arenas (“agoras”) where scientific 
information is contested to make it more socially robust. The climate sceptical 
blogosphere, as a site of active knowledge contestation, could therefore be understood 
as a (virtual) site of Mode-2 knowledge production. Indeed, Donald (2011) suggests 
that, by understanding climate science as post-normal, networks of contrarian bloggers 
may also be understood as new types of global advocacy networks. However, it is 
unclear whether the blogosphere is a “functioning” agora as Crompton suggests is the 
case in her description of the orphan drug network. The mutual learning necessary for 
a functioning agora where the ‘public [is] accepted as a legitimate partner exerting 
democratic rights of participation’ (Crompton, 2007: 201) appears to be less apparent 
overall in the case of climate change, with Hoffman (2011b: 9) identifying a ‘logic 
schism’ between different actors in the debate, across which dialogue is extremely 
difficult. Climate scepticism, as a challenge to mainstream climate science and policy, 
does not reflect ‘an absence of certainty, but rather of contradictory certainties: several 
divergent and mutually irreconcilable sets of convictions both about the difficulties we 
face and the available solutions’ (Hannigan, 2006: 29, emphasis in the original). As well 
as policy choices, scientific evidence itself is actively disputed, with, for example, 
knowledge claims presented within the climate debate as either “sound” or “junk” 
science (McCright and Dunlap, 2003). Sound science emerged as a term during the 
early 2000s bovine spongiform encephalopathy health scare in the USA when 
scientific—instead of economic—rationales were employed to defend policy responses. 
Evidence that does not fit the desired policy frame is conversely labelled as “junk 
science”, although critics using the sound science argument often refer to incomplete 
data and scenario modelling (two things inherent to climate science) as key elements 
of junk science, rather than engaging in a direct debate about the quality of the extant 
data itself. As McGarity (2003-2004: 901) argues, ‘stripped of their rhetorical flourish, 
“junk science” means “their science” and “sound science” means “our science”’.  
 
In contrast to controversies such as the health impacts of tobacco smoking which is no 
longer widely publicly disputed, the more scientifically abstract nature of climate 
science and its inherently values-laden character means that scientific evidence alone 
is inadequate to drive policy decision-making (Hulme, 2009). Hoffman (2011a) argues 
that the climate debate may have entered into the realm of what Pielke Jr. (2007) coins 
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“abortion politics”, that is, a situation where no amount of scientific information can 
reconcile the different values held on a certain topic. This is in contrast to the “rational-
instrument” approach whereby science is seen as providing ‘verifiable facts about 
reality on which rational policy decisions can be based’ (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 100) and 
which would suggest that climate change could be resolved by systematically 
uncovering factual knowledge. It is important to recognise that the range of potential 
policy responses to climate change each hold deeply embedded ideological 
implications, with Hoffman (2011a: 3) providing the example of attendees at a climate 
sceptics’ conference in 2010 stating that ‘the issue isn’t the issue’; instead, that ‘climate 
change is just another attempt to diminish our freedom’. 
 
While the academic literature to date has mainly focused on the manifestation of 
climate scepticism in the mainstream media (Boykoff, 2007; Schmidt et al., 2013), little 
work has been done to understand why climate sceptical blogs exist and what their 
role may be as public sites of knowledge contestation. Several elements are relevant to 
consider, including conflict over the legitimacy of the public’s ability to contribute valid 
climate change knowledge, particularly where it disputes mainstream climate science 
(Douglas, 2009), mistrust by some regarding the data and methods used to create 
climate predictions (exemplified by the “Climategate” controversy, where more than 
1000 emails and documents were stolen or leaked from the University of East Anglia in 
2009), or a desire for greater transparency overall in the scientific process (Nerlich, 
2010). The notion of knowledge networks under Mode-2 conditions provides a 
particularly useful analytical framework, as the production of knowledge and 
specifically, its reproduction by different actors in a network helps to identify which 
types of information are most relevant to a particular debate, as well as showing how 
framing and sources contribute to knowledge legitimacy. For example, Kahan et al. 
(2011) suggest that even the perception of whether a scientific consensus exists on a 
certain topic is determined by both the source of the information in question, and the 
side upon which consensus forms. This flow of knowledge enables the creation of what 
Cope and Kalantzis (2009: 5) term ‘dispersed communities of expertise’, with the 
format of online networks in particular promoting near instant feedback on knowledge 
claims (Koteyko et al., 2012).  
 
Furthermore, while the ways in which mainstream science and policy is organised and 
interact have been the subject of considerable attention (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; 
McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Berryman, 2006; Daviter, 2007), correspondingly little is 
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known about contemporary online sites of knowledge contestation and how this 
knowledge is created and disseminated across virtual space. These new sites of 
knowledge (re)production that blogs embody are important to address because they 
facilitate ‘a shift in the balance of textual agency between the author and reader’ (Cope 
and Kalantzis, 2009: 6) by enabling contested knowledge to be freely circulated, and to 
act as direct challengers to “official” expertise. While it is possible that these climate 
sceptical blogs are not making a significant impact on public discourse outside the 
online environment, this seems unlikely, as blogs are increasingly recognised as 
important contributors to the public climate change debate (Guimaraes, 2012). Blogs’ 
low entry barriers compared to peer-reviewed journals, which are generally too 
expensive to access for non-institutional readers (Harnad, 1998) or written in an 
overly obtuse or technical style (Culler and Lamb, 2003; Eagle et al., 2012), may also 
give them a unique position as a mediator of public discourse.  
 
 
2.3 A networked blogosphere 
As a tool to express opinions and disseminate ideas, blogs are an increasingly popular 
online phenomenon (Wei Lai, 2009), particularly given the rise of free blogging 
platforms which require little technological know-how (Hookway, 2008). 
Blogospheres, as networked user communities, contribute to the creation of attitudes 
and transfer of information and ideas (Tremayne et al., 2006; Tremayne, 2007; Bruns 
et al., 2011; Etling et al., 2010; Moe, 2011). However, while individual blogs have been 
recognised as significant disseminators of knowledge, particularly knowledge which 
may be deemed partisan (Lowrey, 2006), comparatively little work has been 
undertaken that examines these sites of knowledge contestation as a networked whole.  
 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a useful method to examine blogospheres as it 
provides a coherent mechanism to interrogate their structure. For example, the use of 
links between blogs enables the connectedness of the blogosphere to be explicitly 
mapped (see Herring et al., 2005: for a more detailed discussion of the merits of SNA in 
analysing blogospheres). A social network may be thought of as a ‘collection of social 
actors and their interconnections… [which] consists of nodes (social actors) and links 
between the nodes (the interconnections)’ (Sun and Qiu, 2008: 1769). SNA is used to 
analyse these links, emphasising the interconnections between actors rather than the 
characteristics of the actors themselves (Borgatti et al., 2009). Centrality is a core 
concept within SNA, with a variety of approaches (such as degree, closeness or 
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betweenness) used to measure ‘the locations of individuals in terms of how close they 
are to the “center” of the action in a network’ (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: 147). 
Those nodes in particularly central positions are also understood in SNA as potentially 
powerful, with power in this context existing as a result of the advantageous position of 
a node in comparison to others. While the ‘question of how structural position [i.e. 
centrality] confers power remains a topic of active research and considerable debate’ 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: 168), this research will follow the lead of Brass (1984: 
520) who argues that, ‘actors or units occupying central positions in a network are 
viewed as potentially powerful because of their greater access to and possible control 
over relevant resources’. This focus on centrality is particularly relevant to the study of 
a blogosphere, as it enables a focus on those blogs most likely to play a role as pivotal 
sites of opinion formation and reinforcement.  
 
In addition to centrality, clustering is also argued to be an important characteristic of a 
blogosphere (Watts, 1999; Barabási et al., 2000; Newman et al., 2002) whereby 
relationships are indicated by bloggers linking to or commenting on others’ blogs, or 
via the existence of “blog-rolls” which are links to other blogs displayed on either the 
home-page or links page of a blog (Adamic and Glance, 2005). Bruns et al. explain the 
importance of blog-roll links: 
Patterns of interlinkage between contemporaneous blog-rolls indicate the 
existence of a long-term network of recognition between peers. Sites with many 
incoming and outgoing links may be understood as hubs for communication in 
this network; sites with many incoming, but limited outgoing links may be 
understood as central sources for information; sites with many outgoing but few 
incoming links may be understood as (not necessarily central) distributors of 
attention to other members of the network (2008: 3, emphasis in the original).  
 
Blog-rolls indicate long-term connectivity between bloggers, as opposed to a link found 
within a single post, and can also be understood as an indicator of ideological closeness 
or shared interest (Caiani and Wagemann, 2009). The number of incoming versus 
outgoing linkages is interesting, as those blogs with ‘a high number of incoming 
links…can be understood as the most respected blogs in the overall population’ (Bruns 
et al., 2008: 6), whereas those blogs with many incoming and outgoing links are 
important hubs within the network, playing a role as connector nodes, and thus 
contributing to a tight-knit cluster formation (Sun and Qiu, 2008). Rogers (2012) 
argues that these incoming links may serve as an indicator of reputation and, what he 
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terms as the “politics of association”. That is, blogs will only link to others with whom 
they want to be associated in an effort to create a coherent group (Niederer, 2013). 
 
Also of relevance is the user community’s perception of the credibility of the 
information contained and shared within the blogosphere. This is particularly 
important to climate sceptical blogs providing an alternative explanation to 
mainstream climate science (as opposed to blogs focusing on, for example, climate 
change policy choices). In a survey of over 3,700 readers of more than 60 blogs of 
diverse content, Johnson and Kaye (2004) found that nearly three-quarters considered 
blogs “moderately” to “very” credible sources of information, with their particular 
strength being the provision of in-depth information. Readers did however 
acknowledge that the accuracy and neutrality of blogs may be questionable, with half 
the respondents judging blogs as either “somewhat” or “not very” accurate or fair (this 
is a significantly lower assessment of credibility than that perceived of Wikipedia 
entries, as found by Chesney, 2006). Yet Johnson and Kaye argue that this does not 
appear to be inherently problematic as blog readers tend to seek out information to 
support their own views (Kahan et al., 2011), and as Hsu and Lin (2008) propose, 
bloggers themselves are blogging because they want to share their own opinions and 
influence others by the knowledge they provide.  
 
 
2.4 Method 
A multi-stage process was followed in order to a) map the climate sceptical 
blogosphere, b) identify the most central blogs, and c) understand why the most 
central blogs occupy such positions of importance. This section explains the 
blogosphere mapping process, with Section 2.5 discussing the SNA tests and Section 
2.6 outlining the thematic content analysis. 
 
To identify the population of climate sceptical blogs, the search string “climate blog” 
was entered into WebCrawler, with the initial 12 pages of results used as the basis 
from which all further blogs were identified via a snowball method using blog-roll 
links. WebCrawler is an integrated online metasearch engine combining Google Search 
and Yahoo! Search results. At the time of research, it also included Microsoft’s Bing 
Search. A metasearch engine was chosen in order to obtain the most comprehensive 
search results possible, as it combines the results from multiple search engines into a 
single  output (Lawrence and Giles, 1999). Inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
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implemented in order to create a coherent dataset, with all blogs identified and 
assessed manually to ensure only relevant blogs were identified (Heath et al., 2009). 
First, the blog had to identify itself as a blog about climate change, either through use of 
the term “climate” or “global warming” in the title, or through substantive discussion in 
posts. Substantive was determined as at least 50% or more of the blog’s content and 
was assessed in two ways. If tags were allocated to a post, a frequency analysis was 
undertaken and if 50% or more of the posts were tagged as “climate change” or similar, 
it was added to the network. Where tags were not present or were ambiguous, the first 
five pages of each blog were analysed using content analysis to determine whether 
50% or more of the posts could be categorised as climate change-related. While this 
coding process is inherently subjective, it did not limit the rigour of the analysis as this 
process of ‘recognizing (seeing) an important moment and encoding it (seeing it as 
something) prior to a process of interpretation’ (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 
83) was based on an extensive grounding in the climate change literature. 37 blogs 
were excluded for not having climate change as majority content, including political 
blogs such as the Australian TEA Party or weather blogs such as the UK’s Met Office 
News Blog. 
 
Second, the blog had to be identified as climate sceptical. This was determined by 
individual assessment of each blog’s content insofar as it employed language which 
agreed with Rahmstorf’s (2005) typology of trend, attribution or impact climate 
scepticism. As Painter (2011: 54) explains, trend sceptics are ‘those who say global 
temperatures are not warming’, while attribution sceptics are ‘those who say they 
[global temperatures] are warming, but argue that the anthropogenic contribution to 
global warming or climate change is over-stated, negligible, or non-existent compared 
to other factors like natural variations or sun spots’ and impact sceptics are ‘those who 
accept it is happening but for different reasons question its impacts or the need to do 
something about it’. While this was clearly evident in most cases, a categorisation 
system became a necessary addition in order to distinguish between types of blogs, as 
there was a marked difference in language employed. Two categories were developed: 
openly sceptical (category 1) and self-proclaimed “open-minded” (category 2). For 
example, compare the following excerpts in Table 2.1 from Climate etc., a category 2 
blog authored by Judith Curry (Georgia Institute of Technology) and GORE LIED, a 
category 1 blog authored under the pseudonym “The Editor”, based in Oregon, USA. In 
the GORE LIED excerpts, the phrase ‘the foundation for anthropogenic global warming 
is fraudulent’ and the suggestion of climate scientists and policy-makers personally 
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profiting from the existence of climate change clearly identifies it as a category 1 blog. 
Conversely, in the Climate etc. excerpt, the discussion of the need for greater causal 
investigation into the scientific factors behind the physical manifestation of climate 
change is markedly different in tone, hence its classification as a category 2 blog.  
 
Table 2.1: Category 1 and 2 language 
Blog About Post excerpt 
Climate 
etc. 
‘Climate Etc. provides a forum for climate 
researchers, academics and technical 
experts from other fields, citizen 
scientists, and the interested public to 
engage in a discussion on topics related to 
climate science and the science-policy 
interface.’ 
‘In the case of main stream climate 
science, the physical mechanism for 
climate change is clearly posited as 
arising from external forcing: solar, 
volcanoes, anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases and aerosols. However, climate 
scientists have not racked their brains 
anywhere near hard enough to come up 
with other causal explanations. The 
main outstanding causal explanation 
that has been neglected is internal 
natural variability of the coupled 
ocean/atmosphere system.’ 
 
(Pseudoscience?, 20 March 2012) 
GORE 
LIED 
‘The main point here at GORE LIED is that 
Al Gore lied about anthropogenic global 
warming. It’s pretty simple. I repeat that 
often, and prove it over and over. While 
that is my main quest, I also hope to 
entertain you along the way…The 
Climategate scandal has proved that the 
data that comprised the foundation for 
anthropogenic global warming is 
fraudulent, and as a result has tainted 
virtually every other study, conclusion, 
and public policy “solution” that had been 
produced or proposed. Therefore, GORE 
LIED firmly believes that Al Gore, and any 
other scientists or governmental officials 
that continue to fan the flames of man-
made global warming alarmism to stoke 
public support for “solutions” that prove 
to enrich them in money or power be held 
legally liable for foisting a fraud on the 
public.’ 
‘Joe Romm asks his readers, “What are 
you doing to prepare for climate 
impacts?” The beneficial-molecule-
fearing Rommulans obediently reply in 
droves. One particular comment from 
a warmist blogger goes a bit beyond the 
question Romm posed, and predicts a 
very dark solution for an imagined 
future climate hell: 
 
I’ll also predict that laws permitting 
euthanasia will become commonplace in 
about two decades. The world will have 
to choose between keeping the old and 
ill fed and alive, and keeping the young 
and fit fed and alive. (Hopefully I’m 
exaggerating slightly in the second 
sentence, but maybe not.) 
 
So, he might be exaggerating a bit about 
the choice of exactly who to euthanize, 
but he’s not exaggerating about the 
actual euthanasia itself. 
 
Some of these people have lost their 
minds.’  
 
(Climate death panels? Warmist blogger 
predicts ‘laws permitting euthanasia will 
become commonplace in about two 
decades’, 28 February 2012) 
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Third, the blog had to present new content, thus excluding three blogs that collated 
posts originally published elsewhere such as Climate Depot. Fourth, it had to present 
itself in a blog format, requiring elements typical to a blog such as post headings, dates, 
tags, and contributing author identification (Bar-Ilan, 2005). This excluded 57 
websites. Fifth and finally, four blogs were excluded because they were not written 
predominantly in English. This is a recognised limitation of this research, as the 
presence of non-English language blogs in the identified network, and an unknown 
number of non-English language blogs that were not identified via blog-roll links, 
constitute a missing space of unknown size. However, this research is predominantly 
interested in English language blogs, building on previous research in the 
communication of climate scepticism which emphasises the Anglo-American or Anglo-
Saxon nature of the phenomenon (Painter, 2011; Niederer, 2013). Six blogs were 
retired or appeared inactive, yet were included in the network as potential sources of 
static information. A blog containing pornographic images as well as climate sceptical 
posts was excluded, despite being linked to by several other blogs. Three parody blogs 
which purported to be climate sceptical, but on closer investigation were actually 
satirical in nature, were also excluded from the dataset such as The Climate Scum. 
 
To carry out the SNA, a one-mode network adjacency matrix was created based on 
blog-roll linkages and analysed using the computer programme UCINET and its 
accompanying graphical visualisation software, NetDraw. As Borgatti et al. (1999: 15, 
emphasis in the original) explain, ‘the rows and columns of the adjacency matrix [in 
UCINET] correspond to the nodes of the graph [in NetDraw], and the cells in the matrix 
correspond to pairs of nodes or dyads. A matrix value X(i,j) = 1 indicates the presence 
of a link between node i and node j, and X(i,j) = 0 indicates the absence of a link’. In this 
case, the matrix value of 1 indicated the existence of a blog-roll link. The inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were particularly important to the adjacency matrix, as to list all the 
blogs included on the identified blog-rolls without focusing on a particular topic would 
have resulted in a likely ever-expanding network of blogs. Some of the blog rolls 
differentiated their blog-roll links into groupings (such as “climate” or “politics”) as 
well as identifying fellow sceptical blogs and those on the “other side” of the debate. 
The Global Warming Heretic provides a good example of this, with its blog roll divided 
into the following sections:  
 
- Data (5 links) 
- Fellow heretics (87 links) 
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- Mostly impartial (1 link) 
- GW/CC [global warming/climate change] news (16 links) 
- True believers, Hangers-on, Folks who don’t know any better, and folks who 
should know better (54 links) 
- Carbon brokers (4 links) 
- Heretic sympathizers (1 link) 
- Other heretics (non-AGW [anthropogenic global warming]) (5 links) 
 
The Global Warming Heretic also provides a note about its classification system, with 
the categories explained as follows: 
I have done my best to classify the links into the stated categories based on my 
impression about the general thrust of each of these sites. Sites classified as 
'Fellow Heretics' will not necessarily agree with me on all issues related to 
climate change—they merely contain content that unapologetically diverges 
from the consensus. Sites classified as 'True Believers' are those that have 
accepted the essence of the AGW hypothesis—but some present their views 
reasonably rather than in the hysterical fashion of the CoGW [Church of Global 
Warming].  
 
In such cases, only those blogs identified as sceptical by the blogger themselves were 
added to the adjacency matrix. Both the adjacency and attribute matrices were 
analysed using UCINET and NetDraw, with the results explained in the following 
section. 
 
 
2.5 Results 
In total, 171 blogs were identified, 155 of which are allocated to category 1 (openly 
sceptical) with the remaining 15 identified as category 2 (self-proclaimed “open-
minded”). Note however that this is a snapshot of the blogosphere created during 
March-April 2012. It is expected that many blogs will no longer exist by the date of 
publication and concomitantly, that many others will have been created. Of those blogs 
whose authorship could be determined (155 blogs, with authorship identified via the 
blogger naming their location), nearly half (75) are authored from within the USA. 
Where both author location and nationality were identified but were different, author 
location was chosen. In descending order of prevalence, the authorship of the 
remaining blogs is: Australia (32), United Kingdom (26), Canada (9), New Zealand (5), 
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and the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy and Sweden (1 
each). It is interesting that seven of the blogs whose authorship could be determined 
come from predominantly non-English speaking countries, yet are written in English. 
This may be due to these bloggers’ desire to connect with the predominantly Anglo-
American/Saxon manifestation of climate scepticism as referred to above (Painter, 
2011; Niederer, 2013). 
 
Of the 171 blogs, 114 list links in a blog-roll. Only one blog (found via the initial scoping 
process using WebCrawler) is not linked to the remainder of the network. The geodesic 
distance of the entire network is measured at 2.71, that is, only 2.71 blogs on average 
separate each blog from another. While this may seem like a densely connected 
network, employing UCINET’s density algorithm shows a density rating of only 0.06. 
The density of the network examines the proportion of possible ties that are present, 
with a density rating of 1 meaning that every blog would be directly connected. Thus, 
of all possible ties, only 6% are present, suggesting a low-density network. Figure 2.1, 
which visualises the blogosphere using an ego network display, clearly indicates that 
other clusters of relationships, for example through particularly central nodes, may 
instead be important to investigate. Using the arc method, the reciprocity of the 
network (how many blogs link to each other) was analysed to assess the blogosphere’s 
interdependency, with a result of 19.93%. This result, where less than a quarter of 
blogs provide reciprocal links on their respective blog rolls, in addition to the low 
network density, appears to provide further evidence for a blogosphere that depends 
on central nodes. Three centrality tests were selected to achieve the goal of 
determining the most central nodes within the blogosphere. Those blogs that appeared 
in the top 10 of each reciprocal centrality test (for example, both in- and out-degree 
ratings) were placed on a short-list of central blogs for subsequent analysis. Table 2.2 
outlines these tests and the short-listed blogs. 
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Figure 2.1: The climate sceptical blogosphere, where round nodes are category 1 (openly 
sceptical) and square nodes are category 2 (self-proclaimed “open-minded”) 
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Table 2.2: Centrality tests 
Test Description Detail Most central blogs 
according to test 
results 
Degree 
centrality 
(Freeman’s 
approach) 
Measurement of 
incoming and 
outgoing linkage (also 
known as in- and out-
degree rating). 
In-degree rating determines 
the most linked-to blog. 
 
Out-degree rating 
determines which blogs’ 
blog-rolls are the most 
extensive. 
 Bishop Hill 
 WUWT 
Degree 
centrality 
(Bonacich’s 
approach) 
Measurement of 
centrality and power 
according to number 
of connections within 
the network. 
A positive co-efficient of 0.5 
determines centrality. 
Centrality is achieved if the 
blogs that are linked to on a 
blog-roll have themselves 
many subsequent links. 
 
A negative co-efficient of -
0.5 determines power. 
Power is achieved if a blog 
is connected to many blogs 
without further links 
themselves.  
 GORE LIED 
 The Friends of 
Carbon Dioxide 
 The Global 
Warming Heretic 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Measurement of 
centrality that shows 
those nodes upon 
which others depend 
to make connections. 
A blog is central if it is 
situated on the shortest 
path between other pairs of 
actors in the network.  
 Climate Audit 
 JoNova 
 ICECAP 
 No Frakking 
Consensus 
 
 
Two tests for degree centrality (Freeman’s and Bonacich’s approach) were chosen as 
‘very simple, but…very effective measure[s] of…centrality’ (Hanneman and Riddle, 
2005: 148). Freeman’s approach shows the centrality of a node based on its degree, 
that is, the number of connections a node has. In this case, the rating score represents 
the number of other blogs linking to that blog on their respective blog rolls. The blog 
with the highest in-degree rating according to Freeman’s approach is Watts Up With 
That (WUWT), with 54% of the blogosphere linking to WUWT, which claims to be the 
‘world's most viewed site on global warming and climate change’. Freeman’s approach 
may also be used to analyse out-degree linkages, that is, examining which blogs’ blog-
rolls are the most extensive. While out-degree score is usually seen as a measure of 
how influential an actor is in a network, in this case, a blog has no control over whether 
it is included in another blogs’ blog-roll. It is thus possible that out-degree score in a 
blogosphere context may instead be regarded as an indicator of desire to enhance the 
network, for example, by ensuring readers are aware that there exist other blogs that 
support the position of the original blog. Interestingly, only two blogs show both high 
2. Mapping the climate sceptical blogosphere 
49 
in- and out-degree linkages (WUWT and Bishop Hill). Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the top 
10 Freeman’s approach scores for in- and out-degree linkage. 
 
Table 2.3: Degree centrality (Freeman’s approach) in-degree results 
Rank Blog Score Category Blog-roll 
1 Watts Up With That 93 1 Yes 
2 Climate Audit 76 2 Yes 
3 JoNova 55 1 Yes 
4= Bishop Hill 46 1 Yes 
4= ICECAP 46 1 Yes 
6 Tom Nelson 42 1 Yes 
7 No Frakking Consensus 37 1 Yes 
8= JunkScience 34 1 No 
8= Science and Public Policy Institute 34 1 Yes 
10= Climate etc. 32 2 Yes 
10= Climate Realists 32 1 No 
10= Roy Spencer 32 1 No 
10= the reference frame 32 1 No 
 
Table 2.4: Degree centrality (Freeman’s approach) out-degree results 
Rank Blog Score Category Blog-roll 
1 C3 Headlines 67 1 Yes 
2 GORE LIED 57 1 Yes 
3 Global Warming Science 51 1 Yes 
4 Climate Change Dispatch 43 1 Yes 
4= Global Warming: A Worn-Out Hoax 43 1 Yes 
6 Web Commentary 42 1 Yes 
6= Bishop Hill 42 1 Yes 
8 Climate Research News 38 1 Yes 
9= ecomyths 36 2 Yes 
9= Watts Up With That 36 1 Yes 
9= Rajan’s Take: Climate Change  36 1 Yes 
 
 
Bonacich’s approach for degree centrality is a more nuanced mechanism to determine 
both centrality and power based on the number of secondary connections attributed to 
a node. A positive coefficient of 0.5 is used to determine centrality, that is, whether the 
blogs that are linked to on a blog-roll have themselves many subsequent links. 
Centrality is achieved because the node is linked to other nodes that are well-
connected. A negative coefficient of -0.5 is used to determine power, with the concept 
of power understood in this test as whether a blog is connected to many blogs without 
further links themselves. Power is implied because a node that is connected to few 
other nodes is more dependent on them than if it was connected to many others 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The positive coefficient test to determine centrality 
provided some very different results to both the Freeman’s approach tests, with Table 
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2.5 showing The Friends of Carbon Dioxide as the most central. The blogs to which The 
Friends of Carbon Dioxide links on its blog-roll have themselves many subsequent 
links, indicating that it may be well-attuned to the key nodes in the climate sceptical 
blogosphere. The negative coefficient test to determine power assigns negative values 
to well-connected nodes and positive values to weakly connected nodes. In the case of 
a blogosphere, the results for this test may indicate that high-scoring blogs are serving 
as key sources of inspiration and information. According to the negative coefficient 
results (Table 2.6), The Friends of Carbon Dioxide is less powerful, only ranking sixth. 
The blogs GORE LIED, and The Global Warming Heretic scored in the top 10 results of 
both the positive and negative coefficient tests.  
 
Table 2.5: Degree centrality (Bonacich’s approach) positive coefficient (centrality) results 
Rank Blog Score Category Blog-roll 
1 The Friends of Carbon Dioxide 50.48 1 Yes 
2 iloveCarbonDioxide.com 27.45 1 Yes 
3 The Global Warming Heretic 21.08 1 Yes 
4 Impact of Climate Change 20.34 1 Yes 
5 hauntingthelibrary 19.54 1 Yes 
6 Tory Aardvark 19.53 1 Yes 
7 CO2 Insanity 18.96 1 Yes 
8 Climate Change Denier 18.88 1 Yes 
9 Global Warming 18.81 1 Yes 
10 An Honest Climate Debate 17.68 1 Yes 
 
Table 2.6: Degree centrality (Bonacich’s approach) negative coefficient (power) results 
Rank Blog Score Category Blog-roll 
1 Climate Nonconformist -430.62 1 Yes 
2 Global Shamming -324.14 1 Yes 
3 False Alarm -280.37 1 Yes 
4 The Global Warming Heretic -222.19 1 Yes 
5 Kiwi Thinker -200.96 1 Yes 
6 The Friends of Carbon Dioxide -192.02 1 Yes 
7 Errors in IPCC Science -182.42 1 Yes 
8 Climatequotes.com -175.84 1 Yes 
9 Digging in the Clay -160.21 1 Yes 
10 GORE LIED -159.55 1 Yes 
 
 
In order to test the results for degree centrality (as the number of connections may not 
necessarily indicate the relative importance of a node within a network), a test for 
betweenness was also conducted. Betweenness centrality is used to highlight those 
nodes upon which others depend to make connections. In traditional SNA, this is a 
measure of whether a node is “between” other nodes in a network, for example, how 
many people depend on an individual actor to make connections with other people. In 
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the case of a blogosphere, a blog may achieve a high score if it is linked to by many 
other blogs (thus results for this test are expected to be similar to those for in-degree 
rating using Freeman’s degree centrality). Table 2.7 shows that WUWT is an extremely 
central node according to this test. The results of this test are interpreted against the 
mean betweenness score. WUWT has a score of 3971.52, significantly higher than the 
mean score of 180.31. As anticipated, there was a large overlap between the results for 
this test and those for Freeman’s in-degree centrality, with six blogs appearing in both 
sets of results. Climate Audit, ICECAP, JoNova and No Frakking Consensus were short-
listed based on these results.  
 
Table 2.7: Freeman’s betweenness node centrality results 
Rank Blog Score Category Blog-roll 
1 Watts Up With That 3971.52 1 Yes 
2 ICECAP 2638.08 1 Yes 
3 Bishop Hill 1948.08 1 Yes 
4 Global Warming Science 1805.80 1 Yes 
5 No Frakking Consensus 1790.30 1 Yes 
6 GORE LIED 1672.28 1 Yes 
7 C3 Headlines 1365.88 1 Yes 
8 Climate Audit 1221.18 2 Yes 
9 JoNova 1084.35 1 Yes 
10 Australian Climate Madness 1016.16 1 Yes 
 
 
2.6 Analysis 
The centrality test results show that nine blogs from the total network of 171 could be 
considered to be the most central nodes within the climate sceptical blogosphere: 
WUWT, Bishop Hill, Climate Audit, GORE LIED, ICECAP, JoNova, No Frakking 
Consensus, The Friends of Carbon Dioxide and The Global Warming Heretic. However, 
while a blog may appear to be influential as a result of high centrality scores, this 
position may be illusory, created through mathematical analysis rather than actual 
influence. Delving deeper is a vital part of good SNA, as the results should not be 
viewed in isolation, or necessarily meaning that the ‘measured relationships and 
relationship strengths as accurately reflecting the “real” or “final” or “equilibrium” 
status of the network’ (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: 13) in question. In nearly all 
respects, apart from all having blog-rolls, they are heterogeneous. Climate Audit is a 
category 2 blog, whereas the remainder are category 1. Four are USA-authored, three 
in Australia, and one each in Canada and the UK. WUWT and JoNova receive hundreds 
of comments per post, whereas The Friends of Carbon Dioxide regularly receives either 
none or fewer than five comments per post. GORE LIED and The Global Warming 
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Heretic appear to both be infrequently updated (or retired) which is an important 
discount factor in the blogosphere, where quick turnaround of information is critical to 
retain readers’ attention and get repeat visits. In order to test the SNA results, reader 
statistics were employed to indicate the blogs’ relative importance to the blogosphere 
user community (however, it is also important to note that site traffic should not be 
interpreted as an indicator of credibility per se—while site traffic may provide an 
indication of relative attention, these results only demonstrate site traffic as compared 
to each other (and not to wider traffic to other websites or blogs) and can in no way 
indicate how the information contained within each blog is regarded or interpreted). 
Google’s Ad Planner was used to estimate site traffic. Very little research is available 
that compares the accuracy of publicly-accessible (both free and subscription) site-
traffic estimation services (Vaughan and Yang, 2013). In the absence of such research, 
Ad Planner was chosen as it yielded the most data on the short-listed blogs as 
compared to other services. Moreover, it does not provide information for low-traffic 
websites, thus suggesting that if any of the nine blogs were not tracked, they are 
unlikely to receive significant traffic. As shown in Table 2.8, only four of the nine blogs 
appeared in the Ad Planner results: Climate Audit, ICECAP, JoNova and WUWT. ICECAP 
receives significantly fewer estimated page views per month than the other blogs and 
was thus excluded from the final analysis. 
 
Table 2.8: Estimated site traffic using Google Ad Planner 
Blog Estimated unique visitors per month Estimated page views per month 
Climate Audit 19,000 200,000 
ICECAP 14,000 84,000 
JoNova 22,000 200,000 
WUWT 140,000 2,100,000 
 
 
In order to understand why Climate Audit, JoNova and WUWT occupy the most central 
positions in the climate sceptical blogosphere according to the SNA and site traffic 
results, thematic content analysis of multiple posts from each blog was performed. 
Thematic content analysis was chosen as it enables an assessment and subsequent 
classification of each individual post, focusing in particular on the key thematic 
preoccupations of the blogger (i.e. what is the content deemed most important to 
therefore post online), and on how the information is presented and interpreted (i.e. 
what terminology or language is used in the post/how is the argument framed) 
(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). 20 posts in chronological order dating from 1 
March 2012 were identified from each blog, with each post categorised under either 
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“science”, or “policy”. The categories of science and policy were chosen as they are the 
most prevalent underlying themes of climate scepticism identified in the literature in 
terms of climate sceptical arguments (Rahmstorf, 2005). While such categorisations 
have also been associated with different motivations behind climate sceptical 
viewpoints (Hulme, 2009; Washington and Cook, 2011), an investigation of underlying 
motivations was beyond the scope of this research (and again, served to direct the 
methodological choice towards manifest thematic analysis as opposed to, for example, 
discourse analysis). “Science” included all scientifically-related points, including any 
argument that referenced scientific data or methods, scientific transparency, scientific 
theories or the role and activities of scientific institutions. No distinction was made 
between what has been suggested as being ‘scientifically legitimate’ arguments 
(Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010: 483) as opposed to ‘non-science and pseudoscience’ 
(Cormick, 2011) or the dressing of ‘science denial in the trappings of science’ 
(Rosenau, 2012: , p. 567). This is an important point to emphasise, as the aim of this 
research is not to cast judgement on the validity or legitimacy of the blogs’ content, 
such as the scientific knowledge claims contained within specific posts, but to 
understand how the choice of topic contributes to a blog’s position in the network. As 
such, it focuses on overtly manifest themes and language, rather than analysis of any 
latent discourse or identification of motivated reasoning behind specific framings of 
climate change (Whitmarsh, 2011) (both beyond the scope of this specific piece of 
research). “Policy” included all discussions that emphasised the politics of, or policy 
decisions related to, climate change, such as the political appropriateness of mitigation 
or adaptation policies. While this categorisation may appear to be an overly simplistic 
binary (particularly given the complex interrelationships between science and policy 
as outlined above in relation to theories such as post-normal science), it was chosen as 
a way of most accurately reflecting the overt choice of topic made by each blogger. 
While research has shown that it is very likely that the motivations behind the 
expression of climate sceptical arguments and opinions relate to particular values, or 
political or ideological worldviews (McCright and Dunlap, 2000; McCright and Dunlap, 
2003; Hulme, 2009; McCright and Dunlap, 2011a; Poortinga et al., 2011; Corner, 2013), 
the choice of scientific language or scientific framings as the vehicle through which 
climate scepticism is communicated is also important to understand, as it allows for an 
insight into the issues deemed most pertinent, or indeed most convincing, to the debate 
in the blogosphere environment. It is thus important to emphasise that it is not the aim 
of this categorisation system to make “policy” synonymous with an ideologically-
motivated scepticism, nor to suggest that “science” is conversely ideologically 
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independent. Where neither of these categories was an accurate fit, a further category 
of “other” was used. More detailed sub-themes were also used, including “funding 
sources” or “transparency” under the overall category of science, and “regulation” or 
“government agency” under the overall category of policy. 
 
The dominant category across all three blogs was science. 95% of the analysed posts on 
Climate Audit were categorised as science, with the remaining post categorised as 
other. 50% of the posts on JoNova were categorised as science, with the remaining 
50% split equally between politics and other. 100% of the posts on WUWT were 
categorised as science. The overall category of science was supplemented by several 
sub-themes, with discussions of alternative scientific rationales for observed climate 
variability and extreme weather events, and critiques of techniques and results from 
mainstream climate science such as computer modelling of surface temperature data 
particularly prevalent. Distrust of scientists involved in mainstream climate science 
and associated scientific arguments was also a frequently occurring point of 
contestation, including claims that mainstream climate scientists’ claims were 
scientifically invalid.  
 
Climate Audit appeared to be predominantly interested in issues of scientific 
transparency, such as information access, funding sources and scientific integrity. For 
example, the following excerpt from a post entitled Schmidt’s “Conspiracy Theory” (16 
May 2012) discusses efforts that Climate Audit made to access primary data:  
Wahl and Ammann announced in May 2005 that all our claims were 
“unfounded”. Since our codes were very close and I reconciled them almost 
immediately, I knew that their verification r2 results would be identical to ours. 
Again, I was asked to review the paper (though my review was disregarded.) As a 
reviewer, I asked for the verification r2 results. Wahl and Ammann refused. 
Rather than rejecting the paper, Schneider terminated me as a reviewer. 
 
JoNova discusses a broader range of topics (for example, fake gold bars and full-body 
scanners at airports), yet still has a clear interest in scientifically-related climate 
sceptical arguments. Key sub-themes included conspiracy theories (predominantly 
regarding climate scientists) and media behaviour when discussing climate science. 
For example, in a post entitled Monbiot—Steal things and be a “democratic” hero (4 
March 2012), referring to journalist George Monbiot, JoNova argues that the ‘richest of 
ironies is that Monbiot relies on models and opinions, while the sceptics that he looks 
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down upon want observations and data, true to the original tenets of the scientific 
method. Despite not apparently knowing what makes science different from a religion, 
he calls sceptics “anti-science deniers”’. WUWT is extremely prolific, with 190 posts for 
March 2012 alone; however, the posts analysed had several reoccurring sub-themes 
under the overall category of science, with a predominant interest in alternative 
explanations for climate models, temperature data or human-induced climate change, 
largely in the form of scientifically-based challenges to published science. For example, 
the following excerpt from Why William D. Nordhaus Is Wrong About Global Warming 
Sceptics Being Wrong… (3 March 2012) disputes mainstream climate science 
knowledge claims: ‘As the Earth’s climate continues to not cooperate with their models, 
the so-called consensus will eventually recognize and acknowledge their fundamental 
error’. Across all three blogs, the two most prevalent sub-themes identified were a) 
direct scientifically-based challenges to mainstream climate science, and b) critiques of 
the conduct of the climate science system, such as individual climate scientists’ actions 
(including issues of transparency) or institutional decision-making. While the latter 
sub-theme may be understood as related to more “political” understandings of science 
(such as the relative role of science as a factor in decision-making under controversy), 
as it is still overtly discussing the organisation of climate science as a whole, it was still 
categorised as science. 
 
While the three most central blogs focus on scientific framings of the climate debate, it 
is possible that other, non-central, blogs also have a similar focus and that, instead of 
being a significant factor in the centrality of these blogs in particular, it is broadly 
characteristic of the entire climate sceptical blogosphere. To test this, of the 162 blogs 
not identified as central in any way, 20 were randomly selected, with 20 posts from 
each blog dated in chronological order from 1 March 2012 subject to thematic content 
analysis and allocated to one of the three main categories: science, policy or other. 
Where a blog had more than 50% of its posts allocated to a single category, that 
category was assigned as the overall theme of the blog. Of the 20 randomly selected 
blogs, the majority (65%) were categorised as policy, focusing on issues such as energy 
policies or climate change legislation. For example, of the 20 posts analysed from Tory 
Aardvark, six focused on wind-farm policies, five examined international or UK climate 
politics, one discussed climate science, and the remaining eight investigated topics as 
varied as the psychology of climate change fear and the teaching of climate change in 
schools. 30% of the 20 non-central blogs focused on climate science, using similar 
arguments and content as was found in the most central blogs, such as discussions of 
2. Mapping the climate sceptical blogosphere 
56 
the authority of climate models or IPCC predictions, with only one blog allocated to the 
category of other as it was solely preoccupied with the weather-related impacts of 
climate change. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This research aimed to identify the climate sceptical blogosphere and its most central 
nodes, and to investigate whether a focus on particular themes contributed to the 
positioning of the most central blogs. A blogosphere comprising 171 individual blogs 
was identified using SNA, with three blogs in particular, Climate Audit, JoNova and 
WUWT, identified as the most central based on three tests of centrality (Freeman’s and 
Bonacich’s approaches for degree centrality and Freeman’s betweenness) and site-
traffic. While the SNA provided varied results as to which blogs may be considered the 
most central, the results of one specific measure of centrality, in-degree rating 
according to Freeman’s approach for degree centrality, appear to be particularly 
relevant. The three blogs identified as the most central are also the top three most 
linked-to sites according to Freeman’s in-degree rating. This suggests that in-degree 
connectivity may be an important indicator when analysing the centrality of a 
blogosphere, although further research on different blogospheres is required to test 
this hypothesis. It does however accord with Bruns et al.’s (2008) contention that a 
blog with a high number of incoming links may be understood as highly respected by 
its peers.  
 
The most noteworthy finding of this research however is that the blogs identified as 
the most central predominantly focus on the scientific element of the climate debate. 
Regardless of the motivation behind the existence of the climate sceptical opinion, 
what appears to be the most valued and legitimate way of expressing that opinion 
within the blogosphere is through the use of scientific themes and language. Within 
this overall focus, providing a direct scientifically-based challenge to mainstream 
climate science, or a critique of the conduct of the climate science system (such as 
individual climate scientists’ actions or institutional decision-making) appear to be 
particularly important themes, thus according most closely with Rahmstorf’s (2005) 
categories of trend or attribution scepticism. The central blogs’ overt framing of 
climate sceptical arguments within the language of contested scientific knowledge 
claims and critiques of science conduct is interesting for multiple reasons. First, it 
suggests that the blogosphere is still preoccupied with framing climate change as an 
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active scientific controversy. Whilst multitude scientific uncertainties regarding 
climate systems still exist, fundamental components of climate science such as the 
relationship between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and temperature 
increases are no longer considered contentious within the academic literature (IPCC, 
2011; IPCC, 2013). As newspapers such as The Los Angeles Times and The Sydney 
Morning Herald refrain from publishing reader letters which deny anthropogenic 
climate change (Lewis and McEvoy, 2013; Thornton, 2013), it is possible that 
scientifically-framed climate sceptical arguments may become increasingly rare in 
traditional mainstream media fora, instead retreating into the unregulated blogosphere 
environment. Second, it contradicts claims that climate science is ‘adrift in the 
blogosphere’ (Schäfer, 2012: 529) because even though few climate scientists 
themselves blog—and are suggested to mainly focus on addressing the 
“pseudoscience” suggested as existing within the climate sceptic blogosphere (Schäfer, 
2012)—this does not mean that science itself is not an active topic of discussion. 
Finally, it also suggests that by not focusing on, or explicitly identifying, debates 
regarding the ideological foundation for climate change disagreement, which more 
explicitly highlights ‘attitudes and worldviews…[and] political ideology and personal 
values’ (Poortinga et al., 2011: 1022), the blogosphere may be playing a central role in 
perpetuating doubt regarding the scientific basis for subsequent climate change policy-
making. This conclusion therefore stands somewhat in contrast to the results found by 
Elsasser and Dunlap (2013) whose analysis of conservative columnists’ discussion of 
climate change shows a strong preoccupation with trend sceptical arguments, yet a 
concomitant emphasis on connecting the political figure of Al Gore with these 
arguments.  
 
The expertise that appears to be the most valued in this alternative knowledge 
network—command of scientific knowledge and willingness to use it to critique 
mainstream climate science—is thus also different to that valued in other alternative 
knowledge networks. For example, in the knowledge networks formed by UK mothers 
in response to the potential threat from the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine, 
‘personalised framings’ (Poltorak et al., 2005: 717) rather than disputes over the 
scientific evidence were predominant. Thus building on Merritt and Jones’ (2000) 
suggestion of climate sceptics as “agents of persuasion”, this research has shown that 
these central nodes are key protagonists in a process of continual expert knowledge 
de-legitimisation and contestation. Interestingly however, and in opposition to the 
Cumbrian sheep farmers in Brian Wynne’s classic investigation of expertise, these 
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bloggers do not appear to recognise a ‘dependency upon the scientific experts as the 
certified public authorities on the issue’ (Wynne, 1992: 299). It is suggested that these 
central blogs in particular are not only acting as translators between scientific research 
and lay audiences, but, in their reinterpretation of existing climate science knowledge 
claims and critique of scientific institutions, are acting themselves as alternative public 
sites of expertise for a climate sceptical audience.  
 
Several reasons may explain why scientifically-based challenges to, or 
reinterpretations of, climate science, as well as arguments that criticise systems of 
scientific enquiry or quality, are highly valued in this context. These blogs may be 
regarded as providing more accurate or trustworthy knowledge than exists in 
mainstream climate science, or indeed is available either as readily or in as detailed a 
format as in other sources such as the mainstream media (Boykoff, 2013). This 
rationale would suggest that the ‘relevant resource’ that Brass (1984: 520) identifies as 
critical as to why certain nodes become more powerful than others is, in this instance, 
command of scientific knowledge, in particular, knowledge that attempts to destabilise 
mainstream science. Bloggers are thus acting as gatekeepers and interpreters in an 
alternative knowledge network that is running in parallel to the ways in which, for 
example, scholarly journal editors carry out the same function in the mainstream 
academic knowledge network (McGinty, 1999). These blogs therefore may be seen to 
provide a resource upon which scepticism—which, as the literature suggests, is very 
likely related to processes such as motivated reasoning and disputes of underlying 
values or worldviews (Heath and Gifford, 2006; McCright and Dunlap, 2011a; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Boykoff and Olson, 2013)—can be scientifically justified 
(Cook et al., 2004). It is possible that this contributes to a situation whereby these 
blogs serve as an “echo chamber”, within which users are ‘consuming news that mesh 
with their worldview and ideology’ (Boykoff, 2013: 15), and thus contributing to 
Hoffman’s (2011b) concept of a logic schism within the climate debate. Nonetheless, it 
is important to note that this research has explicitly aimed to avoid judging the validity 
of the scientific arguments contained within the blogs in question. It has also been 
outside the scope of this paper to investigate the latent rationales behind the existence 
of sceptic opinions held by the specific bloggers identified within the network. 
However, by highlighting how the use of scientific language and framings (i.e. how 
bloggers are talking about climate change, rather than necessarily why they are using 
those framings to make their arguments) is contributing to the relative positioning of 
blogs in the climate sceptical blogosphere, such as JoNova’s reference to arguments of 
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scientific quality as a means to validate her argument, this paper does aim to contribute 
to wider debates about the interaction between the public and more traditional forms 
of expertise (Wynne, 1992; Collins and Evans, 2002; Demeritt, 2006). 
 
This research has also contributed to the literature on online knowledge networks by 
showing that these central blogs may also be attempting to break open Latour and 
Woolgar’s (1986) “black box” of science, with the lack of deference given to 
mainstream climate science possibly attributable to the medium of contestation. The 
internet enables a dramatically different type of social interaction between what 
Nowotny (1993: 308) terms ‘knowledge experts and protoexperts’, with the minutiae 
of the building blocks of scientific argument, particularly visual representations such as 
graphs and diagrams, laid bare for detailed, and rapid, critique. Ravetz (2012) even 
goes so far as to argue that the blogosphere has actualised post-normal science, with 
debates about quality—particularly quality related to scientific work—a central tenet. 
The freely accessible nature of blogs is also notable, as while there is a movement in 
academia towards open-access journal publication (Chan, 2004), it is not yet the norm. 
This is significant as blogs are an increasingly common source of scientific source 
material for mainstream media (Brumfiel, 2009) and the climate sceptical arguments 
emphasised in these central blogs likely receive a disproportionately larger audience 
than is warranted when compared with the knowledge claims made by the majority of 
mainstream climate science (Boykoff, 2013).  
 
Many opportunities exist for further research using this dataset, including examining 
discursive links between the blog posts (Bruns et al., 2011), or dialogical analysis when 
a specific scientific knowledge claim is debated by more than one blog. Investigating 
the transformation of an issue through this process of debate could point to ways in 
which participants in the climate debate are framing particular issues of contention. 
Another extension could be to examine the linkages between climate sceptical and non-
sceptical blogs, following the example of Adamic and Glance (2005) who examined 
linkages between Democrat and Republican political blogs in the run-up to the 2004 
USA Presidential election. Finally, it remains unclear what the centrality of these blogs 
means in terms of their “power” as suggested by Brass (1984), as regards their reach 
outside beyond the online environment. While blogs in other areas have been 
suggested as playing an important public agenda-setting role (see for example research 
by Wallsten (2007) on political blogs in the USA), more research is required that 
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investigates how the climate sceptical blogosphere may be influencing the wider public 
debate about climate change.   
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3 Section 
Abstract  
Labels play an important role in opinion formation, helping to actively construct 
perceptions and reality, and place individuals into context with others. As a highly 
complex issue, climate change invites a range of different opinions and dialogues about 
its causes, impacts, and action required. However, the polarised labels used in the 
climate change debate, such as sceptic or alarmist, are both reflecting and helping to 
frame the debate as antagonistic and combative. This paper critically reviews the 
literature on climate opinion labels, and the efforts taken within an academic context to 
categorise differences, create new taxonomies of more detailed sub-labels, or create or 
argue for the use of new labels such as denier or contrarian. By drawing on research on 
typologies of climate opinions, problems with labelling constructs and discussions 
around context and the implications for science-policy dialogue, we argue that climate 
labels, both as constructed in the academic literature, and as applied in science and 
policy debates, are serving to isolate, exclude, ignore, and dismiss claims-makers of all 
types from constructive dialogue. It suggests that context has been inadequately 
considered by the literature and that an emphasis on labels is accentuating division 
and diverting attention away from a focus on underlying motivations, which may be 
more conducive toward increasing public understanding and encouraging 
communication across this polarised debate. 
 
Keywords: climate change, scepticism, opinion, categorisation, label, motivation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Categorising and grouping people is a fundamental part of the human cognitive process 
(Watts and Dodds, 2007). Not only does it aid in the understanding and assimilation of 
the vast amount of information humans face each day, but it is essential to the ability to 
learn, understand the world and effectively process information (Piaget and Inhelder, 
1973; Bowker and Star, 1999). Therefore, creating a categorisation system to identify 
different opinions held about climate change appeals as it enables a way to structure 
understandings of these opinions and to place oneself in context with others. Labels act 
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as short-hand descriptors for these different categories, evoking meaning(s) and 
interpretation in the mind of both the user and listener (Dutton and Jackson, 1987). 
They can thus be understood as subconscious interpretive devices which help to frame 
perceptions of the category in question (recalling Goffman’s (1974) seminal work on 
frames as schematas of interpretation). Labels are increasingly being recognised as 
important because, as Parmar (2014) suggests, by acting as discursive elements, they 
are understood as able to actively construct reality, rather than just reflect it. Dutton 
and Jackson (1987: 77) explain that ‘categories are engaged by using linguistic labels’ 
and once labels are applied, they can therefore ‘initiate a categorization process that 
affects the subsequent cognitions and motivations’ of those involved. 
 
In the context of climate change, labels are applied to people (rather than for example, 
to issues) and act as short-hand descriptors which reflect individual or group opinions 
about climate change. They also predominantly reflect arguments made about climate 
change (e.g. its scientific veracity or whether policy measures are necessary or 
appropriate) rather than the motivations behind the formation of these opinions. The 
majority of the literature in this area, interestingly, is largely silent in terms of rationale 
as to why categories and labels are deemed necessary in this context. Where 
arguments are made, the justification behind the need for categorisation and/or 
labelling appears mostly as a means to make sense of the multitude of arguments 
expressed about climate change. However, scholars also tend to focus on constructing 
labels without consideration for their use and value beyond the academic environment 
(for example at the science-policy interface, and/or their impact on public framing and 
understanding of climate change).  
 
Research on climate opinions and labels also has a propensity to assess public 
perceptions of climate change and the extent to which the subsequently constructed 
labels are robust (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012). Whilst some work calls for a clear 
distinction between, for example, types of scepticism, others conclude that the public 
does not distinguish between these different types of scepticism(Poortinga et al., 
2011), begging the question of the impact and value of such labelling constructs. 
Insights from Kahan et al. (2011) in contrast, provide an approach focusing on 
underlying values and worldviews, identifying two key categories of risk perception, 
namely hierarchical-individualistic and egalitarian-communitarian. What is valuable 
about this approach, and which is not widespread across the literature, is that it is 
more attuned to motivations, and hence stops short of ascribing polarising labels to 
3. Labelling opinions in the climate debate: A critical review 
70 
individuals who fit within these categories. This insight from the theory of risk 
perception thus provides a platform from which categorisation leads to constructive 
dialogue, as opposed to polarised labelling which influences public perceptions of a 
highly antagonistic debate. 
 
Indeed, what also appears to be particularly noteworthy in the context of climate 
change is not just that labels appear in abundance, but how they also both reflect and 
help to construct this dualistic, antagonistic debate between polarised adversaries 
(Washington and Cook, 2011). In other situations of scientific or public policy 
controversy, such as debates over vaccination or genetically modified foods, while 
labels exist (such as “anti-vaxxers”) labelling practices in the climate debate appear to 
be somewhat unique in that the labels used to describe opinions about climate change 
solely represent positions at the opposite ends of the debate, and in so doing, divide 
those labelled into two polarised camps.  
 
Labels also seem to be used by all actors involved, from the climate science community 
(Lahsen, 2013), to policy-makers (Thornsby, 2014) and media outlets (Painter, 2011; 
Boykoff, 2013), through to commentators as varied as NGOs or lobbying bodies 
(Singer, 2008; Greenpeace USA, 2013), bloggers (Delingpole, 2012; Lewandowsky et 
al., 2013c; Sharman, 2014) or social scientists (Turnpenny, 2012) (although the 
contexts in which different labels are used, as well as by whom and of whom, varies 
considerably and will be discussed later in more detail). A possible reason for this is 
the extraordinarily high stakes of the climate debate: current policy decisions will have 
extremely significant implications for both present and future generations (IPCC, 
2011). It evokes many salient issues that are touchstones for strong emotional 
responses, such as the role of government (Holbrook and Briggle, 2013; Ingold and 
Gschwend, 2013; Kane, 2013), and thus it is unsurprising that correspondingly intense 
viewpoints about climate change exist, for example, by those who feel disempowered 
by current climate change-related decision-making processes (Poortinga et al., 2011). 
This labelling exercise translates into confused public understanding of climate change: 
that it is an issue dominated by debate, contention (Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014) 
and fraught with polarised opinions, a phenomenon heavily influenced by media 
coverage of the issue (Leiserowitz et al., 2013b). While it is unclear whether this 
polarisation of labels is a product of the political polarisation inherent in the climate 
debate (Antonio and Brulle, 2011; McCright and Dunlap, 2011b) or whether the labels 
are actually causing this division (as may be the case following the argument of Parmar 
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above), or even whether they combine together in a self-reinforcing feedback loop, 
their ubiquitous presence in the debate makes them worthy of attention. 
 
This paper reviews research from the social sciences (predominantly geography, 
sociology and psychology) on (i) typologies of climate opinions, (ii) problems with 
labelling constructs and (iii) discussions around context and the implications for 
science-policy dialogue. An analysis of over 120 articles addressing climate opinions 
through terms such as “climate sceptic”, “climate denier”, “climate contrarian”, was 
conducted for the first aim and wider terms such as “climate communication”, 
“framing” and “science-policy” were used to identify relevant literature for the second 
and third. The paper then identifies how and why labelling constructs in the climate 
debate have become so problematic, including how they can help to dictate the nature 
of dialogue by validating group polarisation (Hoffman, 2011a) and creating a perpetual 
cycle of disengagement as opposing groups are stereotyped behind fixed labels 
(Whitmarsh, 2011). We also suggest that context has been inadequately considered by 
the literature and conclude with a call for the research community to think more 
critically about how an emphasis on underlying rationales and motivations may allow a 
more productive dialogue to occur. The academic literature is important to address 
because it has long been recognised that it can play an important role in influencing 
and legitimising policy formation (Weiss, 1980; Walt, 1994). It is critical that policy-
makers continue to use the academic literature as an evidence base, therefore it is also 
vital that researchers are attentive to the ways in which their use of, and focus on 
labels in the climate debate may not be contributing constructively towards a more 
inclusive dialogue about climate change. It is important to note that because of this 
focus, we are unable to make any definitive statements about the origin of these labels 
in other contexts beyond academia, nor speculate as to the application of, or 
motivations behind the use of different labels by the various actors involved in the 
debate (however we do suggest that future research is needed to address this deficit).  
 
 
3.2 Labelling in the climate debate 
3.2.1 Sceptical voices 
Those who express “ambivalence”, “attitudinal uncertainty”, “dissonance” or “cynicism” 
about mainstream climate science and/or the need for mitigation or adaptation climate 
policy are most commonly referred to in the climate debate as sceptics, deniers or 
contrarians (Poortinga et al., 2011; Corner et al., 2012). We define mainstream climate 
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science as the scientific position on climate change as expressed in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth and Fifth Assessment 
Reports on the Science of Climate Change (Section 2: Causes of change), published in 
2007 and 2013 respectively. The first occurrence of these labels in relation to climate 
change appears to have been in 1989 with the label greenhouse sceptic (based on 
Nerlich’s analysis of English language newspapers listed in Nexis (Nerlich, 2014) using 
the search terms “greenhouse sceptic”, “global warming sceptic”, “climate sceptic”, 
“climate change sceptic”, “climate change denier” and “climate change contrarian”). By 
the late 1990s, Nerlich finds that this label was overtaken by global warming sceptic as 
the most common term up until 2005, after which point the discursive turn away from 
global warming and towards climate change occurred (Luntz, 2002) and climate 
change sceptic became the most commonly used label. However while overall the label 
sceptic is the most common, peaking at 2246 mentions in 2009, the label denier is also 
increasingly prevalent and was the most common label found in 2013 (over 1500 
mentions).  
 
Scepticism, as part of the scientific process, is a ‘systematic form of continued informed 
questioning’ (Bryce and Day, 2013: 606) which requires the investigator to doubt the 
truth of an assertion that is not supported by reproducible evidence. It implies seeking 
the truth, distancing oneself from personal dogma and thoroughly examining findings 
and conclusions (Washington and Cook, 2011). A central tenet of good scientific 
practice is thus demonstrating scepticism which ‘starts with an open mind, weighs 
evidence objectively and demands convincing evidence before accepting any claim. It 
contributes to the debate and forms the intellectual cornerstone of scientific enquiry’ 
(Kemp et al., 2010: 673). In relation to environmental issues, the notion of scepticism 
has a long history and is not limited to its more recent association with climate change 
(see for example its use in the context of chemical carcinogenesis nearly 40 years ago 
(Maltoni, 1976)). More recently Jacques (2009: 1) defined environmental scepticism as 
‘a counter-movement built on the premise that global environmental changes have 
been grossly exaggerated, misguided or maliciously fabricated’. This definition is 
however inadequate in the case of climate change as it fails to critically unpack a 
number of questions such as which elements have been exaggerated, what are the 
motivations for such fabrication, and what is the strength with which such views are 
held? The impreciseness of nomenclature has been recognised, with Hobson and 
Niemeyer (2012: 397) arguing that ‘within modern public discourse, [climate] 
scepticism stands more for a broader suite of positions and rationales for which no 
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singular definition exists’. Thus scepticism may therefore, in the context of climate 
change, have significantly and potentially permanently shifted beyond its original 
definition as a fundamental scientific tenet. 
 
Climate sceptic is also a problematic label in that it can be used to suggest a normative 
position whereby those who question the findings of the majority may be regarded as 
either ‘stupid, crazy or evil’ (Aronson, 2008: 123). Corner et al. (2012) have argued 
that the use of the label has given scientific scepticism a “bad name” as the ideologies 
and experiences of self-proclaimed climate sceptics are hugely variable and being 
labelled as a sceptic, or labelling oneself in such a manner, can become a form of self-
identity and thereby difficult to change (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012). Consequently, 
expressions of opinion, which within the scientific community would be regarded as a 
constructive form of scepticism (such as seen within the peer review process (Weller, 
2001)), may be at risk if this automatically invites the ascription of the label climate 
sceptic and its associated connotations. In light of these challenges, research effort has 
been directed into better understanding climate change scepticism. In so doing, two 
main avenues have been followed in the academic literature: to create more detailed 
taxonomies of labels, or, to create new, or justify the use of, alternative labels (Figure 
3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Main avenues taken within the literature to better understand climate scepticism 
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Detailed categories 
Rahmstorf (2005) was the first to group sceptical arguments into labelled categories, 
identifying a taxonomy of trend, attribution and impact sceptics. Trend sceptics reflect 
those who claim that climate change is fictional, often denying the existence of climate 
change outright, including basic greenhouse gas (GHG) feedback mechanisms. 
Attribution sceptics agree to the existence of climate change but question its 
anthropogenic cause, or deny that climate change is resulting in temperature increases. 
Impact sceptics also agree that climate change is occurring, but fail to see the 
consequences as problematic and may also believe that the impact of a warmer climate 
will be beneficial. This final category, also referred to by Lahsen (2008) as “backlash 
actors”, includes those who argue for climate change, feeling it will have positive 
repercussions, therefore negating the necessity of mitigative action. Rahmstorf’s 
description and categorisation of arguments was innovative for its time. It pioneered 
an abundance of research seeking to further explore the characteristics of those 
expressing sceptical arguments, as well as to better understand how these opinions are 
expressed both in scientific contexts and in wider public environments (Islam et al., 
2013). Its simplicity and linearly straightforward nature also appeals to our cognitive 
habit to categorise and distinguish groups uniformly and concisely. However, 
Rahmstorf’s categories have been criticised as failing to capture the full variety and 
intersection of opinions which exist in reality. For example, Poortinga et al. (2011) 
employed Rahmstorf’s categories to understand British scepticism and demonstrated 
that sceptic arguments among the public are strongly interrelated and not clear-cut, as 
while they are often rooted in an individual’s norms and values, they can be flexible 
and are not necessarily concretely fixed. Moreover, whereas Rahmstorf argued that as 
‘warming is now evident even to laypeople, the trend sceptics are a gradually vanishing 
breed’ (2005: 77), the continued evidence of trend scepticism, particularly in online 
environments (Loveys, 2010; Sharman, 2014) challenges this claim.  
 
As a result, more detailed taxonomies of labels have been created, with, for example, 
Doherty (2009) building on Rahmstorf’s foundation and identifying four types of 
sceptics: (i) outright deniers, who claim the IPCC and the science used is simply wrong; 
(ii) combative confrontationists, who automatically assume a position in opposition to 
any major consensus; (iii) professional controversialists, who assume a contrary 
position in order to appear more significant in dominant discourse and (iv) conflicted 
naysayers, who think climate change is/may be occurring, but feel a sense of loyalty to 
their career industry (oil, coal etc.) and therefore do not protest. Another effort was 
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made by Hobson and Niemeyer (2012) who identified five discourses of climate 
scepticism (emphatic negation, unperturbed pragmatism, proactive uncertainty, 
earnest acclimatisation, and noncommittal consent) as well as a variety of different 
categories using two axes of issue dimension and nature of scepticism. These 
categories, including associated labels such as deep scepticism and epistemic impact 
scepticism, reflect components such as the nature of the opinion (i.e. how deeply held it 
is) and its epistemic uncertainty (i.e. how certain they are). Akter et al. (2012) 
returned to Rahmstorf’s original taxonomy, but added two additional categories of 
mitigation scepticism (how effective mitigation policies will be) and global cooperation 
scepticism (how likely it is that other countries will reduce their emissions). More 
recently, Capstick and Pidgeon (2013) identify epistemic scepticism, referring to 
scepticism about the physical existence of climate change, and response scepticism, 
referring to doubts about climate change policy.  
 
 
New labels 
Taking the opposing route, that of creating or applying new labels in their entirety, has 
been suggested as a more accurate way of identifying the arguments involved as well 
as better reflecting the underlying rationales of different actors within the debate 
(Washington and Cook, 2011). The two most commonly used alternative labels in the 
literature are denier and contrarian (while other terms, such as dismisser/ive or 
limitnik (Nordhaus, 1994; Maibach et al., 2009; Leiserowitz et al., 2013a) have been 
suggested, they are significantly less prevalent in scholarly as well as in public 
discourse). To ascribe the label of climate change denier implies a categorical disregard 
of the overwhelming majority of the scientific literature that argues that Earth’s climate 
is changing as a result of human GHG emissions. Different rationales exist as to the 
existence of denial. Specter (in Washington and Cook, 2011: 3, emphasis added) 
suggests that denial is the replacement of ‘rigorous and open-minded scepticism of 
science with the inflexible certainty of ideological commitment’. McCright and Dunlap 
(2000) have made a similar point, suggesting that it is associated with a particular 
political viewpoint, and Washington and Cook (2011: 89) concurring that a reluctance 
to change minds or accept the mainstream scientific position is the result of not liking 
‘the political views held by those advocating action on global warming’. Such 
arguments suggest that denial is thus critically different to scepticism and that much of 
what is currently labelled as climate change scepticism, particularly in popular 
discourse, ought to actually be re-labelled as denial. Indeed, Kemp et al. (2010: 673) 
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suggest that making the distinction between denial and scepticism is important as the 
former ‘erodes public understanding of the issue and undermines trust in scientists…’ 
and most importantly, ‘[c]onviction drives denial as opposed to evidence-driven 
scepticism’. 
 
Weintrobe (2013) suggests that a key reasoning behind climate change denial is that 
climate change is too worrisome a topic—if it were to be real, significant lifestyle and 
other changes would become necessary which may not be desirable. Denial therefore 
incorporates attitudinal uncertainty, understood as ‘a lower subjective sense of 
conviction or validity as to whether climate change ‘really’ exists, is caused by human 
activity, and/or will have major impacts’ (Poortinga et al., 2011: 1016). The idea of 
denial of scientific findings is particularly interesting, and Kalichman (2009: 1) makes 
an interestingly self-reflexive statement in his examination of AIDS denial. He describes 
how he as a scientist finds denial ‘easy to ignore’ and that he can dismiss deniers as a 
small group of troublemakers. It is also regarded as the most contentious of the labels, 
regarded by some as necessary to emphasise the potentially very serious opposition to 
climate change policy implementation (Washington and Cook, 2011), and obstructive 
by others, as its reference to Holocaust denial brings a ‘moralistic tone into the climate 
change debate that we would do well to avoid’ (O'Neill and Boykoff, 2010: E151).  
 
The other most commonly used label, contrarian, refers to ‘a person who opposes or 
rejects popular opinion’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). Although less prevalent in 
mainstream public discourse than sceptic or denier, it has been used within the climate 
debate to emphasise those who actively choose to take an opposing point of view and 
publicly criticise mainstream climate science and policy. It has been suggested that 
contrarians often have financial support from fossil fuel industry organisations or 
conservative think tanks, and thus have a motivated rationale for their vocal opposition 
(McCright, 2007). O’Neill and Boykoff (2010) describe climate contrarians as those 
who have ideological motivations for their opinion, but explicitly exclude those who 
are ‘thus far unconvinced by the science and individuals who are unconvinced by 
proposed solutions’ (Boykoff, 2013: 8). This interpretation implies a deliberate 
decision to take an opposing view to the mainstream based on pre-existing ideologies 
and opinions on climate change, or indeed on any topic where a consensus position has 
been identified. It foreshadows Lewandowsky et al.’s (2013a: 1) finding that not only 
are free-market worldviews ‘an important predictor of the rejection of scientific 
findings that have potential regulatory implications, such as climate science’, but that 
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rejection of scientific propositions are, in general, associated with those who endorse 
conspiracy theories. This includes the idea that inconvenient scientific conclusions, 
such as those which may require regulation or behavioural change, are a hoax.  
 
Some attempts have been made to mix taxonomies and the creation of new labels, 
mostly in terms of providing sub-categories for denial. For example, Weintrobe (2013), 
mainly focusing on psychological elements, identifies three forms of climate denial 
(denialism, negation and disavowal). Hobson and Niemeyer (2012: 398) take Cohen’s 
(2001) typology of denial and apply it to climate change. In this interpretation, literal 
denial means that ‘climate change is not happening’, interpretive denial is closer to 
climate scepticism in that it ‘encompasses rationales like “it may be happening but is 
caused by natural cycles/is not that big of a deal”’, and implicatory denial suggests that 
climate change is either too distant a phenomenon to care about personally, or too 
large an issue for a single person to change (Hamilton, 2010). This typology is built on 
to create five labelled categories of denier: (i) emphatic negaters who claim the science 
is too uncertain to authoritatively claim that climate change is happening; (ii) 
unperturbed pragmatics who do not deny climate change per se but do reject the idea 
of fixed policies aimed at mitigating climate change and feel the cost would outweigh 
the benefits; (iii) proactive uncertains, a broad category which shares elements with 
the other four identified—they doubt the existence of climate change and are 
indifferent to policies; (iv) earnest acclimatisers who question the cause of climate 
change and believe in a natural origin of increasing CO2 levels; and (v) non-committal 
consenters who question the science pertaining to the causes and consequences of 
climate change.  
 
 
Alarmist voices 
Most often used to identify those at the other end of the polarised climate debate, the 
other most prevalent group of labels includes alarmist, warmist, believer or 
catastrophist (Risbey, 2008; Smith, 2012). These appear to be employed almost 
exclusively by those themselves labelled as sceptics, deniers or contrarians to identify 
individuals who agree with mainstream climate science and/or the need for mitigation 
or adaptation climate policy (with some labels such as catastrophist or warmist applied 
to those who are particularly vocal in their agreement). While these labels do appear in 
the academic literature to varying degrees they have not been subject to anywhere 
near the same degree of critical attention as have labels such as sceptic or denier 
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(noting nonetheless some valuable and interesting discussions in the grey literature 
(Edwards, 2012; Nerlich, 2013)) possibly due to their use mostly by outsiders to the 
academic community. Of these labels, believer appears to be particularly worth 
addressing however, as it implies religious connotations that are in direct conflict with 
the notion of conclusions based on scientific evidence (with a related identifier being 
the “church of global warming”). It is thus used to criticise individuals who do not 
evaluate knowledge claims on merit, but “believe” that such claims must be true, for a 
variety of reasons such as uncritical acceptance of scientific proclamations, or because 
they align with self-interested viewpoints such as the need for supra-national 
government structures (Jeffrey, 2011). 
 
 
3.2.2 The mainstream  
As has been emphasised throughout this paper, labels in the climate debate focus on 
identifying those at polarised extremes (whether or not the individuals being labelled 
as such see their position in this light). Thus an omission that was striking during the 
course of this research was the lack of label(s) to identify all those who occupy the so-
called middle ground between these extremes (with the noted exception of the triptych 
of ‘cautious’, ‘disengaged’ and ‘doubtful’ from Maibach et al. (2009)). However, we 
suggest that while not previously identified as such, the notion of a mainstream may in 
itself be considered to serve a similar function for this middle ground as do sceptic or 
alarmist for the extremes. The idea of a mainstream appears to be most frequently 
used to identify the body of climate science that indicates a relationship between 
human-induced fossil fuel emissions and global temperature increases (Boussalis and 
Coan, 2013; Hmielowski et al., 2014), with the corresponding labels mainstream 
climate scientist or mainstream climate science. It is also strongly related with the 
work of the IPCC (Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010). The idea of a scientific consensus is 
more controversial (Montford, 2013), despite efforts to quantify its strength (Cook et 
al., 2013), but is often also used in the context of this mainstream (Anderegg et al., 
2010). The notion of the mainstream is interesting as people label and identify 
themselves in terms of occupation of ranks and positions to create an ideology of their 
identity. This in turn invokes expectations, guiding their own and others’ behaviours 
and setting the nature of an individual’s engagement with activities and people. Thus a 
mainstream, particularly a mainstream that is in agreement with a (scientific) 
consensus, is an important label, as it groups together those who self-identify that they 
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form part of a majority opinion (similar to Kuhn’s (1962) concept of prevailing 
scientific paradigms).  
 
Notably, the idea of a mainstream appears to be largely, if not entirely, limited to 
climate science, as it is apparent that public opinion regarding climate change is ever-
evolving (Clements, 2012; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012) and as such no clear labels have 
been developed to identify this more amorphous public grouping (thus again helping to 
exacerbate the perception of the climate debate as one between polarised adversaries). 
Hoffman (2011b) suggests that the most common public position on climate change 
can be regarded as “convinced” (using a stylised bell curve to represent deniers at one 
end and believers at the other); however this label is not in common dialogue. It is 
unclear whether these middle ground opinions have not been the focus of as much 
labelling attention as it is considered unnecessary to do so, or whether they are 
regarded as too heterogeneous to accurately categorise.  
 
The notion of a mainstream is also interesting in that it helps to highlight the important 
idea that labels are not created or applied equally. Similar to other contexts in which 
labels are used pejoratively (Gadon and Johnson, 2009) or have become stigmatised 
over time (Asard, 2009), two distinct modes of labelling appear to be occurring within 
the climate debate, both producing very different outcomes: self- and other-labelling. 
For example, “the mainstream” is a classic example of self-labelling, defined in social 
identity theory as the process by which an individual reflects on themselves as an 
object, and categorises themselves in relation to the pre-existing social categories 
within their society to create an identity (Stets and Burke, 2000). While it is arguable 
that there is an overwhelming majority of climate scientists who are in agreement with 
certain fundamental components of climate science such as the idea that humans have 
a discernible impact on climate processes (Doran and Zimmerman, 2009; Cook et al., 
2013; Santer et al., 2013), the same cannot be said of the general public (Boussalis and 
Coan, 2013). Thus self-labelling helps to see that the notion of a mainstream is 
problematic, as it not only fails to adequately specify who is captured within that 
mainstream, but it also immediately frames all those who disagree as an outsider. The 
alternative, creating categories from the outside, variously known as other-labelling or 
analysts’ categories (Edwards, 1998), is also troublesome. For example, while the label 
of sceptic can often be self-designated, rarely is the label of denier (Niederer, 2013). 
Conversely, those designated as alarmists, warmists or believers appear to be entirely 
labelled as such by those at the other end of the spectrum. By creating categories from 
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the outside rather than engaging claims-makers to create categories for themselves, 
labels can thus be used to attack, rather than to explain. Hobson and Niemeyer 
highlight this issue, arguing that ‘there is a difference between voluntarily identifying 
oneself as a climate sceptic and responding to a survey questionnaire that aims to 
locate those who might be considered as sceptical in some way but do not self-identify 
as such’ (2012: 401).  
 
 
3.3 Problematic labelling constructs 
While more detailed labels can allow for more precise descriptions, and alternative 
labels may more quickly identify the viewpoint in question, we suggest that climate 
labels are mostly problematic as they tend towards division rather than acting as a 
means of bringing actors closer together. Not only is the positionality of labelling 
largely ignored within the literature (who is labelling whom and how do these labels 
contribute to ideas of being “right” and “wrong” about various aspects of climate 
change?), numerous other problems can be identified.  
 
 
3.3.1 Undertones 
Some labels within the debate appear to have the intent of being pejorative, such as 
denier or alarmist, with the latter associated with “crying wolf” or exaggerating danger 
(Bacon, 2013). Indeed, the very idea of labelling someone as an alarmist, rather than as 
legitimately sounding alarm at the potential implications of climate change, implies a 
diminished importance to that individual’s claim and is thus inherently derogative. The 
use of labels directly influences the way in which individuals are seen in the eyes of 
others, rather than attempting to understand how, inter alia, political or ideological 
viewpoints contribute to individual opinion formation. For example, in a more overtly 
political setting, members of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Independence Party have been 
allegedly labelled as “mad, swivel-eyed loons” by members of the UK Conservative 
Party (Dominiczak, 2013), closely echoing the label of “eco-loons” recently ascribed to 
“warmists” by some UK climate sceptics (Delingpole, 2012). These derogative labels 
immediately frame the nature of the debate as antagonistic and combative (as also 
seen in Kerr and Moy’s (2002) examination of newspaper coverage of fundamentalist 
Christians). Even the greater detail proposed by authors such as Weintrobe (2013) in 
their sub-categorisations of denial, while positive in aiming to actively highlight 
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difference within an overall category, fails to avoid the negative implications of the 
term denier, particularly when it is used as a means of attack.  
 
Labels can also serve to mask the detail of particular points of view, such as the 
motivations behind why these opinions are formed in the first place, and, as a result, 
allow for a pejorative overlay to be implied without adequate critical thought. This is 
particularly concerning given that the meaning of particular labels may change over 
time. Consequently, what may once have been a term with a positive or neutral 
implication (such as the idea of scepticism within scientific practice) changes as it 
becomes associated with particular individuals who hold an outlier view. For example, 
uncertainty regarding the potential impacts of climate change, as well as our 
understanding of the global climate system, is a particularly important motivating 
factor for sceptical opinions (Corner et al., 2012) yet is completely masked by labels 
such as denier. Importantly, uncertainty is often not due to a lack of scientific 
understanding, but a ‘lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings 
amplified by the various political, cultural, and institutional contexts within which 
science is carried out’ (Sarewitz, 2004: 385). Moreover, uncertainty, and specifically 
the words we use to describe uncertainty, means different things to different people 
(Morgan and Mellon, 2011). Corner et al. (2012) explain that in the field of scientific 
enquiry in particular, the term has come to be associated with ignorance, and if the 
perception exists among the general public or the media that scientists do not have 
100% certainty, then they do not or cannot know anything (certainly) about it at all. 
Uncertainties can be deliberately highlighted by those seeking to cast doubt on an 
overall field of science due to ideological or other motivation (Luntz, 2002) and can 
play a central role in further deepening opposition between those who conceive of 
science as a “search for absolute truth” and those who understand it more as an 
ongoing debate (Rabinovich and Morton, 2012).  
 
 
3.3.2 Polarised labels and identity attribution 
Existing climate labels serve to represent individuals as polar opposites, failing to 
represent the myriad of opinions that exist between these extremes. As highlighted 
above, this is particularly obvious as there are no labels existing to identify those 
whose viewpoint falls within these opposing poles. This binary format, establishing an 
inherently dualistic and combative debate, is concerning, as it necessarily pits each 
group against a far-distant “other” and the strengthening of opposition as a result of 
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these combative labels is clearly evident (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2012). Binary labels 
also delay public understanding about climate change by contributing to a ‘logic 
schism’ (Hoffman, 2011b: 9) across which dialogue is becoming less and less politically 
viable (Pielke, 2007). Labelling in this context is thus fostering an environment where 
preservation of one’s ideology, identity and the group one belongs to takes priority 
over constructive deliberation of knowledge or evidence: who one is becomes more 
important that what one is arguing. Indeed, assigning directly conflicting labels to 
groups of individuals based on their opinions risks putting people on ‘separate sides of 
a divide where the purpose of the exercise is to prove each other wrong’ (Sciencewise-
ERC, 2011). For example, Jones argues that ‘pitting liberals against conservatives leads 
to a polarized perception of the climate change issue and provides little practical 
guidance for policy makers who may be seeking compromise solutions’ (2011: 720).  
 
Thus, the creation and application of labels with an associated set of distinctive 
characteristics may lead to individuals adopting character aspects, or more and more 
extreme positions on a particular topic, in order to maintain group identity and 
homogeneity. This could further stimulate the adoption of the group perspective when 
processing information as well as the notion of “assimilation bias” whereby an 
individual habitually selects information which encourages and defends their existing 
position and ignores data which conflicts with their ideology (Cormick, 2011; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). To this end, the very act of categorising even by academic social 
scientists may further emphasise in-group cohesion, exacerbating the existing problem. 
 
Preserving group identity and membership is also argued to be preferable to the 
potential for cognitive dissonance (Cooper and Stone, 2000) which is understood as a 
‘negative…state which occurs whenever an individual simultaneously holds two 
cognitions (ideas, beliefs, opinions) which are psychologically inconsistent’ (Aronson, 
1969: 2) and which threatens a person’s positive self-image. Group membership 
(enhanced through labelling practices) can reduce dissonance by diffusing individual 
responsibility for potential negative consequences created by that group, and thus 
reducing the overall magnitude of the dissonance experienced by any one individual. 
Eliminating cognitive dissonance can occur by admitting the original opinion was built 
on false values or evidence, or re-aligning values and beliefs to fit well with the newly 
formed opinion—however, the latter rarely occurs (Weber, 2013). What is more likely, 
as Tavris and Aronson (2007) explain using a pyramid analogy, is that, when faced 
with an issue, individuals will take small steps down one side of the pyramid, each 
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moving further away from their starting point as a result of their differing 
interpretations of evidence and associated self-justifications. The consequence is that 
finally each individual arrives at opposing ends of the pyramid and is unable to 
recognise the initial similarities between their viewpoints, and see the other’s opinions 
as unreasonable, or even dangerous. Tavris and Aronson suggest that while it is easy to 
take steps down the side of the pyramid, it is much more difficult to climb back up. The 
relationship between labels, opinions and group membership therefore suggests that 
the labels associated with each of these extreme positions in the climate debate may 
also be an important contributory factor in the challenge of ascending the pyramid in 
order to engage in productive dialogue. 
 
 
3.3.3 Fixed opinions 
The very act of creating and applying labels can also contribute to an opinion becoming 
increasingly static, or unresponsive to new information. Individuals piece together 
different pieces of information from trusted sources to fit with more general values and 
beliefs and ‘do not adopt a rational choice model in which they weigh benefits against 
costs, utilizing subjective probabilities and discounting the future’ (Marquart-Pyatt et 
al., 2011: 39). Moreover, due to the evolving nature of these attributes, in addition to 
contextual influences such as the media, it is important to recognise that opinions are 
not fixed and instead continuously evolve (Zhao, 2009). This point of flexibility is 
important, as opinions may change based on exposure to new information or changes 
in external circumstance (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2013b). 
However existing climate labels serve to reduce the need to delve deeper into the exact 
arguments or motivations made by individual claims-makers and to write off those 
expressing an opposing point of view by virtue of the category to which they have been 
ascribed. In other words, the very act of labelling fixes categories, increasing the 
possibility of transforming into stereotypes. Such labels thus fail to accurately reflect 
reality, yet cement our interactions with those we have stereotyped (Stets and Burke, 
2000). As Koteyko et al. (2012: 9) suggest, stereotypes are a shorthand way in which 
the “negative other” is conceived in the climate debate, such as ‘AGW [anthropogenic 
global warming] nuts’ or ‘scaremongering scientists’.  
 
With this in mind, categorisation that leads to stereotyping may in turn reinforce the 
power of group-identity dynamics. Therefore, not because of personal disagreement 
but due to the category an individual feels he or she belongs to (or should belong to), 
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scepticism or disengagement may seem like an appropriate response. For example, 
McCright and Dunlap (2011b) show that political orientation is a significant factor in 
opinion formation about climate change in the USA. Social group association, 
identification and commitment all have implications for the processing of climate 
change information, the construction of knowledge and concern about the 
environment, as well as the construction of ignorance and ambivalence (Oreskes and 
Conway, 2008). It is thus unsurprising that climate change opinions have been 
demonstrated to be intrinsically linked to an individual’s world view, values and beliefs 
(Whitmarsh, 2011).  
 
 
3.3.4 Failure at capturing complexity 
Labels within the climate debate have also failed to fully capture the complexity of 
particular opinions about climate change, let alone how they may change over time. 
Despite the increasingly detailed taxonomies created within the literature, they do not 
seem to capture well the arguments and motivations which together make up an 
opinion. As Fischhoff (2007: 7205) argues, the choices people make reflect their 
experience, concerns, behaviours, attitudes and values; however, at the same time, ‘it is 
impossible to judge people fairly or to provide them with needed information without 
knowing what is on their minds when they formulate, resolve, implement, and revise 
climate-related choices’. Current climate labels, which actively mask awareness of 
internal motivation and focus on expressed opinion, are thus acutely problematic.  
 
Labels are also failing to capture geographic complexity, as viewpoints on climate 
change encompass different meanings in different geographical contexts. Painter 
(2011), in a study of the occurrence of climate scepticism in the media in China, Brazil, 
France, India, the UK and the USA identifies the challenges and limitations of our 
current labels for different opinions about climate change opinions, noting that there 
can often be a vast difference between different terms, yet sometimes little 
consideration given to how they are employed. In a recent study of audience 
segmentation as a means by which targeted climate change messaging can be 
developed and deployed, Hine et al. (2014) also note that while labels may, ‘at least in 
broad terms’ reflect climate change mind-sets, it ‘can be challenging to generate labels 
that are intuitively meaningful, and also faithfully represent the complex combination 
of variable scores upon which the segments are formed’. 
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Collapsing important distinctions of arguments or motivations into blanket labels such 
as sceptic also does little to illuminate arguments and instead, can demonise individual 
claims-makers. This is not unique to the climate debate. As Cole and Morgan (2011) 
argue in their examination of derogatory discourses of veganism, labels can serve to 
misrepresent the experience of what it means to hold a particular viewpoint, and thus 
marginalise those to whom the label is applied. They suggest that this also harms those 
who do not share that specific viewpoint, as they are not presented with the 
opportunity to understand the phenomenon. This also reduces the likelihood of 
debates being engendered about our fundamental relationship with, in Cole and 
Morgan’s case, nonhuman animals, and in the case of climate change, the environment. 
The example of veganism has direct parallels with climate change, as, for example, by 
labelling individuals as alarmists, the general public may be less inclined to want to 
understand the reasons why such concern is being felt in the first place—with the label 
serving to “write-off” the need to examine the argument in question. Indeed, as Boykoff 
(2013: 9) argues, ‘treatment of individuals through denigrating monikers does little to 
illuminate the contours of their arguments; it actually has the opposite obfuscating 
effect in the public sphere’.  
 
Furthermore, as it remains the simplest and most well-known typology, Rahmstorf’s 
(2005) categories continue to be loosely employed when discussing all types of what 
we in this paper identify as sceptical voices. However these are often supplemented by 
additional labels and terms which add to the ambiguity and in a sense “mobilisation” of 
claims-makers, as boundaries are blurred and the periphery of denial becomes 
distorted with, for example, those who hold more nuanced opinions; those who 
question the models used to predict future climate change; those who experience 
cognitive dissonance; and those who do not deny climate change but fail to act 
mitigatively. Thus creating a labelling taxonomy to adequately represent the nuances 
inherent within opinions about climate change may best be regarded as an inherently 
problematic and possibly futile task. 
 
 
3.4 The importance of context 
In addition to these problematic labelling constructs, the application of these climate 
labels in context appears also to have been significantly under-investigated (as 
compared to the considerable effort directed towards academic exercises of 
classification). For example, while a search of Web of Knowledge fails to identify a 
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single use of the label warmist in the academic literature, it is not an uncommon term 
both online and in media sources. For example, “climate warmist” resulted in 5,840 
results via Google Search (on 14 August 2014). On 1,070 occasions, the label “warmist” 
appears five times or more in English language newspapers (sourced from Nexis 
online) in conjunction with either “climate change”, “global warming” or “greenhouse”: 
47% of these newspapers are Australian and 35% are UK-based (and of these 24% are 
publications of the Telegraph Media Group). Why this particular label is vastly more 
common in Australian and UK media than in other Anglo-Saxon countries where 
climate scepticism has also been found to be prevalent (such as the USA or Canada) 
(Painter, 2011) is unclear.  
 
It does seem apparent that different contexts give rise to different forms of climate 
opinions (for example in terms of relationship to political affiliation) and hence 
labelling constructs. In the USA, Maibach et al. (2009) identify six different ‘Americas’ 
in terms of their relationship to climate change: alarmed, concerned, cautious, 
disengaged, doubtful and dismissive, with the most extreme of the groups strongly 
related to, respectively, Democratic politics (alarmed) and Republican politics 
(dismissive). This relationship between party politics and climate opinions is clearly 
demonstrated in the US literature; however, this appears to be less of an area of 
interest for, for example, UK-based scholars.  
 
Taxonomies of climate scepticism, while identifying broad locations where debate 
occurs such as ‘internet forums’ (Rahmstorf, 2005: 77) or ‘the public sphere, 
particularly the media’ (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012: 397), provide little to no 
indication as to the origins of the pre-existing labels identified, not to mention where 
the authors intend the newly specified labels they have created to be employed in the 
future. While it is entirely possible to create detailed taxonomies or alternative terms 
within an academic context, it is a potentially entirely futile exercise if such efforts do 
not go beyond the confines of university enquiry. One may therefore ask what the point 
would be in greater specificity if it is unable to change the terms upon which debate is 
held. Questioning who may be using which labels and to what purpose enables a more 
nuanced understanding to be held regarding questions of, for example, access to 
scientific debate (Huntingford and Fowler, 2008), influence of corporate lobbying on 
policy decision-making (Falke, 2011), or the more general legitimation strategies or 
rhetorical techniques employed by the multiple actors involved (Malone, 2009; Besel, 
2011). 
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Thus, what is most problematic about the lack of attention given to the specifics of 
context is that the literature has, to date, missed the opportunity to highlight the power 
inherent in the application of such discursive terms. For example, why may particular 
terms be deemed acceptable in certain contexts and not others, and what might that 
mean in terms of framing the climate debate overall? Schäfer (2012) contends that 
stakeholders communicate strategically in online environments, yet despite suggesting 
that ‘climate ‘sceptics’ are perceived to be very present online’, provides no further 
insights into how specific labelling choices may be contributing to these strategic 
processes of communication. While the appropriateness of terminology in different 
contexts and its performative effects on those contexts is hotly debated in other arenas 
(see arguments regarding race and ethnicity markers in academic journals (Bhopal et 
al., 2000) and in wider public use such as legislation (Aspinall, 2009), or the use of 
disability terminology in the mass media (Auslander and Gold, 1999)), little attention 
appears to have been paid to such issues within the climate change context.  
 
Furthermore, while claims have been put forward as to the most appropriate locations 
for overall debate about climate change, these are also rarely adequately reflected 
upon. For example, Doherty (2009) asserts that ‘sceptics and deniers…cut themselves 
off from ongoing scientific discussion but happily share their views in the full glare of 
the media’. Not only does such a claim fail to adequately recognise the gated nature of 
peer review and other processes of scientific discussion (Hojat et al., 2003), it contains 
an implicit value judgement as to the appropriate nature of the location of debate about 
climate change, and who, defined by which labels, is able to participate in which 
contexts. Consequently, whilst these labels may be more attuned to a particular context 
they remain largely an academic construct and their use and value beyond this 
scholarly environment is questionable. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion: Moving beyond labels 
Individuals who are identified by labels such as sceptic or alarmist are highly variable, 
coming from ideologically diverse backgrounds with different motivations and goals 
(Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012; Boykoff, 2013). While the literature surrounding climate 
opinions is large and growing, social science research has so far been unable to fully 
capture the extent and variety of the arguments and, importantly, underlying 
motivations that comprise these opinions. Despite recognising that categories are a 
‘fundamental device by which all members of any society constitute their social order’ 
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(Suchman, 1994: 181), we suggest that each attempt to label climate opinions 
produced thus far has been unable to accurately portray the complexity that exists, 
resulting in a mixture of labels which are used interchangeably and confusingly in 
academia, policy, the media and across other networks. Moreover, this paper has 
demonstrated that climate labels are serving to isolate, exclude, ignore and dismiss 
claims-makers of all types from constructive dialogue due to the category label to 
which they have been assigned (Canales, 2000; Jacques, 2012). Their binary and 
dualistic format (e.g. an alarmist versus a denier) entrenches positions by focuses on 
differences, creating an unhelpful “us and them” mentality which reduces opportunities 
for constructive communication and engagement. Stereotyped narratives associated 
with labels can also serve to dehumanise individuals (Smith, 2012; Cortina, 2013) so 
that legitimate concerns are unable to be adequately valued or explored. 
 
We suggest that the debate about labels, as well as the academic focus on detailed 
taxonomies or new terminology, is a distraction that is diverting attention away from 
what we consider is the most important issue to address, and one that would do most 
to encourage constructive dialogue across this polarised debate—a focus on the 
underlying motivations and rationales as to why these different opinions about climate 
change exist. Focusing on the motivations behind different opinions about climate 
change is important for several reasons, not least allowing for the identification of 
common ground between previously polarised individuals, thus creating a thread by 
which dialogue may begin. Bringing motivations to the fore would also allow for a more 
open and honest (although no less challenging and difficult) debate to be held about 
the underlying reasons as to why we disagree (Hulme, 2009). Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, focusing on motivations enables an ongoing dialogue to occur which 
is not about coming to a consensus or conclusion, but rather about emphasising the 
participatory nature of the dialogue itself.  
 
Encouraging difficult conversations about how different inputs, such as scientific 
evidence, come to be evaluated as a basis for decision-making, is likely to be more 
productive and effective in reducing polarisation than debates which hide behind 
labels and prioritise arguments without understanding their underlying rationales. As 
Wolf and Moser (2011) argue, it may be necessary to accept that no single theory will 
be able to represent human experience and action in relation to climate change. We 
hope that this focus may enable deeper and more constructively critical conversations, 
which are particularly important in terms of both public perceptions of climate change 
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and policy decision-making. For example, Ding et al. (2011) show that public 
perceptions of scientific (and policy) disagreement on climate change leads to lower 
certainty that climate change is occurring and consequently lower support for climate 
change policies. Labels are an important component in terms of public awareness of 
climate change as they frame the conversation as contentious, polarised debate, with 
this perception also heavily influenced by media coverage, and attempts to provide a 
(now-recognised as problematic) “balanced debate” (Ward, 2008; Leiserowitz et al., 
2013b; Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014) Moreover, scientists’ lack of understanding of 
whether and how to participate in policy dialogue, combined with policy-makers’ 
misperceptions of caveats in scientific processes can also lead to a confused and 
ineffective science-policy discourse (Petes et al., 2014). 
 
Understandings about climate change will vary according to historical period, 
geographical location, and social, political or cultural context. These understandings 
will also be expressed differently according to philosophical framework or academic 
discipline. New ways of framing and talking about contentious topics, as well as 
presenting related information, can have a significant impact on the way a debate is 
understood (Nelson et al., 1997). We acknowledge that some climate labels will always 
exist given the human propensity towards classification systems and the desire for 
shorthand monikers to describe complicated topics, but suggest that placing less 
emphasis on labels as a topic of interest may reduce the legitimacy of particularly 
derogatory labels as accurate signifiers. We call for an advance to be made in this field 
of research, and for focus to be squarely placed on individual motivations and 
rationales and a better recognition of their inherent idiosyncrasies and complexities. In 
so doing, we argue that unhelpful labelling constructs will have less opportunity to 
shape and further polarise an already antagonistic debate. 
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Chapter 4. Climate stories: Why do climate 
scientists and sceptical voices participate 
in the climate debate? 
4 Section 
Abstract 
Public perceptions of the climate debate predominantly frame the key actors as climate 
scientists (CSs) versus sceptical voices (SVs); however it is unclear why CSs and SVs 
choose to participate in this antagonistic and polarised public battle. A narrative 
interview approach is used to better understand the underlying rationales behind 22 
CSs’ and SVs’ engagement in the climate debate, potential commonalities, as well as 
each actor's ability to be critically self-reflexive. Several overlapping rationales are 
identified including a sense of duty to publicly engage, agreement that complete 
certainty about the complex assemblage of climate change is unattainable, and that 
political factors are central to the climate debate. We argue that a focus on potential 
overlaps in perceptions and rationales as well as the ability to be critically self-reflexive 
may encourage constructive discussion amongst actors previously engaged in 
purposefully antagonistic exchange on climate change. 
 
Keywords: climate change, debate participation, perceptions, climate scientists, 
sceptical voices 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Within the positivist scientific tradition, scepticism refers to an organised investigation 
of reality via empirical observation, informed questioning and doubting claims based 
on anecdotal evidence or belief (Gower, 1997). However, in the context of climate 
change, scepticism has become increasingly associated with a public perception of a 
dualistic, antagonistic “climate debate” characterised by intense disagreement 
regarding the existence of a scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate 
change (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2012). Prevalent arguments include disputes regarding 
the legitimacy of scientific claims made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), such as the increased level of confidence between the fourth and fifth 
Assessment Reports that anthropogenic greenhouse gases are the dominant cause of 
observed global warming since the mid-20th century, as well as arguments more closely 
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linked to national circumstances such as debates over renewable energy policies in the 
United Kingdom (UK) (Carter, 2014). Perceptions of polarisation appear justified, as 
the majority of public-facing debates about climate change frame the debate as a 
hostile “battle” or “duel” (Hoffman, 2011; McKewon, 2012).  
 
While climate change is a complex and multi-faceted issue with substantial policy 
ramifications, these public debates also frequently present the key actors as climate 
scientists (CSs) versus those who explicitly note their objection as stemming, either in 
full or in part, from disagreement over the legitimacy of scientific knowledge claims. 
We use the term sceptical voices (SVs) here in an attempt to move away from the 
problematic labelling constructs evident in the climate debate (Howarth and Sharman, 
2015), but following Painter (2011) in recognising the need for a pragmatic descriptor. 
This public framing of the climate debate as a scientific disagreement between CSs and 
SVs has been recognised in the literature. Verheggen et al. (2014: 8964) note that 
contention regarding the existence of scientific consensus about climate change is at 
the ‘center of the public debate’ and Pearce et al. (2014) also suggest that debate is 
predominantly represented in the public as focusing on the veracity of scientific 
evidence. This differs to academic understandings which encompass both science and 
policy (Martin and Rice, 2014) or, as Rayner (2012: 117) suggests, an awareness that 
the climate debate includes policy debate ‘conducted by means of a surrogate dispute 
over the quality of the science’. Indeed, rhetorical devices such as the notion of “sound 
science” are particularly important in framing fundamentally political debates as 
scientific (McGarity, 2003-2004). Whilst causality between scientific evidence and 
policy action is complex to establish and is not the focus here, the perception of active 
scientific debate about the anthropogenic nature or severity of climate change is 
important because climate change is unlikely to appear on policymakers’ agendas 
without public recognition of its legitimacy as a basis for policy action (Pralle, 2009). 
 
Despite recognising therefore that much of what is disputed are not the explicit 
knowledge claims themselves, but underlying issues such as competing values (Hulme, 
2009) or perceptions of societal risk (Kahan et al., 2012), what remains unclear is why 
do CSs or SVs then participate in an ostensibly scientifically-focused public debate. 
Rooted in Converse’s (1964) notion of issue publics where individuals are interested in 
issues of perceived personal relevance, a vast literature exists to investigate 
motivations behind public participation in political debates. Attention has increasingly 
been directed towards participation in specific topic areas, particularly those 
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combining science and controversial policy implications. Ho et al. (2011) find that 
perceptions of media bias are directly and positively associated with issue-specific 
participation and Becker et al. (2010) find that ideological predispositions and 
attention to particular media are also significant. In the case of climate change, opinion 
leaders play an important role as ‘connective communication tissue’ (Nisbet, 2011: 
357) within issue publics, helping to recruit previously passive members to become 
further involved. Individuals move up Milbrath’s (1965) hierarchy of political 
participation, from “spectator” to “gladiator”-type activities (such as appearing in 
political forums) in order to influence others’ opinions. However, this literature focuses 
predominantly on political participation by the general public and is thus inadequate to 
explain why actors presented as key participants in contentious public debates (in this 
case, CSs and SVs) either actively choose to, or are drawn into participating in, public 
scientific controversies. These actors are differentiated from the general public in 
terms of their status as holders of relevant expertise (Stehr and Grundmann, 2011). 
This expert status is fundamental, as those who are deemed “experts” are, within an 
evidence-based policy model, regarded to have a greater degree of influence and power 
over subsequent policy decisions (Weible, 2008). Critically, expert status may be self-
designated by individuals within alternative issue publics and achieved via public 
profile, or may also be externally-designated via third-party accreditation (such as 
formal qualifications gained within academic epistemic communities). However we do 
not aim here to comment on the legitimacy of actors’ participation in the climate 
debate. Whereas attention has previously been directed towards individual 
understanding of and personal engagement with climate change as an issue (Wolf and 
Moser, 2011), we do however identify a gap in terms of understanding the underlying 
motivations behind more active and vocal participation by both types of expert 
knowledge holders within public scientific controversies.  
 
It is possible that fundamental and impenetrable differences exist between CSs and 
SVs, with each actor group entering and operating within the climate debate according 
to distinct paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). For example, scientists are understood to be 
particularly anxious about retaining control over knowledge claims (Poliakoff and 
Webb, 2007), with Young and Matthews finding that scientists become especially 
concerned when they perceive the public as changing the ‘meanings of claims based on 
non-scientific values and principles’ (2007: 141). This reflects a desire to uphold the 
pre-eminence of the positivist scientific tradition as a basis for evidence-based 
decision-making (Wesselink et al., 2014) as well as (perhaps unconscious) boundary-
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making activity (Gieryn, 1999). Alternatively, these differences may not be innate, but 
it is the public perception of a polarised, scientifically-focused debate that frames these 
actors as fundamentally different. In this interpretation, framing participants as 
duelling adversaries in the media (Zhao et al., 2014) or via labelling practices 
(Howarth and Sharman, 2015), helps to co-construct polarisation over time, ignoring 
potentially important underlying similarities between actor groups such as overlaps in 
motivations for debate participation. Ravetz’s (2011; 2012) work on ‘Climategate’ 
using the framework of post-normal science gives plausibility to the latter scenario as 
he finds that challenges to the speaking ‘truth to power’ model of the science-policy 
interface makes both CSs and SVs uneasy. However, with the turbulent nature and 
unpredictability of modern life, combined with complexities inherent to different 
cultures, existing commonalities can be challenging to recognise (Jasanoff, 2004). We 
are therefore particularly interested in the possibility of identifying commonalities 
between divergent groups engaged in conflict in order to assess where overlapping 
motivations for debate participation could facilitate constructive dialogue. Exposure to 
others’ opinions is a known driver of public and individual opinion formation 
(Moussaid et al., 2013), and critically, explicit recognition of opinion overlaps has been 
shown to increase positive attitudes across both groups engaged in dispute (Dovidio et 
al., 2012). Leveraging overlapping opinions, such as consensus regarding particular 
scientific claims, can reduce climate policy conflict (O'Sullivan and Emmelhainz, 2014) 
and exposure to ideologically dissimilar viewpoints has also been found to reduce 
public dissemination of extreme opinions (Wojcieszak and Rojas, 2011).  
 
An example of this occurred in 2014, when 12 CSs and SVs, all active on social media, 
met in the UK in an effort to ‘calm the debate’ (Yeo, 2014). While the specifics of the 
conversation are unavailable, the event was regarded by one of its participants as 
useful in terms of stimulating discussion and providing the possibility to ‘understand 
each other better’ (Watts, 2014). Such occasions indicate the possibility of more 
nuanced understanding of the different rationales contributing to others’ opinions. 
Importantly, it suggests that focusing on commonalities or engendering deliberative 
fora to avoid the more common dead-end ‘dialogues of the deaf’ (van Eeten, 1999: 185) 
evident in public scientific controversies may be necessary in order to inspire critical 
self-reflexivity to occur. Self-reflexivity is a crucial process as it, in essence, requires 
individuals to question their own inherent assumptions and values (Cunliffe, 2004), 
and is may reduce antagonism and hostility between actors involved in polarised and 
adversarial public debates. Moreover, examining together the underlying rationales 
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behind issue publics and more formal epistemic community participation in public 
scientific controversies is important because it may suggest avenues for constructive 
dialogue, rather than dualistic debate. This is a critical methodological distinction 
because it innately reduces the dichotomy of the lay public versus an accredited 
knowledge holder(s).  
 
 
4.2 Method 
A series of 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted with UK-based individuals 
identified as CSs (n=11) and SVs (n=11) (Table 4.1). As much of the literature on the 
climate debate is US-focused, this research provides an important alternative 
perspective. In order to delve beyond explicit statements of self-declared rationales 
towards more latent motivations, interviews aimed to enable participants to build their 
own narratives and to critically self-reflect on them throughout the interview. While 
research interviews engender an artificial situation (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) 
where interviewees may feel the need to provide answers they think the interviewer 
wants to hear (Schwarz, 1999), stories told within an interview can also form part of 
an important ‘meaning-making process’ (Seidman, 2013: 7), interpreted by the 
researcher using theoretical underpinnings to form relevant conclusions. Daniels and 
Endfield (2009) suggest that the method in which people receive and interpret climate 
change information, particularly of its “dangerous” nature, affects resulting actions. 
Thus, by producing their own stories, interviewees offer a window into personal 
experiences and a mechanism by which to self-reflect (Hards, 2012). Hiller and Diluzio 
(2004) also suggest that interviewees participating in narrative-based interviews carry 
out a complex discursive activity known as reflexive progression. Through this process 
the interviewer can ‘push further for linkages, motivations and clarifications that lead 
to new discoveries by the interviewee… [and create] some kind of order that was 
previously unclear, even to the interviewee’ (Hiller and Diluzio, 2004: 17). 
 
Questions covered three main themes: (i) how each actor perceives themselves, (ii) 
perception of a dominant “other” (most commonly framed as a polarised adversary), 
and (iii) the perceived usefulness of participating in a vocal and public debate, 
including perceptions of debate framing. The first two themes were chosen in order to 
understand whether actors’ perceptions of themselves or the “other” could be seen as 
contributory factors towards debate participation. The third theme covered a wider 
range of topics relevant to debate participation such as perceptions of debate topic 
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(both explicit and latent), labelling practices, and why they as individual actors should 
be involved. Interview transcripts were analysed using a mixture of descriptive and 
thematic coding (Thomas, 2006). Whilst verbally narrating their thought process, 
interviewees were also asked to place their opinion, and that of a dominant “other” 
(representing the main arguments encountered that oppose their point of view) on a 
spectrum of opinion with two axes (science and policy), building on Capstick and 
Pidgeon’s (2013) epistemic and response scepticism.  
 
Table 4.1: Interview sources 
Category Source Number of 
interviewees 
Climate 
scientists  
(CSs) 
Senior, most >30 years post-PhD 6 
Mid-career, most 15-30 years post-PhD 2 
Early-career, most <15 years post-PhD 3 
Sceptical 
voices  
(SVs) 
Individuals from the ‘list of sceptics ‘mentioned’ more than 
once in 10 UK national newspapers’ (Painter, 2011) 
4 
UK-based blog authors from Sharman (Sharman, 2014) 4 
Involved with the activities of the GWPF e.g. Academic 
Advisory Council or published on GWPF website 
3 
  22 
 
 
Participating CSs’ specialisms included climate modelling and climate physics, with all 
participating in public engagement activities such as public speaking or blogging. CSs 
were selected using Kahan’s (2013) list of characteristics defining a credible scientist, 
including professional experience in the climate science field (e.g. contributors to IPCC 
Assessment Reports), number of peer-reviewed publications, and seniority. SVs were 
identified from three sources: Painter’s (2011: 128) ‘list of sceptics ‘mentioned’ more 
than once in 10 UK national newspapers’; Sharman’s (2014) climate sceptical blog 
authors, chosen due to online sources’ increasing importance in the climate debate 
(Gavin and Marshall, 2011); and those associated with the Global Warming Policy 
Foundation (GWPF), a well-known sceptical voice about climate change in the UK. 
 
 
4.3 Perceptions of self 
The dominant theme driving climate scientists’ (CSs) self-perceptions was a youth-
driven aspiration to contribute positively to the environment. Personal experiences of 
nature during childhood were critical, with many CSs recalling that they “enjoyed being 
outdoors” (CS5) or being in close proximity to “the natural world which surrounded 
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our houses” (CS1). Other experiences built on this engagement with nature, such as 
CS10 recalling hearing a talk at primary school that led to him “becoming worried 
about the environment” as a result, or from family influences, such as CS1 who 
remarked that “I’ve always had an interest in energy, right from being a child. My dad 
worked at a nuclear power station and we lived around the corner from it”. These early 
experiences were identified as important contributory factors to the subsequent 
aspiration to take a career path that was regarded as “positive or useful” (CS2) to 
society. Two other directly-related sub-themes were identified: an ongoing fascination 
with the environment, and a heroic desire to do good. CSs mentioned a sustained 
curiosity driven by frequent occurrences of professional amazement or awe inspiring 
their interest in the natural sciences. While this fascination for some was directly 
youth-driven, for others it emerged after a few years in the field, as the original choice 
to work in climate change arose from the need to be employed. CS4 identified that “I 
probably stumbled into the area… [as after] finishing my PhD I needed a job” and CS8 
noted that at the start, “I didn’t believe that this was going to be my life-long career”. 
However, nearly all perceive themselves as having a heroic desire to “do something 
that felt more tangibly useful to society” (CS10) or to “[work] on a problem that was an 
important problem for society” (CS2). In making these statements and creating their 
personal narratives, the CSs emphasise the value of their work to society as well as how 
it fits in the growing international context of climate change as a topic of public 
concern. They are also cognisant of the obligations placed on them as recipients of 
public funds, particularly as regards requirements to publish results truthfully, despite 
the possibility they may be “politically unpalatable” (CS9). The spectrum presented to 
interviewees enabled actors to further self-reflect on their opinions with most CSs 
placing themselves in the top right quadrant (Figure 4.1). This was predominantly 
based on high value being accorded to scientific knowledge claims that climate change 
was having serious global impact. Reflections on the certainty of this evidence were 
however noted, with CS6 commenting that “nothing is certain, but it’s very certain” and 
CS9 narrating: 
If you're defining anthropogenic climate change as global mean surface 
temperature, then I'll be right up high at the top here in terms of certain. If you're 
talking about anthropogenic climate change in particular regions of the globe, at 
particular times of the year around the place, I would be far less than certain. I 
have a range, depending on what your definition is.  
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Indeed, two interviewees (one CS, one SV) were critical of the notion of “certain” 
evidence for anthropogenic climate change and chose not to place themselves on the 
spectrum at all. 
 
The dominant theme underlying sceptical voices’ (SVs) self-perceptions was that of 
being a crusader for truth. The actor disinterestedly and independently investigates 
scientific claims made about climate change and finds them either incorrect or, more 
commonly, corrupt and self-serving. There was a strong moral rationale underpinning 
this theme. SV3 noted that “I have to give up a job and have no earnings in order to 
have someone…who can stand up and say it’s not about politics; it’s about whether the 
evidence is right!”. The SV is thus fighting to expose climate change as the “biggest 
scandal in modern science” (SV5). The ideal of disinterested investigation based on 
evidence, unrelated to “motivation like a thick brown envelope from the oil industry” 
(SV9) is critical to this self-perception, even when the actor acknowledges that their 
view on climate policies influences their view on climate science. Seven SVs disagreed 
that personal values influenced their opinion as they felt it was more inconvenient to 
take a contrary point of view to that espoused by the majority. However others were 
more critically self-reflective during the interview process. For example, SV6 
recognised a greater personal interest in sources which suggested climate change was 
not a serious problem. SV8 explicitly identified the role of individual values as being an 
important part of opinion formation, specifically as regards “understanding how 
people perceive problems and risks”. Two sub-themes support the crusader self-
perception: opposition to the hype of climate science and concern for equity. The first 
involves the actor being triggered by a single event (e.g. Climategate) or gradually over 
time, to investigate scientific claims (and associated economic implications) and 
finding them “over-egged… exaggerated…not realistic” (SV8). This exaggeration is done 
by scientists, the media or others, all of whom have a financial stake in maintaining the 
mainstream consensus. Equity captures the opinion that current climate change policy 
is “hurting… the poor” (SV1) both in the UK and internationally. Thus the SV perceives 
him/herself as standing up and fighting for a society which “should be richer… more 
abundant, [and where] more people should have access to more energy” (SV7). 
 
The vast majority of SVs disagreed with government GHG emissions-reduction policies, 
near-exclusively on a cost basis. There was a clear message that climate change policy 
would “bust the economy” (SV11) and, building on the crusader and equity themes, 
that the ensuing ramifications would be felt most acutely by the poorest members of 
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society. However, opinion as regards the certainty of scientific evidence for 
anthropogenic climate change was divergent. As with climate scientists, most SVs 
found it challenging to place themselves on the spectrum (Figure 4.1) because “certain 
is a bad word in science” (SV2). The spectrum also highlighted difficulties SVs felt of 
articulating necessary assumptions and caveats around specific knowledge claims into 
the debate. Many SVs railed against the public perception of the debate as “black and 
white, yes/no” arguing it should be more focused on “how much and which policies” 
(SV10, emphasis in the original). This tension between the latent and manifest 
elements of the public-facing climate debate, particularly in terms of the instrumental 
use of certain types of knowledge claims, was important. For example, even though 
SV10 frequently publicly criticises climate science he argued that “I don’t think 
anyone’s interested in climate science per se… No-one cares. Only people care when it 
comes to policy”. 
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Figure 4.1: Climate scientists’ (above) and sceptical voices’ (below) opinions 
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4.4 Perceptions of a dominant “other” 
Climate scientists (CSs) found it challenging to identify a single opposing dominant 
voice, particularly as regards the spectrum in Figure 4.2. However, the most prevalent 
theme was that opposing opinions arise due to a lack of understanding about climate 
science itself, and that this misunderstanding results in people feeling threatened and 
needing to look for “ways to justify not accepting it” (CS3). A wide range of opposing 
arguments were encountered, including those who disputed the certainty of climate 
change science, through to those who “don’t deny there’s some anthropogenic 
component of climate change” (CS1) but who were more concerned with economic or 
social rationales. This perception of a lack of understanding was supported by two sub-
themes. First, CSs frequently acknowledged that opposing arguments may be 
fundamentally driven by perspectives on government intervention in society. These 
opposing arguments use scientific uncertainty to suggest that “there's not enough 
evidence to justify government regulating carbon emissions” (CS11). CSs were 
however divided on the extent to which their role should involve engaging in 
manifestly political debate and making policy recommendations (see Section 4.5). 
Thus, even though CSs are key actors in public debates that explicitly focus on scientific 
claims, they frequently recognise that the nature of the debate itself (particularly its 
potential to be based on disagreement with policy choice) means that they may not 
always be the right debate participant. Second, most CSs acknowledged that the 
opinions of others were strongly linked to values, particularly in terms of how climate 
change challenges existing ways of life. For example CS4 explicitly referred to climate 
change making people “uncomfortable” as it challenges their “cognitive and normative 
values”. This suggestion that the opinions of those who challenge mainstream climate 
science are largely formed by values and not by a rational assessment of evidence is 
important to note as it implies the possibility of normative judgement regarding the 
legitimacy of others’ opinions. Opposing voices are perceived by CSs as being strongly 
emotionally influenced and experiencing “fear, guilt, grief, loss, hopelessness” (CS3) in 
response. Discomfort regarding the causes and potential solutions to climate change 
was mentioned, as was reference to different perceptions of human interaction with 
nature. For example CS3 noted encountering a “religious belief that we have dominion 
over the planet rather than we have its custody and care in our gambit”. Nonetheless, a 
spectrum of opposing arguments is recognised. As CS6 notes,  
“[there is a] spectrum of opinions because people have different attitudes and 
different weightings on how you take now, the future, yourself in the scheme of 
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richer people, poorer people, people in different countries, whether you agree in 
principle with the governments controlling these things or not”.  
 
Sceptical voices (SVs) clearly identified a dominant other fuelled by vested interests, 
standing in direct contrast to their role as a crusader and “seeker after truth” (SV2). 
These vested interests included scientists who are focused on “trying to save their 
jobs” (SV6), although a distrust of the civil service (including but not limited to 
government scientists) was also present and related to perceptions of an alleged left-
wing agenda. Charges that SVs were themselves funded by interests such as fossil fuel 
companies were strongly refuted. There was also anger at perceptions of politicised 
science wherein scientists ignore the “ugly facts” so that they can make a “political 
play” (SV11). This may also help to explain why CSs are seen as the dominant other as 
opposed to political actors. For example, SV9 alleges the existence of a “nexus of media 
plus politicians plus establishment plus science which is funnelling literally billions and 
billions and billions of pounds into academic research” (SV9). This is particularly 
interesting when contrasted with perceptions of the role of evidence itself in the 
decision-making process. Whereas there is frustration with “people who can’t 
understand that if the policy isn’t backed up by the evidence you shouldn’t be doing the 
policy, especially if it’s… costly” (SV3), this does not translate into agreement that 
“scientists ought to be having more impact on policies” (SV11, emphasis added). 
Evidence is perceived as needing to be able to speak for itself because scientists, “are 
clearly, clearly not telling the truth” (SV1). Therefore while most of the SVs entered the 
climate change debate ostensibly due to disagreements over scientific elements (see 
the crusader theme above), they do not perceive that the other is similarly-motivated 
by a search for scientific truth, and is instead corrupted by political or financial 
incentives. The dominant other is near-unanimously perceived to be certain about the 
scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and supportive of government 
GHG emissions-reduction policies, reflecting the public perception of a polarised 
debate (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Climate stories: Why do climate scientists and sceptical voices participate in the climate debate? 
109 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Climate scientists’ (above) and sceptical voices’ (below) perceptions of the dominant 
others’ opinion 
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4.5 Debate participation and framing  
Despite it at times affecting relationships with their peers, the climate scientists (CSs) 
interviewed see it as essential to be publicly vocal about their work, particularly in 
terms of explaining the methods and data that have led to their conclusions. Being 
publicly vocal is regarded as critical as it was seen as easy for the public “to dismiss us 
and dehumanise us and make assumptions about our agenda and have reservations if 
they don’t see us out there” (CS10). This dominant theme of a strong sense of duty to 
communicate research findings was related to the publicly-funded nature of their work 
and the significant social implications arising from certain findings. However, many 
acknowledged that it is “not second nature” (CS4) for many CSs to be good public 
science communicators, as “the qualities that make you a good scientist, they’re not 
qualities that make you good communicators, they’re almost the opposite” (CS2). 
Consequently it is seen as understandable that many CSs have historically been 
reluctant to be publicly vocal. It was also argued that public engagement is not valued 
by universities and that CSs may be reluctant to publicly engage as they are fearful of 
their statements being misinterpreted or exaggerated in the media. As a result, CS9 
notes that he has been “deafened by the roar of the silence of scientists”.  
 
Several sub-themes were also identified. CSs have extensive experience of being 
labelled and attacked, using epithets such as “corrupt” (CS3), “naïve, misguided, a 
moron” (CS10) and “a liar, a cheat, a fraud” (CS7). CSs strongly believe labels, and 
indeed their personal experience of being labelled, leave people feeling angry and 
defensive, as well as deepening “the polarisation and the entrenchment of views” 
(CS10). Several CSs noted that in public discourse they attempt to avoid such labels or 
find words without negative connotations. Some also identified explicitly trying to 
directly personally engage with those who hold diametrically opposed opinions, such 
as via the meeting of CSs and SVs referred to in the introduction above. A general 
consensus emerged among interviewees that debate participation should be 
encouraged “as long as it’s constructive” (CS6). This meant that participants should 
present “credible arguments that they can back up with science” (CS4), as well as 
bringing to the table “their concerns, their worries, their opinion and what we should 
do about it, who should do it” (CS2). There was also a commonly held perception that 
the current climate debate is not being held on an equal footing. For example, CS9 
commented that he was is “increasingly perturbed that people make what look to be 
very cogent and very eloquent conclusions but actually have completely nebulous, 
unframed starting points”. Therefore whereas the CSs interviewed do engage in public 
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debate, they are often cautious about this engagement because debates are often seen 
as inadequately focused on scientific topics or involve other actors who are deemed to 
be less credible in terms of their expert status. It is thus unsurprising that most CSs 
believe that their engagement in the climate debate should not be overtly political and 
that they as scientists should remain “impartial and humble and open to criticism” 
(CS10). The need for establishing a frame of credibility and expertise came across 
strongly from the CSs who believe those who participate in the debate must be 
accredited and where the authoritarians of climate science consist of “people who have 
got first or second degrees in relevant disciplines and have spent a certain amount of 
professional investment of their life and study and publishing” (CS8). CSs expressed 
frustration that the climate debate involves actors who mix science and policy issues 
when engaging with scientists thereby using the arguments interchangeably to suit 
their purpose: they are “resistant against the science when really they’re resistant 
about policy” (CS10) and where “they’re still propagating that policy scepticism back to 
the science” (CS10). There was however a certain tension between this desire to retain 
a separation between science and policy, with CS11 commenting that the nature of the 
issue means that “some advocacy is warranted”. 
 
The dominant driver for sceptical voices (SVs) participation in the climate debate was 
“a sense of duty” (SV3) to bring an important alternative perspective to the table. This 
was supported by numerous rationales. For example, SV1 identified being driven by a 
combination of “a passion for science and…justice and poverty” as what is happening 
(current climate policy) is “wrong and…is hurting people”. SV2 is concerned with 
exposing “scientific fraud”; to the point that he is “gradually encircling them [climate 
scientists] and it will eventually be reported to the police”. A clear tension was 
however identified between frustration with the “politicised” (SV8) and “very 
unscientific” (SV11) nature of the climate debate, and a clear and consistent message of 
disagreement with government climate-related policies. Several SVs emphasised the 
impact of climate policies on energy prices as a key motivation for debate participation. 
As SV11 argues, “energy is the basis of all wealth [so]…all this green economy stuff is 
rubbish…We’re not a post-industrial nation. We can’t possibly exist on services”. The 
relationship between energy policy and immediate political imperatives was frequently 
mentioned, particularly as regards need to retain security of energy supply and the 
impact of green levies on energy prices. Bringing this perspective to the debate was 
seen as imperative to avoid “damaging both households and industrial 
competitiveness” (SV9).Notions of equity as well as opinions regarding the role of 
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government in society were also present. For example, while SV7 acknowledged that 
“there is a problem of climate change…that does require some level of intervention”, 
the nature of this intervention was disputed. SV7 argued that “it doesn’t have to be top-
down…it should be democratic and we should be left better off”. SV2 also contended 
that: 
“climate science…is about pursuing a…nasty political agenda, it’s a collectivist, 
centralising, bureaucratic political agenda which will make a few people very 
rich at the expense of everybody else”.  
 
The tension between the scientific and political framings of the climate debate was also 
related to the notion of belief or religion, and sometimes with the idea of a scientific 
consensus. For example, SV11 suggests that the public climate debate is framed as a 
matter of “don’t argue, the science is certain. Believe!”. The notion of belief stands in 
contrast to the desired pre-eminence of traditional scientific enquiry where “the 
arbiter of all the arguments is empirical evidence” (SV8). For many SVs, the notion of 
belief was also strongly linked to the way that labels were seen to frame the debate as 
antagonistic between duelling sides. SV11 also noted that the use of labels “more begs 
religion than it does science. When you have a religious orthodoxy, then people that 
disagree with it tend to be called deniers and hunted down”. Labelling was regarded as 
“very unhelpful” (SV10) as it is perceived as a mechanism to shut down debate. It was 
also suggested that the use of labels can further polarise individuals as those using 
them “don’t realise that members of the public are thinking, well, that’s me as well he’s 
talking about” (SV10) thus “forcing a dialogue between the middle ground…and the 
sceptics” (SV7). Labelling was thus also seen to limit the possibilities for constructive 
dialogue. SV7 commented that: 
“Everyone walks into the room knowing that there are two sides, and there’s no 
nuance. And so you try and express some kind of perspective. Oh right, so you’re 
not one of us, you’re one of them, and it’s really powerful”.  
 
No clear signal existed as to the importance of either themselves or others being 
publicly vocal (despite all being chosen due to their public profile). While half believed 
that it was “absolutely” (SV9) vital to vocally express their opinion, others were more 
cautious, with SV7 suggesting that it “depends on the level of the debate” as to whether 
or not participation was recommended. SV8 took recourse in the idea that evidence 
would be the key arbiter, only wanting to be vocal “in a measured way [as] we’re not 
campaigners…at the end of the day arguments will win”. And whereas SV6 considered 
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it critical to be active in the debate as “people have to fight their corners, so yes, the 
more the merrier”, he also noted that the hostile nature of the debate is both 
undesirable and off-putting to many. The notion of consensus was clearly seen as an 
attempt to close down debate, with SV5 passionately arguing “don’t ever tell me what I 
can or cannot have a debate about, don’t you ever say that to me! That’s fascism!”. 
 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This research investigated the underlying rationales behind the participation of climate 
scientists (CSs) and sceptical voices (SVs) in the climate debate, focusing in particular 
on potential overlaps between previously polarised individuals as well as each actor’s 
ability to be critically self-reflexive about their own and others’ opinions about climate 
change. Three research themes were investigated using a narrative format: perception 
of self, perception of a dominant “other”, and the perceived usefulness of participating 
in a vocal and public debate, including perceptions of debate framing. Table 4.2 
summarises the dominant themes emerging from both CS and SV narratives. While the 
sample size of 22 interviewees necessitates caveats regarding the representativeness 
of these findings and suggests the need for further research with a larger population, a 
notable degree of overlap between themes expressed by both actor groups is apparent. 
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Table 4.2: Key themes 
 Climate scientists Sceptical voices 
Perception of self 
Dominant theme: 
Youth-driven aspiration to contribute 
positively to the environment 
 
Sub-themes: 
 Fascination with the environment 
 Heroic desire to do good 
Dominant theme: 
Crusader for truth 
 
 
Sub-themes: 
 Opposition to the hype of 
climate science 
 Concern for equity 
Perception of a 
dominant other 
Dominant theme: 
Lack of understanding of climate 
science 
 
Sub-themes: 
 The role of government in society 
 Values-laden response 
Dominant theme: 
Vested interests 
 
 
Sub-theme: 
 Politicisation of scientific 
process 
Debate participation 
and framing 
Dominant theme: 
Sense of duty 
 
Sub-themes: 
 Labelling is negative  
 Accreditation is vital 
 Credible debate needed 
 Debate is often actually about 
policy, not science  
Dominant theme: 
Sense of duty 
 
Sub-themes: 
 Labelling is negative 
 Disagreement with 
government policy, 
especially energy policy 
 Climate change as a belief 
 
 
Immediately apparent is the mutual sense of duty to participate in the climate debate, 
albeit recognising that CSs and SVs may have differing levels of inclination or access to 
particular venues for engagement, such as the peer-reviewed literature versus 
blogosphere discussion. Whereas SVs largely feel marginalised by the mainstream 
press, the CSs who do have a greater level of access are cautious due to worries of 
misinterpretation. Nisbet and Markowitz’s (2014) finding that scientists’ engagement 
in overtly public activities such as media appearances is a function of political outlook, 
as well as holding the opinion that media coverage was important for career 
advancement, is likely applicable in this instance. We build on this finding by adding 
that a strongly held sense of duty (which may be unrelated to specific political outlook) 
is also a likely contributory factor for debate participation. Commonality in terms of 
self-perception regarding the moral rationale to do what was right for society (the CSs’ 
heroic desire to do good and the SVs’ crusade for truth) is also apparent. While the 
analysis carried out by SVs as adults was distinct from the rationales underpinning CSs 
more youthful motivations, both groups self-identify as moral actors acting upon 
deeply held convictions. Another interesting overlap identified via the opinion 
spectrums (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) was the recognition that certainty was a challenging 
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concept both in terms of precise definition and as a basis for policy decision-making. 
While there were clearly differences of opinion regarding the level and/or nature of 
certainty required for policy implementation, possibly due to different “ways of life” as 
explained by cultural theory (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999), many CSs and SVs 
acknowledged that the notion of a general scientific certainty about such a complex 
assemblage as climate change is unattainable. Recognising that certainty is multi-
faceted and that particular knowledge claims may be uncertain or contested without 
casting doubt on other pieces of evidence has significant implications as it may 
engender more explicit and necessary discussions about the trade-offs between 
scientific evidence and political decision-making. 
 
While a common public perception is that of a single debate where climate scientists 
are representatives of scientific truth and sceptical voices are the dominant 
challengers, this research contributes to understanding of a more complex reality by 
also highlighting the potential misalignment of actors and their roles in engaging in 
public debate. Nearly all SVs expressed an underlying interest in the impact of climate 
change policies on the economy despite explicit disagreement with the politicisation of 
the scientific debate. CSs were also acutely aware, and often made uncomfortable by, 
recognition that much of the debate centred on disagreement about policy choice 
rather than the science itself. If the actor-subject interaction in public discourse were to 
be renegotiated (i.e. politicians debating policies rather than CSs, or CSs actively 
choosing to debate the policy implications of their research), it may reduce the 
exhaustive nature of the debate where dead-end arguments are being held precisely 
because they do not make explicit what is actually being debated, i.e. Rayner’s (2012) 
surrogate debate. The suggestion of critical self-reflexivity evident in some interviews, 
such as SV6 and SV8 who presented themselves as able to (at least explicitly) 
acknowledge that personal values shaped their opinion, was also interesting. It was 
however not evident in the majority of interviews. We contend that critical self-
reflexivity is likely to be particularly useful in debate re-framing as it helps to pare back 
the actual topic of disagreement (Hulme, 2009) and forces the centre of the debate to 
shift towards a more overtly policy or values-focused dialogue. This is particularly 
important for public perceptions of climate change and how debate is understood to be 
a useful and necessary part of the scientific process. 
 
Nonetheless, despite uncertainty regarding the extent to which self-reflexivity did or 
can occur, what we consider the more important outcome of the narrative method 
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employed for this research is its ability to uncover overlap in interviewees’ perceptions 
and rationales. What is particularly significant is that even the way that each “side” of 
this polarised debate chose to express themselves can invite the possibility for 
constructive dialogue. Critically, identifying and emphasising these commonalities can 
be seen as a possible mechanism to defuse the antagonism evident in the debate. For 
example, it may be difficult to continue a hostile argument when participants are 
reminded of commonalities such as a mutual love of enquiry and scientific 
understanding, or agreement regarding the antagonistic and potentially off-putting 
nature of the current climate debate. This research also indicates that whereas 
inevitable differences of worldview exist, such as regarding the role of government in 
society (explicitly identified as a topic of concern by SVs and rarely mentioned by CSs) 
or which types and holders of knowledge are valued in public debate (with 
accreditation more highly valued by CSs than SVs), greater commonalities also exist 
than may be acknowledged in public forums. Building on cultural interpretations of the 
many different understandings of climate change (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999; Hulme, 
2014), we therefore suggest that a focus on potential overlaps between underlying 
(and/or manifestly expressed) rationales behind climate opinions may encourage 
constructive discussion even with actors who had previously engaged in purposefully 
antagonistic exchange. Identifying even one or two such commonalities in motivations 
and opinions could provide a valuable source for collaborative and constructive 
dialogue whereby those involved utilise these commonalities to facilitate a further 
exchange of ideas. Based on the common themes identified above, and in order for this 
to progress in practice, we suggest that it is critical that the purpose or frame of the 
debate is made as explicit as possible (i.e. whether scientific or political factors are the 
focus of contestation) so that participating parties may be nominated appropriately. 
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Chapter 5. The impact of controversy on 
the production of scientific knowledge 
5 Section 
Abstract 
Much of the existing literature employing the framework of controversy focuses on the 
science-policy interface. However a clear gap exists regarding the way(s) in which 
controversy may fundamentally shape the production of scientific knowledge itself. 
This research uses the debate about climate change as a case study to understand the 
impact of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge, focusing in particular 
on the interrelated elements of scientific practice and the agency of individual 
scientists. Based on 63 research interviews with climate scientists, “sceptical voices” 
about climate change and others, it finds that whereas the majority of climate scientists 
do not consider sceptical voices to have an impact on scientific practice, the vast 
majority do identify impacts on scientific agency. The predominant type of agency-
related impact is increased caution, followed by disruption, a greater focus on 
communication, defensiveness and reluctance to publicly engage. It is argued that 
scientists’ ability to distinguish between impacts on agency and practice is both a 
performative expression of Gieryn’s (1999) notion of boundary work and a function of 
controversy, with the greater the impact of controversy, the less fluid and contingent 
the boundary between the two. Boundary work is thus a more active and explicit 
process under conditions of public scientific controversy, as scientists work to ensure 
the independence and unassailability of their cognitive authority in contested domains. 
Potential implications for epistemological norms and the social value of science are 
also identified.  
 
Keywords: Production of scientific knowledge, controversy, climate change, scepticism 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As a guiding paradigm, controversies have become an increasingly visible topic in the 
literature. They magnify and make explicit the ‘normally hidden social dimensions of 
science’ (Pinch, 2001: 13719) and highlight the ways in which factors such as political 
struggles or values debates can influence the role of science in society (Martin and 
Richards, 1995). To date, the vast majority of controversy-based research has focused 
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on the ways in which scientific knowledge is used in, or shapes, the policy process 
(Wynn and Walsh, 2013; Beck et al., 2014; Landström et al., 2015). In particular, 
engagement between scientists and other social actors, such as the general public, 
politicians or knowledge brokers, appears to have been the dominant investigative 
avenue (Wolf and Moser, 2011; Knight and Lyall, 2013; Gluckman, 2014). This has 
however meant a concomitant lack of attention being paid to how controversy may 
fundamentally shape the production of scientific knowledge itself, particularly in terms 
of individual scientists’ responses to controversy. This is a critical gap in the literature 
and is vital to understand for several reasons. Not only may the substantive knowledge 
gained within disciplinary boundaries be impacted (with, for example, subsequent 
ramifications for its use as an input to policy decision-making), but wider 
epistemological norms may also be influenced. These include the types of future 
scientific enquiry that are carried out, including the appropriateness of specific 
techniques or modes of investigation, or what the expectations are of scientists as 
actors in society, such as their role in public or political engagement (Nowotny, 1993; 
Delborne, 2008; Douglas, 2009). Furthermore, and directly relevant to current debates 
related to expertise and legitimacy (Suryanarayanan and Kleinman, 2013; Collins, 
2014; Nisbet and Markowitz, 2014; Turner, 2014), is the need to understand how 
scientists are able to make sense of, and retain their cognitive authority in the face of 
controversy. Accordingly, this research examines the impact of controversy on both the 
‘material practices that embody the work of doing science’ (Roosth and Silbey, 2009: 
459, emphasis in the original) and on scientists’ perceptions of their own agency as 
producers of scientific knowledge.1 It thus follows in the footsteps of Latour and 
Woolgar (1986) by entering the “black box” of scientific knowledge production, and 
also responds to Longino’s (2013) call for greater attention being paid by philosophers 
of science to ‘individual rationality and individual knowledge’ in terms of decisions 
made by scientists as discrete actors within the knowledge production process. It 
employs Gieryn’s (1983; 1999) concept of boundary work to explain scientists’ sense-
making regarding their perceptions of impact, and provides a conceptual framework of 
the ways in which controversy may influence the scientific knowledge production 
process, focusing on the responses of individual scientists. 
 
As has been recognised by many other authors in the field, climate change presents a 
particularly valuable case study for research into controversy and science (Demeritt, 
2001; Demeritt, 2006; Beck et al., 2014; Jankó et al., 2014). Due to its socially-relevant 
yet complex nature, it illuminates the way that the social trust placed in science (and 
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scientists) as creators of policy-relevant “facts” can be precarious under conditions of 
uncertainty. This research focuses on the experiences of climate scientists in two case 
study locations, New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK). While the majority of 
the public in both countries agree that climate change is predominantly anthropogenic 
in origin2, debate about climate change science is still in evidence (Cooper and Rosin, 
2014; Carter, 2014; Tranter and Booth, 2015). In addition to a general undercurrent of 
scientific contention, controversy also exists in the form of vocal sceptical voices3 
external to traditional modes of scientific enquiry (for examples of overarching 
arguments and associated framings in the climate debate see Knight and Greenberg, 
2011; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2013; Matthews, 2015) and key events such as 
Climategate.4  
 
The next section examines how the existing literature conceptualises responses of 
scientists under conditions of controversy, followed by outlines of both the climate 
change debate and the controversy occurring within the two case study locations. 
Section 5.5 presents the method and is followed by results, discussion and a conclusion. 
 
 
5.2 Reactions to controversy 
In order to understand how controversy may impact the production of scientific 
knowledge, it is necessary to understand how scientific knowledge comes to be created 
in the first place. Following Gieryn (1999: xii) the starting point is taken that science is 
an inherently cultural space, without ‘essential or universal qualities’ to enable easy 
definition of its borders. However, in order to structure this investigation, the focus on 
scientists as knowledge creators suggests attention should be paid to the fundamental 
and interrelated components of agency and practice. Scientists have active agency in 
their choice and employment of the component practices that constitute the “doing” of 
science. Yet these component practices are also mutually constitutive of scientists’ 
behaviours or agency (Figure 5.1) in what Pickering (1992; 1993; 2010) calls the 
“mangle”. However, outside of sociology of scientific knowledge-based approaches, 
Merton’s (1973 [1942]) influential normative principles describing scientific enquiry, 
particularly those of disinterestedness and organised scepticism, arguably remain the 
dominant framing in both the physical science tradition (Kardash and Edwards, 2012; 
Bucchi, 2015; c.f. Kellogg, 2006) and in the general public’s view of science (Jaspal et 
al., 2013). Within this traditional paradigm, pre-eminence is given to scientific practice, 
with scientists’ agency also framed as objective and instrumental rather than 
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subjective or co-constructive. Scientists engage in a variety of—supposedly neutral and 
linear in fashion—activities in order to achieve scientific truth (Latour, 1993). These 
range from identification of a research topic through to public engagement (shown in a 
stylised fashion in Figure 5.2 which explicitly focuses on the activities of scientists 
within formally-designated epistemic communities such as universities). However, 
drawing inspiration from Mannheim (1936), more sociological understandings of the 
scientific knowledge production process such as from Gieryn (1999) above and 
Gibbons et al.’s (1994) theory of Mode 2 knowledge challenge this narrow framing and 
suggest that science is also a cultural practice, i.e. they bring agency to the fore. Thus 
the choices made at each step in Figure 5.2 are neither as straightforward in time or 
space as they may appear, and are inevitably shaped by a myriad of more subjective 
factors both internal and external to the research process (Nowotny et al., 2001). For 
example, Lacey (2015: 2) identifies five ‘logically distinct, but temporally and causally 
entangled’ moments of scientific activity, ranging from M1, making decisions about 
methodology, through to M5, applying scientific knowledge. He argues that whereas 
traditional conceptions of knowledge exclude the role of values at, for example M1, the 
decision to adopt a particular methodology is an ethical and social choice and thus 
must be recognised as such. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between agency and practice within the scientific knowledge production 
process 
Practice: 
Component 
practices that 
constitute the 
“doing” of 
science 
Agency: 
Scientists as 
active agents 
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Figure 5.2: Stylised scientific knowledge production process 
 
 
But how may controversy influence this interplay of agency and practice within the 
scientific knowledge production process? More socially-attentive interpretations 
suggest that scientific knowledge claims can be understood as being assembled to 
support opposing points of view (Pawson, 2006; Sharman and Holmes, 2010), with the 
“truth” of such claims heavily contested (Sarewitz, 2004; Gulbrandsen, 2008). 
Epistemic dominance by particular actors in a contentious debate also plays an 
important role in determining knowledge legitimacy and the resonance of claims 
(Stehr and Grundmann, 2011; Suryanarayanan and Kleinman, 2013). Factors such as 
competing values and ideologies (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Douglas, 2009), or varied 
interpretations of uncertainty (Landström et al., 2015) contribute to the ways in which 
such claims come to exist and be employed within debate. Moreover, as scientific 
knowledge is understood to vary in certainty, appeals to uncertainty evident in 
controversial situations (Skinner et al., 2014) indicate the likelihood of controversy 
having a differential impact across the scientific process, including the generation of 
scientific knowledge claims. Controversy may have a stronger influence on more fluid 
forms of knowledge, such as the difference between the tentative nature of hypotheses 
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versus the more immutable character of scientific laws, or those less deeply rooted in 
epistemological norms. For example, attempts to manufacture doubt over the 
legitimacy of climate science in general (Oreskes and Conway, 2010) have frequently 
occurred via uncertainty-based challenges to the notion of a consensus (Montford, 
2013; c.f. Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Truth is created by moving knowledge up the 
hierarchy of facticity (Latour and Woolgar, 1986), therefore it is unsurprising that 
consensus-making has been particularly liable to challenge as a way of delegitimising 
its influence as an authoritative discourse. But what about impacts on individual 
scientists as key actors within the knowledge production process? Scientists’ decisions 
shown in Figure 5.2, such as where to site an experiment, what methods to use, or how 
to appropriately analyse results, are critical to address not only in terms of what they 
may say about individual scientists’ agency and practice, but also because they may all 
be regarded as contributing towards the creation and embedding of (more or less 
explicit) disciplinary theories and norms (Sandoval and Reiser, 2004).  
 
The existing literature suggests that controversy may influence the scientific 
knowledge production process, and in particular, the responses of individual scientists, 
in a variety of ways. Hilgartner (1990) finds that scientists may speak out in defence of 
their own or colleagues’ work when criticised, whereas Negru (2013), examining 
economists’ practices, argues that they have been found to shift the blame for 
disciplinary shortcomings to other factors. While much of the literature is imbued with 
a certain normative tone that controversy is uniformly negative, the independent 
review of Climategate led by Sir Muir Russell (2010) underscored the possibility for 
increased transparency following controversy. Another strand of research focuses on 
scientists’ resistance to controversy, with scientists either actively (or passively) 
ignoring controversy (Oliver, 2001) or being unwilling to share data, particularly when 
requesters are deemed troublesome or with an ulterior motive (Swallow and Bourke, 
2012). Gieryn’s (1983; 1999) notion of boundary work is also relevant, defined as ‘the 
discursive attribution of selected qualities to scientists, scientific methods, and 
scientific claims for the purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and 
some less authoritative residual non-science’ (Gieryn, 1999: 4-5). This concept implies 
that scientists may respond to controversy by creating expertise-based boundaries 
between themselves as holders of a special type of cognitive authority and less 
legitimate “non-scientists”. Controversy may result in changes to overarching 
professional norms within a discipline, as found by Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) when 
examining journalists’ behaviours, and scientists may also be unwilling to discuss or 
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complain about personal or institutional attacks for fear of reprisals or further 
incidents (Illman, 2005). What is however also critical to mention is that responses can 
differ according to the controversy itself. Areas of science that are very public or 
controversial are likely to impact scientists in different ways to those which are, for 
example, less immediately policy-relevant or which have less costly ramifications. 
Whereas the veracity of evolution may be a contested topic in certain environments 
(Berkman and Plutzer, 2010), it seems unlikely that evolutionary biologists will be 
personally or professionally impacted by public scientific controversy in the same ways 
as may a medical researcher using animal subjects (Illman, 2005), an epidemiologist 
publicly visible in the vaccination debate (Deer, 2011), or a climate scientist. 
Furthermore, the individual characteristics of a scientist, such as the type of work they 
do within a discipline or their level of public engagement, are also likely to be very 
relevant to the impacts experienced under conditions of controversy. 
 
In addition to the above, three further pieces of research are particularly relevant to 
this study and worthy of discussing in further detail. Lewandowsky et al. (2015), 
Kempner et al. (2011) and Kempner (2008) introduce the concepts of seepage, 
forbidden and “nonknowledge”, and the chilling effect, respectively. Lewandowsky et 
al. (2015) suggest that in response to controversy, scientists experience a variety of 
cognitive and social processes, notably prolonged stereotype threat (feelings of anxiety 
when reminded of a stereotype held against the group to which they belong), 
pluralistic ignorance (when those who hold the majority opinion believe they are 
actually in the minority when a marginal opinion is dominant in public discourse or the 
media), and third person effect (belief that one is less susceptible to social 
manipulation than others). They suggest that climate scientists’ use of the terms 
“pause” or “hiatus” to refer to the late 20th century-early 21st century period of global 
mean surface temperatures is ‘a departure from standard scientific practice and is 
indicative of seepage’ (2015: 6), defined as ‘the infiltration and influence of what are 
essentially non-scientific claims into scientific work and discourse’ (2015: 2). However, 
no convincing evidence is presented to demonstrate the assumed relationship between 
scientists’ use of these terms and seepage. For example it is suggested that these terms 
are a framing ‘demonstrably created by contrarians’ (2015: 6) and that scientists have, 
in response, tacitly changed the way they interpret data from that of variability to a 
pause or hiatus. Critically however, no traceable evidence is included as to the source 
of these terms (specifically, their supposed origin outside academia and subsequent 
uptake in the peer-reviewed literature). The overtly normative position that science 
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ought to be somehow immune to value judgements, as well as so-called ‘exogenous 
pressures’ and ‘non-experts’ (2015: 9) is also concerning as it essentially disregards 
much of the literature regarding agency within the sociology of scientific knowledge 
approach that science is, in essence, a human process and that expertise remains a 
debated concept (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Longino, 1990; Jasanoff, 2004; Stehr and 
Grundmann, 2011; Turner, 2014; Evans, 2015). Nonetheless, the question as to 
potential impact raised by Lewandowsky et al. is clearly relevant here and the paper’s 
limitations emphasise the need for further research to investigate the impact of 
controversy in detail.  
 
Kempner et al. (2011) suggest that controversy is an important element in the 
production of so-called “nonknowledge”, that is, a factor that impedes the production of 
scientific knowledge. They argue that scientists learn from past scientific controversies 
that certain types of knowledge are deemed to be ‘forbidden…too sensitive, dangerous, 
or taboo to produce’ (2011: 476). While, due to its more demand-driven nature, the 
majority of climate change research differs to the examples provided (such as extra-
sensory perception, argued to result in “career suicide” for the scientists involved, or 
socio-politically undesirable topics such as drug and alcohol harm reduction research), 
this concept is useful in that it indicates that it is possible that certain topics, parts of, 
or behaviours inherent to the scientific knowledge production process may be 
regarded as increasingly forbidden. Specifically, public engagement which requires 
breaching the protective barrier of the academic community, or committing criticisms 
or analytical strategies to forms liable to become publicly accessible (e.g. to emails 
which may be obtained through the provisions of freedom of information legislation), 
may be deemed to be inordinately risky. In a previous piece of research, Kempner 
(2008) finds that the overarching political environment can shape scientists’ research 
practices via what she terms the “chilling effect” with self-censorship (of both specific 
terms and entire research topics) a common strategy when scientists had previously 
been involved in a public scientific controversy. However, she calls for more research 
into the details of exactly how scientists may respond to external political controversy. 
By focusing on the detail of changes to the material practices of science this research 
thus directly responds to Kempner (2008). It also goes further by not only examining 
impact on scientists in terms of their response to a controversial socio-political 
environment in general, but also in terms of response to interaction with individuals or 
groups who provide direct challenges to scientific legitimacy. 
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5.3 Debate about climate change 
Debate about climate change is predominantly presented in both the media and the 
academic literature as a gaping dichotomy (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Marquart-
Pyatt et al., 2014), with two polarised sides at either end of a chasm of disagreement, 
claim and counterclaim (Knight and Greenberg, 2011). Scepticism as to the veracity of 
climate change science has been accused of deepening this gulf, both in terms of 
influencing public opinion or policy decision-making (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013; 
Leiserowitz et al., 2013), but also by negatively impacting the production of climate 
science and its ability to be regarded as a legitimate input back into decision-making 
processes (Lahsen, 2008; Washington and Cook, 2011). This interpretation of what is 
commonly referred to as “climate scepticism” is alleged to impact individual climate 
scientists in a variety of ways, from the requirement to disseminate (potentially 
controversial) findings interrupting ‘their “real” work… [of] the production of 
knowledge’ (Oreskes, 2014: 120) through to more direct and threatening personal 
attacks such as those sustained by individual climate scientists (Readfearn, 2012). 
These have included abusive emails as well as public accusations of so-called “scientific 
cleansing” of knowledge (Oreskes and Conway, 2010) and are contended to be 
attempts to question the entirety of climate science, via the discrediting of a few, 
higher-profile researchers (Mann, 2012). However these narratives are largely 
anecdotal. Thus not only is the representativeness of claims that scientists have been 
‘intimidated into neutrality by environmentalism’s powerful opponents’ (Lynas, 2005: 
25) unclear, but the subsequent impacts of controversy on the production of climate 
science itself is also unknown. Not only is it important to understand how scientific 
knowledge which pertains to increasingly common, yet complex and “wicked” global 
issues such as climate change is influenced (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Lorenzoni et al., 
2007), it is also of practical consequence as it serves to highlight how scientists and 
sceptical voices are interacting to alter the course of what is known, and not known, 
about the changing climate. 
 
 
5.4 Geographies of contestation 
Painter (2011) argues that climate change scepticism is largely an Anglo-Saxon 
phenomenon, and Capstick and Pidgeon (2013) find that epistemic scepticism (i.e. 
disputes about the scientific basis of climate change) is a key argument expressed in 
public discourse. Both NZ and the UK have recently experienced notable epistemic 
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controversies about climate change, making them ideally suitable as case studies for 
understanding the impact of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge. In 
NZ, a small group known as the NZ Climate Science Coalition (NZCSC) formed in 2006 
to provide New Zealanders with ‘balanced scientific opinions that reflect the truth 
about climate change and the exaggerated claims that have been made about 
anthropogenic global warming’ (NZCSC, 2007). Operating predominantly at the fringes 
of the public debate, in 2010 the NZCSC entered squarely into public view by forming 
the NZ Climate Science Education Trust (NZCSET) and filing a statement of claim in the 
NZ High Court asking to invalidate the official NZ temperature record kept by the 
National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), a Crown Research 
Institute (CRI)5 (NZCSC, 2010). In the ensuing court case (NZCSET v NIWA [2012] 
NZHC 2297) the judgement was handed down in favour of NIWA, with costs also 
awarded to the defendant (NZCEST v NIWA [2012] NZHC 3560) although it is unlikely 
that this will be paid given the liquidation of the NZCSET at the end of 2013 (Insolvency 
and Trustee Service, 2014; Kilgallon, 2014). Hereafter these legal proceedings shall be 
referred to as the NIWA-CC (court case).  
 
The UK experience has been more extensively covered in the academic literature, 
although focus has predominantly been directed towards its representation in the 
news media (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Nerlich et al., 2012; Painter and Ashe, 2012). 
Climategate is widely regarded as a critical moment in the UK climate debate in terms 
of a challenge to scientific process, and has been subject to numerous analyses, 
including from a science and technology studies perspective (Ryghaug and Skjolsvold, 
2010; Ravetz, 2011; Grundmann, 2012; Ramírez-i-Ollé, 2015) and in terms of its 
impact on public perceptions of climate change (Koteyko et al., 2012; c.f. Anderegg and 
Goldsmith, 2014). While the person(s) behind Climategate have never been identified, 
epistemic scepticism in the UK is also expressed in online forums such as blogs 
(Sharman, 2014) and by publicly visible organisations, such as the Global Warming 
Policy Foundation (GWPF)6 (Painter, 2011).  
 
 
5.5 Method 
Sixty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted between November 2012 and 
March 2014 across the two case study locations. In-depth discussion enabled a 
comprehensive appreciation of the rationales and experiences of the actors involved 
(Seidman, 2013); however, the large number of interviews and subsequent message 
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saturation that ensued enabled critical analysis to occur. Interviews occurred across 
three main categories: climate scientist, non-climate scientist academic, and other 
(Table 5.1). Climate scientists were identified as those working in a university 
department of physics, geography, earth sciences or environment; or for a government-
funded climate-related organisation. Of this category, 93% were PhD-level qualified 
and were chosen where possible to ensure a wide representation across engagement in 
the public climate change debate (ranging from very engaged to not at all), type or 
method of climate science undertaken (such as atmospheric, oceanographic, 
paleoclimate or statistical climate modelling) and seniority (full-professor level to less 
than 10 years’ experience in the field). Non-climate scientist academics were involved 
in predominantly social science research on the topic of climate change specifically, or 
broader theoretical considerations relevant to this research such as the role of science 
in society. Finally, the category of other was used to classify a broad range of 
individuals such as journalists, industry or NGO representatives, as well as those 
identified as “sceptical voices” (who were also identified within the previous 
categories). This amalgam category of “other” and the lack of further detail regarding 
numbers of sceptical voices within each category are deliberate choices in order to 
avoid more specific breakdowns that would likely lead to the identification of interview 
participants. Individuals referred to as a sceptical voice were identified from sources 
such as Painter’s (2011: 128) ‘list of sceptics ‘mentioned’ more than once in 10 UK 
national newspapers’; those associated with organisations such as the NZCSC and the 
GWPF, or, due to online sources increasing importance in the climate debate (Gavin 
and Marshall, 2011), from Sharman’s (2014) list of climate sceptical blog authors. Of 
the 63 interviews, nine occurred in a UK-based pilot phase and assisted in subsequent 
interview design. 
 
Table 5.1: Interviews 
  NZ UK Total 
Climate scientist 16 14 30 
Non-climate 
scientist academic 
7 5 12 
Other 10 11 22 
 Total 
33 (with 7 or 21% also classed 
as a “sceptical voice”) 
30 (with 10 or 33% also 
classed as a “sceptical voice”) 
63 
 
 
Interviewees were asked a variety of questions related to scientific knowledge, such as 
the role of uncertainty, the value of scientific expertise and the legitimacy of knowledge 
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claims emerging from climate science. Climate scientists were asked whether those 
critical of mainstream climate science7 had an impact on their work, specifically on 
how they “do science” (i.e. scientific practice). Where possible the wording used to ask 
this question was that which had been previously used by the interviewee themselves, 
including “climate sceptics/ism”, “the climate debate”, or “controversy about climate 
change”. Sceptical voices were also asked a series of questions regarding attempts to 
articulate their views on climate change, including their perceptions of their own 
impact on climate science. The data analysis comprised a multi-cycle thematic coding 
process in order to identify salient issues corresponding directly to the research aim, as 
well as to identify any other relevant themes. A mixture of coding approaches was 
employed, such as attribute, descriptive and values coding. Whereas the first coding 
cycle focused on manifest elements of the data, the second served to identify more 
latent or abstract components, bringing analytical meaning to the text via what Saldana 
calls ‘themeing the data’ (2009: 139). Simultaneous coding (applying two or more 
codes within a single datum) was frequently employed to capture the complexity of the 
interview discussion. Coding was conducted both within NVivo10 (following Bazeley 
and Jackson, 2013) and manually. 
 
 
5.6 Results 
Of those climate scientists who directly responded to the question of whether sceptical 
voices have had an impact on their scientific practice, i.e. how they “do science” 
(n=28), the majority (68%) did not perceive any such impact (Table 5.2). Where such 
impact was perceived, it predominantly focused on an increased conservatism or 
caution, or changes to the types or focus of research undertaken (Table 5.3). As Table 
5.2 shows however, during the interview process the majority (86%) also identified 
other impacts that influenced their agency as scientists in a more expansive manner 
than impact on scientific practice alone. These were impacts that either influenced 
them personally, or the climate science community as a whole, and were described as 
explicitly different to impact on practice. As NZScientist1 explains, “they don’t have an 
impact on how we do our science, but they have an impact on what we think about and 
how we provide explanations for the science, the findings that emerge” (emphasis in 
original). This differentiation between impacts on “doing science” (practice) and other 
parts of their experience as a scientist (agency) was noted within the UK-based pilot 
phase and was thus explicitly investigated throughout the remaining interviews 
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(although in the vast majority of cases it was independently identified by the 
interviewee themselves). 
 
Table 5.2: Climate scientists’ perceived impact of sceptical voices 
Category of impact  NZ UK Total 
Impact on scientific practice 
Yes 5 4 9 
No 9 10 19 
Impact on scientific agency 
Yes 12 12 24 
No 2 2 4 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptions of perceived impacts on scientific practice 
Case 
study 
Description of perceived impact 
N
Z
 
"I think it's trained scientists to be ultra-careful what they're saying; to be far more 
conservative" (NZScientist13) 
“…we are more rigorous there than we were before… that's altered the focus of a bit of 
that piece of research” (NZScientist14) 
“I was very reluctant or very careful in how I said that because I could see that this could 
be pulled out of context and used in a way that I, that wouldn't be consistent with what I 
meant... You can choose not to show things, or put emphasis in places which you may not 
have before” (NZScientist2) 
“I guess all it's done is influenced the next research projects that I will do because I want 
to prove these things are correct” (NZScientist4) 
U
K
 
“I think the arguments put forward by sceptics have shaped the way that I think science 
should be done, definitely” (UKScientist2) 
“Whether it was a direct or indirect consequence of Climate Audit, but as some kind of 
consequence of Climate Audit, a piece of science was re-examined” (UKScientist3) 
“You will be able to keep revisiting some of these basics and re-explaining them and 
that leads you to look at the data in new ways and suggests possible ways for future 
research” (UKScientist6) 
 
 
The most commonly experienced impact related to scientific agency was that of 
increased caution (Table 5.4). Caution encompassed several distinct elements, from 
increased attention to scientific findings, “for a solid year after that [Climategate] at 
least, Jesus we were crossing every t, dotting every i three times over for fear of getting 
it right. For fear of anything being wrong, being blown up out of proportion” 
(NZScientist12), to the ways in which scientists communicated, particularly via email, 
“I write every single email as if it is going to be read by somebody at some point in the 
future and they are going to be hostile to what they perceive as my intentions. So 
there’s a chance that they will take my reputation down completely” (UKScientist2). 
Communication with the media or other actors external to the scientific community 
was also frequently noted, with UKScientist7 stating that “we’re very, very careful 
about how we write press releases”. As UKScientist2 foreshadows above, the 
overarching rationale underpinning increased caution was a fear of being 
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misinterpreted, and then subsequently criticised or attacked by actors external to the 
scientific community on the basis of that misinterpretation. For example, UKScientist13 
suggests that “it probably does make us think more carefully about being as 
unambiguous and accurate as possible, and try…to avoid situations where we can be 
accused of misleading people” and UKScientist11 notes that “people are now generally 
afraid about saying anything off the record, maybe on the record even, just what would 
happen to have it misconstrued”. Thus whereas two scientists perceived an increase in 
transparency as a result of sceptical voices (see Table 5.3), the opposite was more 
commonly acknowledged, with UKScientist7 noting that this fear which results in 
increased caution meant that “unfortunately…sometimes you’re not quite as open as 
you could be”.  
 
Table 5.4: Impact identified by climate scientists on scientific agency 
Type of impact NZ UK Total 
Caution 8  10  18  
Disruption 7  4  11  
Greater focus on communication 4  3  7  
Defensive 1  5  6  
Reluctance to publicly engage 2  4  6  
Awareness of being a target - 4  4  
Be more critical - 3  3  
Certain types of sceptical voices can accelerate research 1  1  2  
More transparency - 2  2  
Unwanted attention - 2  2  
Delay 1  - 1  
Fewer scientists in the area - 1  1  
Involved in new areas of science - 1  1  
 
 
Notably, caution was both experienced and expressed differently by scientists in the 
two case study locations. In NZ, caution most often related to the communication of 
science and how scientists “think very carefully both about documenting the way we do 
things in terms of decisions about press releases or what have you and also about 
thinking carefully about what we say publicly” (NZScientist3). However, in the UK it 
was much more closely related to the other themes of awareness of being a target and 
(subsequently) being defensive. UKScientist2 provided the example of seeing a 
comment underneath an article in a major UK newspaper on the topic of a climate 
scientist contemplating suicide: “So the very point at which I realised that it was really 
good to have a defence against the dark arts, was that one of the first five comments 
was ‘I wish he had’”. This expectation of controversy where, for example, UKScientist1 
“knew that it would end with the Daily Mail and The Telegraph attacking” was also 
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frequently communicated to newer scientists in the field. Junior researchers are told to 
expect that any comments they make publicly will result in “people… attacking their 
stuff” (UKScientist1). In addition to more extreme forms of attack, UKScientist1 also 
argued that that whereas it can be suggested that “the only thing that matters to 
scientists is whether someone’s sending you things like hate mail, but the thing that 
matters actually I would contend is low-level, the drip-drip-drip thing is very 
important” and suggested that this constant low-level pressure and expectation of 
external critique would likely be related to fewer scientists wanting to either remain in 
or go into climate science. These two themes were thus strongly bound up with 
reluctance to publicly engage, whereby “if you beat up scientists long enough, they’re 
just not interested in being dragged through the mud in the popular press” 
(NZScientist13).  
  
The second most prevalent theme was that of disruption. Some perceived this as a 
minor impact more akin to distraction, such as constant requests to respond to claims 
made in the media: “you can spend your whole life doing that kind of thing” 
(NZScientist1). However, UKScientist9 put forward the more commonly expressed 
view that “to say it’s a distraction almost trivialises it, which of course it isn’t, it’s very 
important”. In NZ, the “sheer time-wasting” (NZScientist12) of scientists involved was 
associated with a more fundamental point about resource use in a small country. 
NZScientist5 succinctly summed up this perception:  
[It is a] political tool for instance to tie up various groups of scientists so that 
they're always busy constantly answering a stream of questions that are not 
meant to be constructive in any way, they're meant to be destructive and time-
wasting. That's a huge draw on resources in a very, very small place like NZ—
both politically and scientifically. 
 
As Table 5.4 shows, disruption was a more prevalent theme in NZ, and was frequently 
related to the consequences of the NIWA-CC and the time that a particular group of 
scientists were required to spend on preparing NIWA’s defence. The judge’s ruling in 
favour of NIWA was deemed important not only in the NZ context, but also in terms of 
potential ramifications in other jurisdictions. As NZScientist16 explains, “we were told 
that once the sceptics win the case here they’ll start to take them elsewhere, they’ll 
head to Australia to take the case there. I think the Australians are happy we [NZ] won 
the case”. 
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While the majority identified impacts in normatively negative terms, several scientists 
did identify personally or scientific community-wide positive impacts. The most 
commonly expressed of these related to communication. Scientists perceived that 
sceptical voices have “really turned the climate science community to…thinking about 
how we communicate climate science” (NZScientist1). In response, scientists discussed 
actively engaging with sceptical voices in order to “find out what the thinking is” 
(NZScientist11) or “trying to understand where it is other people are coming from” 
(UKScientist12). They also identified learning from previous experiences and paying 
constant attention to “how is this going to be interpreted, how can we make sure that 
we get this message out smooth and clear so that someone doesn't run away with this 
sentence or that sentence” (UKScientist6). This greater focus was thus often bound up 
with the aforementioned theme of caution, with NZScientist6 noting that “we tend to 
be quite cautious then about how we do communicate which is a shame”. Other, less 
commonly expressed positive impacts included accelerating particular pieces of 
research in order to check claims made by sceptical voices, being more attentive to 
documentation, and increased transparency. 
 
In addition to the specific types of impacts identified, another significant theme was 
that impact was regarded as being disproportionately borne by particular individual 
scientists over others. Unsurprisingly, in both NZ and the UK, individual scientists 
involved in high-profile events (the NIWA-CC and Climategate) were clearly identified 
as experiencing a larger share of impact with the ensuing ramifications “pretty 
devastating for them and their careers” (UKScientist9). These events may therefore be 
seen as amplifying mechanisms for controversy. In NZ, scientists who were “in their 
prime in terms of their career, their ability to think, their ability to contribute…were 
robbed of that time and therefore NZ and the world was robbed of their contributions 
that could have been” (NZScientist5). In the UK, individual scientists working in “a big 
organisation like the Met Office which is high profile in terms of climate change and the 
whole Climategate thing” were identified as being at “high risk” (UKScientist2) of being 
attacked. Indeed, any scientist who was recognised as having a public profile was 
identified as being more likely to be “put through the wringer” (UKScientist6). These 
included scientists involved with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) or those identified as more vocally active generally in the climate change 
debate. In response, UKScientist8 suggested that whereas many scientists, particularly 
younger scientists, may be “more or less oblivious” to sceptical voices, others who are 
“constantly bullied and tyrannised” may respond by seeing “it as their mission to stand 
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up for their beliefs” despite the fact that “when you signed up to do science you didn’t 
expect you’d end up in a situation like that”. Those actively working in climate change 
science or policy are thus characterised as a “beleaguered tribe who stand shoulder to 
shoulder” against potential attack. 
 
Sceptical voices themselves perceived a diverse range of impacts on climate science 
and scientists, with a slight majority (56%) identifying some type of impact. Indirect 
routes via the political process or the media were identified, such as working with 
politicians to ask questions of government-employed climate scientists, or the media 
being more critical of scientists’ public communications as a result of lobbying by 
sceptical voices. Others identified impact mostly occurring “at a personal level” 
(UKOther4) as a result of interaction with individual scientists. The notion of climate 
scientists being more transparent or reigning in more extreme projections as a result 
of flow-on effects from Climategate or the NIWA-CC was expressed by several sceptical 
voices, with UKOther2 suggesting that climate scientists are now trying “harder to be 
more moderate” and are “now nervous about refusing data” as a result. NZOther5 notes 
that impact on NIWA in particular has mostly been expressed in terms of changes to 
the way NIWA publicly engages, suggesting that the NIWA-CC “has led to them [NIWA] 
being more circumspect about what they have to say. They're not leaving it to the 
newspapers now so much; they're sticking more to their science rather than advocacy, 
which is completely appropriate for a public servant”. No notable variances were found 
between NZ and the UK as regards perceptions of impact or mechanisms through 
which impact was suggested to occur. It is also crucial to note that the categories of 
climate scientist and sceptical voice are not mutually exclusive. Interviewees who fell 
into both categories expressed frustration that the climate change debate has become 
more focused on ideological viewpoints rather than scientific merit. They also 
described being personally attacked, vilified, excluded and undermined from within the 
climate science community for their dissenting views. Further research on this 
population with a larger sample size to ensure anonymity is required for more rigorous 
and representative findings to be made. 
 
 
5.7 Discussion 
These results provide a number of implications requiring further explanation and 
analysis. First is a discussion of the types of impacts experienced by scientists. Table 
5.5 collates the specific impacts identified here with those found within the existing 
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literature to provide a conceptual framework of the ways in which controversy may 
influence the scientific knowledge production process, focusing on the responses of 
individual scientists. Encompassing scientists’ agency and practice, it identifies a 
spectrum of potential responses from offensive engagement in terms of “rebutting” 
opposing claims or criticism, to defensive avoidance in terms of “removing” oneself 
entirely from the controversial situation. This research clearly showed impacts in 
terms of “reflection”, where climate scientists are paying increased attention to 
accuracy or public communication to avoid misinterpretation; “retreat”, in terms of 
reluctance to publicly engage; and especially “revision”, where scientists are increasing 
cautious regarding scientific process or public communication. It is important to note 
however that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the prevalence of 
caution and particularly its association with reluctance to publicly engage and 
defensiveness may be interpreted as a contributory factors in making elements of the 
climate science knowledge production process regarded as “nonknowledge” (Kempner 
et al., 2011), classified under “removal” in Table 5.5. Most notably, engagement with 
the media is viewed as “very dangerous” (UKScientist8) career-wise, even though it is 
perceived to be “a shame” (NZScientist6) that scientists are unwilling to “put their head 
above the parapet anymore” (UKScientist12).8 However, more senior scientists and 
those who were employed at universities (unlike those at government-funded 
organisations such as the Met Office or NIWA) were less likely to be concerned about 
engaging in such behaviours. The ability to speak freely was seen as something 
particularly highly valued by university-based scientists, as compared to those directly 
publicly-employed who are subject to “additional constraints” (NZScientist6) and are 
thus “more pragmatic and grounded in real politik” (NZScientist7) and cognisant of 
their “pay-masters” or “pleasing the research council” (UKScientist12). No clear 
differences were found in terms of the impact of controversy on different types of 
climate science undertaken; however a larger sample size may uncover further 
relationships of this kind. 
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Table 5.5: Scientists’ potential responses to controversy 
 Potential response to controversy 
 
Offensive 
engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defensive 
avoidance 
Rebuttal  Speak out in defence of own or colleagues' work (Hilgartner, 
1990) 
 Shift blame for shortcomings to other factors (Negru, 2013) 
Reflection  Increased attention to accuracy in scientific practice 
 Clarity in public communications to avoid misinterpretation 
 Increased transparency (Russell, 2010) 
Resistance  Actively (or passively) ignore controversy (Oliver, 2001) 
 Unwilling to share data (particularly when requesters are 
deemed troublesome or with an ulterior motive) (Swallow and 
Bourke, 2012) 
 Boundary work (Gieryn, 1983; Gieryn, 1999) 
Revision  Increased caution or hedging in scientific process or public 
communication  
 Adopt discourses that shape choice of scientific enquiry 
(“seepage”) (Lewandowsky et al., 2015) 
 Changes to overarching professional norms (Boykoff and 
Boykoff, 2007)  
Retreat  Reduction in public engagement activities 
 Unwillingness to discuss personal/institutional attacks for fear 
of further incidents (Illman, 2005) 
 Change research behaviours or topics that are “forbidden” so 
that they become “nonknowledge” (Kempner et al., 2011) 
Removal  Abandon research project/research career via the “chilling 
effect” (Kempner, 2008) 
 
 
The second major implication of this research, and perhaps the result that is 
particularly striking, is that while the majority of climate scientists do not consider that 
sceptical voices have any significant impact on scientific practice (how they “do 
science”), 86% did perceive impacts on their agency as a climate scientist. 
NZScientist1’s claim that sceptical voices don’t have an impact on “how we do our 
science” but do have an impact on “what we think about and how we provide 
explanations for the science” exemplifies the perception of the majority of scientists 
interviewed that the nuts and bolts of “doing” science can somehow be clearly 
differentiated from other elements, such as interpretation of results or interaction with 
the public or policymakers. It is however difficult to imagine how these may 
necessarily be disentangled in practice (Pickering, 2010). To take a particularly prosaic 
example, disruption could arguably be identified as an impact on the “doing of science” 
because it necessarily implies that science itself is not “being done”. And whereas being 
more cautious and more rigorous were most commonly related to public engagement, 
it was certainly not restricted to those activities, with many scientists identifying 
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increased caution throughout the scientific knowledge production process. How 
therefore is such a distinction able to be made? What might explain how scientists are 
able to separate so neatly agency and practice within “the mangle” of science? Gieryn’s 
(1983; 1999) theory of boundary work, categorised as a form of “resistance” above, 
provides a way to explore this conundrum.9 Scientific practices are, within the 
positivist scientific tradition, an integral part of the cognitive authority of science. 
Therefore, to identify the impacts experienced as affecting these practices can clearly 
be seen as a direct challenge to scientific legitimacy. By making a distinction between 
impacts on practice and on agency, scientists are thus engaging in boundary work in 
order to maintain the epistemic authority of science (specifically, the outputs of 
scientific practice) as a distinct form of knowledge production. In other words, the very 
making of the agency/practice distinction within the interview setting as the scientist 
responds to questions regarding perceptions of impact is in itself a performance of 
boundary work.10 Framing impacts in terms of scientific agency is arguably more 
acceptable as it does not impinge to the same degree upon the legitimacy of the claims 
emerging from scientific practice. Moreover, the types of impacts that were identified 
as influencing scientists’ agency are largely also able to be formulated according to the 
notion of the Mertonian ideal. For example, being cautious is a laudable trait as it 
evokes ideas of preciseness and replicability. This performance of boundary work is 
important because it provides scientists with a way of coping with the “discursive 
fluidity” (NZAcademic3) and (possibly unexpected) politicisation of the scientific 
environment evident within controversial situations (Brown, 2015). For those 
scientists who identified impacts such as caution as influencing their scientific practice 
(i.e. they agreed that sceptical voices influenced how they “did” science, shown in Table 
5.3), it thus also seems possible that that they perceived less of a need to engage in this 
performative boundary work. Further work involving a larger sample size to determine 
the variables (such as level of seniority, type of science undertaken or level of 
engagement with the public or with controversial events) that may be relevant is 
therefore an important extension of this work. 
 
A third implication of this research is that sceptical voices operating outside the formal 
epistemic community of science were generally regarded as unable to exert influence 
until the final product (e.g. a journal article) is made public. However, once this 
protected “black box” which contains the work of “doing science” has been opened, 
sceptical voices were then seen to engage in ex-post critiques (which may cycle back 
through nearly all the stages of the scientific knowledge production process), querying 
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each micro-decision made by individual scientists in an effort to challenge the science 
itself or the policy implications of potentially unwelcome scientific findings. Thus, if 
sceptical voices are making scientists “much more careful about anything we publish, 
okay, where are the error bars, where’s the statistical significance” (UKScientist9) it is 
also likely that these new forms of checking and double-checking may become 
entangled with the epistemological norms of the discipline itself, and filter back into 
the ways in which scientists expect themselves and others to behave, particularly in 
terms of their role as scientific experts. Moreover, if climate scientists are fearful of 
being attacked and/or misinterpreted, it is also unsurprising that, for example, 
institutions such as the IPCC are increasingly “incredibly conservative about what it’s 
said because it’s been so terrified not to undermine itself by saying things that can then 
be shown to be wrong” (UKScientist8). This echoes Jasper and Poulson’s (1993: 642) 
finding that once an organisation is ‘spotlighted by protest’, its reputation for 
credibility and competence are likely to be particularly emphasised by its opponents as 
a mechanism to challenge legitimacy.  
 
Fourth and finally, the significant events of Climategate and the NIWA-CC not only had 
considerable impact on scientists’ agency and practice, but also on determinations of 
expertise and the trust placed in climate scientists and, in turn, climate science as a 
whole. In terms of the former, the NIWA-CC was particularly relevant not only as 
regards the legitimacy of scientific data and how/who by that legitimacy may be 
determined, but also in terms of whose expertise is deemed adequately relevant to 
both produce and criticise knowledge. The presiding judge, Justice Venning, remarked 
several times in his judgement that the NZCSET plaintiffs did not hold comparable 
expertise to that of the NIWA scientists: ‘He has no applicable qualifications. His 
interest in the area does not sufficiently qualify him as an expert’ (NZCSET v NIWA 
[2012] NZHC 2297: paragraph 51). Justice Venning argued throughout his decision that 
the court could not, and should not resolve a scientific debate. Particularly, he 
contended that the court ‘should not seek to determine or resolve scientific questions 
demanding the evaluation of contentious expert opinion’ (NZCSET v NIWA [2012] 
NZHC 2297: paragraph 48) and in his awarding of costs to the defendant, that the ‘issue 
of whether there is global warming and climate change is a scientific issue, not suitable 
for determination by a Court’ (NZCSET v NIWA [2012] NZHC 3560: paragraph 46). 
However, in a legal review of the case, Hardcastle (2014: 292) argues that ‘the decision 
offers insufficient protection for scientists and scientific research’ because it has, in 
essence, provided precedent for the High Court of NZ to review research compiled by 
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CRIs. Hardcastle (2014: 291) contends that CRIs’ decisions should only be reviewed in 
cases of ‘fraud, corruption or bad faith’, a pre-existing standard established in a 1994 
Privy Council determination. She also suggests that research, especially if findings are 
controversial, may either stagnate or be less likely to be published if scientists are 
fearful of judicial review. Importantly, criticisms of individual scientists involved in 
these key events were also perceived to contribute to a reduction in the public’s value 
of, or trust in, science. NZScientist12 argues that not only did the controversy 
surrounding the NIWA-CC mean that sceptical voices were “driving the show”, but that 
it also required scientists to “rebuild faith and trust in the public’s mind… [due to] that 
doubt and those seeds that went into Joe Bloggs’ mind”. Climategate was also perceived 
as “damaging to climate science because it undermined trust” which is what “science 
relies on” (UKScientist5) in terms of a public licence to operate. Recognition that those 
who are publicly visible are those who are more likely to be attacked means it is 
entirely possible, if not likely, that this would result in less representation from 
scientists in the public arena. Even if climate scientists perceive it to be part of their 
“duty” as a scientist to be publicly vocal (Sharman and Howarth, 2015), it is possible 
that sustained attack, combined with certain scientists’ perceptions that they are not 
able to speak freely given funding or employment status, may limit such activity in 
practice. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This research investigated the impact of controversy on the production of scientific 
knowledge, focusing specifically on impact experienced by individual climate scientists 
in NZ and the UK. The majority of climate scientists (68%) did not perceive that 
sceptical voices had an impact on scientific practice; however 86% did identify impact 
on scientific agency. The predominant type of agency-related impact was increased 
caution, followed by disruption, a greater focus on communication, defensiveness and a 
reluctance to publicly engage. Caution was experienced differently within the two case 
study locations, with implications for the communication of science most prevalent in 
NZ, and associated with being a target for attack and (subsequently) being defensive in 
the UK. A very slight majority of sceptical voices (56%) considered that they personally 
had an impact on climate science/scientists either indirectly through political or media 
avenues, or via more direct interaction with individual scientists. A conceptual 
framework of potential response to controversy was provided, ranging from “rebuttal” 
at the end of offensive engagement to “removal” at the end of defensive avoidance. 
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Two wider conclusions emerge from this research, with the first related to the 
distinction between impacts on agency and practice as a form of boundary work. 
Gieryn suggests that boundary work would be expected in situations where credibility 
is contested, as the epistemic authority gained by boundary work only exists ‘to the 
extent that it is claimed by some people…but denied to others’ (1999: 14). This 
research extends his argument by contending that boundary work is a more active and 
explicit process under conditions of public scientific controversy, as scientists work to 
ensure the independence and unassailability of their cognitive authority in contested 
domains. Specifically, scientists’ ability or need to explicitly differentiate between 
impacts on agency and practice within Pickering’s (1992; 1993; 2010) “mangle” may 
therefore be understood as a function of controversy, with the greater the impact of 
controversy, the less fluid and contingent the boundary between the two. It is thus a 
coping strategy which protects the dominant paradigm in which one operates as able 
to provide an accurate or representative truth about the world, rather than just a series 
of contestable knowledge claims. Delineating who is able to “do science” is thus also 
likely to be more important in controversial situations as a form of strategic defence. 
As a result of outside attacks, scientists become protective as to their ability to carry 
out the constituent activities of science unencumbered. While there was some 
recognition of exceptions to the rule, such as “people who do not have PhDs in related 
fields of science who have a history of doing high, high quality work” (NZScientist5), 
markers of expertise such as publishing in the peer-reviewed literature were explicitly 
argued as critical in being able to identify an individual as a credible voice on climate 
science. This type of boundary work in terms of attributing legitimacy via pre-existing 
markers of expertise is not unique to controversial situations (Lamont and Molnár, 
2002). However, it seems unsurprising that factors such as entry requirements to 
conduct scientific practice may be accorded greater importance under conditions of 
controversy. Nonetheless, further investigation applying both the conceptual 
framework shown in Table 5.5 and testing the above relationship between impact of 
controversy and fluidity of the boundary between scientific agency and practice in 
other case study locations and areas of scientific enquiry is recommended.  
 
Secondly, the predominant impacts experienced, notably increasing caution, 
perceptions of being under attack and defensiveness, have important implications for 
epistemological norms and the social value of science. As indicated above, certain 
climate scientists perceived normatively positive consequences arising from 
interaction with sceptical voices, including increased attention to detail and rigour in 
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scientific enquiry, or trends towards greater transparency. “Reflection” is a particularly 
important category of potential response as public scrutiny may indeed improve the 
scientific process by making it more publicly accessible or critically self-reflexive. 
However, a greater number suggested that there was significant reluctance to directly 
engage with the public or the media for fear of being misconstrued. In particular, being 
personally attacked, or seeing other, especially well-known scientists attacked, can 
result in researchers being reluctant to communicate research findings beyond 
academia or being dissuaded from participating in public fora. If wider communication 
of results or public engagement becomes regarded as overly risky, a potential 
consequence is that it may no longer be regarded as a “normal” part of the activities of 
a scientist (whilst recognising that not all scientists have previously, or would desire to, 
directly publicly engage). This could lead to increased outsourcing of communication 
activities to third parties (such as science communication specialists) rather than 
forming part of (willing) scientists’ practices, breaking the direct relationship between 
scientists and the public that is understood to contribute to public perceptions of the 
social value of science (Chavis et al., 1983; O'Brien, 2013). Consequences for effective 
public decision-making may also be experienced, especially if highly publicly 
controversial research is suppressed or dampened down (e.g. extreme model 
projections). However, further research is required to provide more concrete examples 
of the impact of controversy on the policy decision-making process, particularly as 
regards specific contexts and settings. 
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5.9 Notes 
1. The role of non-human actors as contributors to the scientific knowledge 
production process is acknowledged (Latour, 1996) but is not the focus of this 
research. 
2. In 2014, 84% of the UK public agreed that climate change is either partly or mainly 
anthropogenic (Capstick et al., 2015). In 2009, 59.5% of New Zealanders agreed 
that climate change was caused by humans (Sibley and Kurz, 2013). 
3. This paper follows Painter (2011) and Howarth and Sharman (2015) by using 
“sceptical voice” to move away from the problematic labelling constructs evident in 
the climate debate. The emphasis on the idea of a “voice” re-focuses on the human 
(the “who” someone is, rather than the “what”) whilst also recognising the need for 
a pragmatic descriptor. 
4. “Climategate” is the colloquial term for the release without authorisation of over 
1,000 emails and documents from the University of East Anglia in 2009 on the eve 
of the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 15th Conference 
of the Parties in Copenhagen. 
5. CRIs are registered companies wholly owned by the Crown that carry out scientific 
research for the benefit of New Zealand.  
6. The GWPF is a charity established in 2009 aimed at advancing public 
understanding about climate change, including potential policy responses. Its 
chairman, Nigel Lawson, is highly visible in the news media as a sceptical voice 
(Grundmann and Scott, 2014). In 2014, the GWPF divided in two, adding a 
campaigning arm (the Global Warming Policy Forum) in response to a Charity 
Commission investigation finding that its activities were not corresponding to its 
main purpose as an educational charity (Charity Commission, 2014). Research for 
this paper occurred prior to this split so all references to the GWPF are to the 
foundation, not the forum. 
7. Mainstream climate science refers to the scientific position on climate change as 
expressed in the IPCC fourth and fifth assessment reports (2007; 2013).  
8. The notion of a parapet or protective walls was interesting, principally in terms of 
defensiveness and a separation between science and society, and was explicitly 
referred to 15 times in 12 separate interviews across all interviewee categories. 
9. See also Jasanoff (1987) and Ramírez-i-Ollé (2015) for other examples of the use of 
boundary work in related contexts. 
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10. It is critical to acknowledge the performative sense-making process that can occur 
during qualitative research interviews (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann, 2000; 
Denzin, 2001; Heiskanen, 2005). The boundary work of making the distinction 
between agency and practice seen here may be different under different research 
conditions such as ethnographic research, or survey-based methods. 
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Chapter 6. Post-decisional logics of 
inaction: The impact of climate 
controversy on policy decision-making 
6 Section 
Abstract 
Contestation over knowledge claims, including their legitimacy as an input to policy 
decision-making, does not end at the moment of policy creation. Policies continue to be 
made and unmade during the implementation phase and climate change policy is no 
exception. Building on Puchala’s (1975) concept of post-decisional politics, we 
investigate the implementation of climate change policy in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom and find influential post-decisional logics of inaction diluting and 
undermining climate policy implementation in both countries. In the United Kingdom, 
contestation over scientific knowledge claims is found to be a significant feature of the 
policy landscape, with sceptical voices seen to exert direct influence on policy decision-
making processes. Conversely, knowledge contestation has limited to no influence in 
New Zealand, where political rationales in the form of the current national economic 
interest and cost-based arguments prevail. Explanatory factors such as structural 
economic considerations and different values placed on science as an input to 
policymaking are discussed, highlighting the importance of being attentive to the place-
based characteristics of post-decisional logics of inaction. 
 
Keywords: climate change, controversy, policy, scepticism 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A growing number of states have committed themselves to ambitious climate 
mitigation policies (Nachmany et al., 2015). Much of the research into these policies 
has focused on their formulation and adoption. However, less well understood is what 
happens after the initial legislative act, including the factors shaping the subsequent 
enactment of domestic climate policy. This is an important gap. There is long-standing 
recognition that policies continue to be made—and, moreover, unmade—during the 
implementation stage (Lipsky, 1979). Indeed, increasing evidence suggests that many 
climate mitigation policies have failed to live up to their original ambitions, as decision-
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makers have sought to water-down commitments in practice (Viola and Franchini, 
2014; Newman and Head, 2015). 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the logics invoked by actors that have proved 
influential in delaying, diluting or otherwise undermining the implementation of 
climate policy, or which are used by decision-makers to justify policy inaction. In 
exploring these logics, we employ two conceptual frameworks. The first is that of 
knowledge controversy, defined by Whatmore (2009: 588) as ‘events in which the 
knowledge claims and technologies of environmental science, and the regulatory and 
policy practices of government agencies that they inform, become subject to public 
interrogation and dispute.’ While the existing literature provides valuable insights into 
the reasons behind controversy surrounding climate change, such as differences of 
worldview (Hulme, 2009; Hoffman, 2015), less attention has been paid to the role of 
knowledge controversy in impacting public policy. We use the framework of 
knowledge controversy to make three contributions to the literature. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, we investigate whether knowledge controversy is itself a 
significant factor influencing climate policy implementation. It could be that other 
considerations that are not predicated upon dispute over knowledge may be more 
influential in certain contexts. Second, we investigate whether and how different forms 
of knowledge controversy matter, focusing specifically on controversies (nominally) 
predicated on science and policy claims. And third, we examine the role of place, and 
the degree to which domestic cultural, political and economic factors impact the 
salience of knowledge controversy in the implementation of climate policy.  
 
The second framework is Puchala’s (1975) concept of post-decisional politics which 
highlights ‘who influences whom to do what, when, how, and why’ (1975: 497) once 
policies are executed. We build on this to introduce the concept of post-decisional 
logics of inaction. We define these as resonant arguments that provide the rationale for 
maintenance of the status quo, or increased conservatism, despite the intended aims of 
enacted policy. We contend that post-decisional logics of inaction are likely to be 
especially apposite in the case of climate mitigation—not least because it may only be 
during the implementation stage that the details of policies are fully worked out and 
the true costs of climate action become apparent. Actors whose interests are 
threatened, or are otherwise critical of climate action, are thus anticipated to mobilise 
against policy using logics of inaction which they believe are likely to prove influential 
amongst bureaucratic or political decision makers. Indeed, the literature has long 
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recognised how certain arguments (or frames) presented by actors can prove 
influential in public policy debates, mobilising support, opening windows of 
opportunity and legitimising certain courses of action (Grolin, 1998; Hannigan, 2014). 
Logics of inaction may invoke knowledge controversy or, alternatively, may be 
predicated upon considerations other than dispute over science and policy knowledge 
claims. 
 
In order to investigate these logics, we focus on two industrialised countries which 
were early-movers in climate policy adoption, the United Kingdom (UK) and New 
Zealand (NZ). The UK is recognised as a climate pioneer, with the 2008 Climate Change 
Act enshrining legal commitments to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by at least 80% by 2050. Concomitantly, NZ was the first country to 
implement an ambitious “all sectors, all gases” emissions trading scheme (the NZ-ETS). 
Yet, against a backdrop of active debate about climate change, both these flagship 
policies have experienced a number of post-implementation set-backs (Bullock, 2012; 
Carter and Clements, 2015). We suggest that such implementation “failures” cannot 
simply be explained by recourse to institutional factors such as inadequate resources 
or principle-agent problems (Howlett, 2012). Rather, other possibilities must also be 
considered, such as issues of political economy, or as the result of ongoing knowledge 
contestation, as sceptical voices1 (defined intentionally broadly as actors critical of 
knowledge claims emerging from climate change science and/or policy) seek to 
undermine the grounds for climate action.  
 
We begin by unpacking the potential relevance of knowledge controversies in the area 
of climate change before examining the literature regarding the post-decisional politics 
of climate change. After identifying the post-decisional logics of inaction occurring in 
both countries we conclude that while scientifically-based knowledge controversy has 
impacted the resourcing and prioritisation of climate policy implementation in the UK, 
it has had little or no impact in NZ. Instead, underscoring the place-based nature of 
knowledge controversy, we find that political rationales in the form of the current 
national economic interest and cost-based arguments have prevailed.  
 
 
6.2 Knowledge, controversy, inaction and place 
As defined by Whatmore (2009) above, knowledge controversies are events in which 
knowledge claims and associated policy practices are subject to public dispute. We 
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build on her definition to argue that knowledge controversies are also inherently 
political in nature. That is, they are fundamentally about whose evidence, opinions, 
arguments and framings are influential, and whose politics and science come to have 
authority within a contested domain. This interpretation thus also references Beck’s 
(1992) concept of the politics of knowledge, defined by Grundmann (2007: 417) as the 
‘instrumental use of knowledge claims for the achievement of political goals’. The 
concept of knowledge controversies is especially pertinent in this context as climate 
change is an issue where conflicting knowledge claims and valuations of evidence and 
expertise have been assembled to support different points of view within a 
contentious, highly divisive public debate (Demeritt, 2001; Ryghaug, 2011).  
 
Two streams of previous research are relevant to understanding the impact of 
knowledge controversy in the context of climate change. The first, deriving largely from 
the United States (US) experience, has examined the political activities of sceptical 
voices. This work has explored the strategies deployed by anti-regulatory groups to 
undermine political action on climate change, including by attacking the credibility of 
the science of climate change, or else the scientists who produce it, as well as 
challenging the assumed costs of various mitigation policies (McCright and Dunlap, 
2003; Layzer, 2007). It has also investigated the role of the media in the production 
and reproduction of knowledge controversy (Boykoff, 2007; Painter, 2011).  
 
A second stream of work, which has largely been situated within literature concerned 
with the nature of disputes over climate change, has sought to categorise sceptical 
voices and/or the different types of knowledge claims being made in the climate 
change debate by sceptical voices. That controversy exists about both the science and 
politics of climate change is unsurprising as there will inevitably be winners and losers 
from any climate policy attempting to cause, or resulting in, fundamental structural 
changes to national economic settings (Skodvin et al., 2010). In addition to disputes 
regarding climate policy, controversy about underpinning scientific claims is also 
evident, and is particularly understandable given the argument that ‘the construction 
of science is the construction of credibility’ (Mahony, 2014: 96, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Following this division, Capstick and Pidgeon (2013) distinguish between response 
and epistemic scepticism. The former encompasses doubts about the effectiveness of 
climate policy, as well as the willingness and ability of actors to implement and carry 
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out such policies, and the latter based on scientific factors. Yet it is important to note 
that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Much policy-related controversy is not 
solely limited to doubts as to the effectiveness of policy, or the willingness behind 
implementation, but is, albeit often implicitly, tied to the scientific rationales for such 
policy in the first place, thus combining the two categories together. Indeed, Van 
Rensburg (2015: 4) identifies what he calls ‘process scepticism’ which is based on 
critiques of the scientific and political processes underlying the creation of climate 
change knowledge. Nonetheless, these categories of science and politics are useful as a 
basic heuristic device to highlight the different explicit framings through which 
knowledge controversy may influence policy decision-making. Thus knowledge 
contestation may be (a) ostensibly based on the expression of scientific doubt or (b) 
based around debates where the potential impacts of various policy choices are 
disputed via the assemblage of conflicting knowledge claims. A third possibility is (c) 
that policy decision-making is shaped by arguments which are not subject to 
knowledge contestation. The policy consequences of such arguments may well 
generate controversy. Yet the important point is that, in such cases, the knowledge 
itself which forms an input into the policy decision-making process is not itself 
disputed.  
 
These categories help to direct attention towards three important, under-researched 
questions. The first is the degree to which knowledge controversy and battles over 
cognitive legitimacy affect policy decision-making during the implementation stage. It 
could be that knowledge controversy matters if sceptical voices are successful in 
exploiting the uncertainty about knowledge aspects of science or policy amongst 
political or bureaucratic actors. Alternatively, it may be that knowledge controversy 
has little or no impact, with rationales other than those focused on questions of 
knowledge resonating amongst decision-makers.  
 
A second question is which particular aspects of knowledge controversy may matter. 
Evidence suggests that sceptical voices have invoked both scientific and policy aspects 
in public discourse (Jaspal et al., 2015). We seek to provide new understanding into 
which of these articulations of controversy have proved influential in shaping the 
debate over climate change. One might expect policy-focused contestation to be 
prominent given the behavioural or cost implications of certain types of climate change 
policies (Whitmarsh, 2009; Fudge and Peters, 2011). Yet less clear is whether science-
based disagreements at the policy adoption stage (Layzer, 2007), also retain salience 
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following policy implementation. It is within this context that we introduce the notion 
of post-decisional logics of inaction in order to identify which arguments achieve 
saliency, credibility and purchase over policy decision-makers at the implementation 
stage.  
 
The third question examines whether and how particular different logics assume 
resonance more in some places than others. Inspiration to examine the place-based 
nature of knowledge controversies draws from previous work identifying national-
level differences between sources of dispute over contentious issues (Scoones, 2008; 
Vogel, 2012). It also responds to work in political ecology which recognises that 
environmental controversies are deeply rooted in local political, cultural and economic 
institutions (Forsyth, 2012). An important issue in the present context is why certain 
logics of inaction are likely to prove more influential in certain places than others. 
These include logics of inaction predicated on aspects of knowledge controversy, or 
logics that are framed outside of cognitive disputes over science or policy. We identify 
two sets of (interrelated) factors. The first stems from the power of sceptical voices 
and other claims-makers, their strategic choices over how to frame arguments, and 
their capabilities to use particular logics to shape the choices of decision-makers. 
Apposite in this regard are factors such as the existence of domestic political 
opportunity structures, group resources, political acumen and actors’ ability to present 
a unified position. A second set of factors focuses on resonance of these logics amongst 
decision-makers. This, in turn, is likely to depend on domestic cultural politics, political 
settings, strategic priorities and the bargaining power of different groups. For example, 
arguments framed around economic costs are likely to have greater weight where 
affected industries can impose a credible and substantive threat (Vining et al., 2005; 
Skodvin et al., 2010). It is also likely to partly be a function of how logics articulated by 
sceptical voices have issue linkage with concerns, imperatives and priorities of the 
wider public (Hannigan, 2014). 
 
 
6.3 The post-decisional politics of climate change 
In investigating whether and how the knowledge controversy surrounding climate 
change affects policy implementation, our work links to a long-established literature 
which has sought to explain the gap between policy objectives, intent and aspirations, 
and subsequent policy action in practice (Lipsky, 1979; Bardach, 1977). A number of 
different factors have been argued to explain this divergence although, in reality, they 
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often interact to shape policy outcomes. One set are institutional in nature. These 
include institutional capacity, institutional fragmentation and principal-agent problems 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Howlett, 2012).  
 
While institutional factors have a role in shaping the implementation of climate policy 
(Ryan, 2015), a second set of factors which are broadly political in nature are also 
critical. The significance of political factors stems from the fact that, as long recognised 
in the literature (Bardach, 1977; Lipsky, 1979), policies continue to get made during 
implementation. As a result, politics frequently carries over from the policy adoption 
phase into the implementation phase, in the sense that the period following policy 
adoption continues to require a series of choices by decision-makers, the influence of 
interests and the exercise of power (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). 
 
Political factors are likely to be especially important at the implementation stage in the 
case of climate change for a number of reasons. One is that both executives and 
legislatures may adopt climate change policies for a wide range of motives. A key 
rationale for the adoption of climate change legislation is the substantive goal of 
reducing GHG emissions. However, as well as ‘issue-related substantive’ reasons, 
political actors may also adopt policies for ‘political-strategic’ purposes (Newig, 2007: 
279). Within the context of climate change, these motives include: relief from domestic 
societal pressure to act; prestige from assuming international leadership on climate 
change; external legitimacy from conforming to norms of environmental responsibility; 
and avoiding stigma arising from a failure to sign-up to legally-binding mitigation 
commitments. Motives are important because they potentially spill over into 
implementation. In particular, climate policies adopted for political-strategic reasons 
can be interpreted as a form of symbolic politics, primarily aimed at reassuring others 
by creating the impression that “something is being done” (Blühdorn, 2013). In reality, 
political actors may lack the intent or resolve to follow through on commitments 
enshrined in symbolic legislation, making implementation vulnerable to anti-
regulatory interest groups or various economic and political vagaries including 
recessions (Bache et al., 2014). Policies may thus include purposefully vague or 
ambiguous goals, or include commitments to long-term targets which allow 
governments to avoid taking aggressive action in their period of office. 
 
Another reason why climate policy implementation is frequently political is that, as 
with other policy areas, primary legislation may be highly general in nature. That is, 
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rather than laying out detailed rules and regulations, it may only specify goals, 
objectives or mitigation commitments. Indeed, climate mitigation legislation can often 
be interpreted as meta-policy, intended to guide the subsequent development of more 
detailed policy settings carried out by administrative bodies (Bache et al., 2014). That 
the specific details of climate change policies are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
elaborated and resolved at the implementation stage has several important 
implications. The first is that political debate and opposition may increase after policy 
enaction when many critical decisions with associated cost and adjustment 
implications are made and that true costs of climate change policy for target groups 
becomes apparent (Ryan, 2015). Indeed, precisely because certain “flagship” meta-
policy has focused on long-term mitigation goals, opposition at the adoption stage can 
remain relatively muted or else ineffective (Carter, 2014). A second, associated, 
implication, is that affected interest groups and other critical parties may be more 
likely to, or be more successful at, politically mobilising at the implementation stage.  
 
The concept of post-decisional politics neatly captures these dynamics, recognising 
that the period following policy adoption may be characterised by a series of choices, 
political influences and institutional constraints on action (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). We 
suggest that this concept is especially resonant in the case of climate change, where the 
period following the adoption of policy has been accompanied by political debates, 
manoeuvring and interest group politics. These dynamics are of academic interest for 
two key reasons. First, they challenge highly stylised accounts which portray climate 
change politics as somehow apolitical and little more than a technocratic exercise in 
the shadow of an assumed political consensus. Whilst the politics of climate change 
have not always been radical, as envisioned by prominent Marxist observers 
(Swyngedouw, 2010), we nevertheless witness an active political debate in many 
countries over the issue. Second, the post-decisional politics of climate change reveals 
something important about the ways in which highly divisive knowledge controversies 
may continue to play out during the implementation phase of policy, and moreover 
which aspects of controversy have the greatest influence over policy in the form of 
post-decisional logics of inaction. It is this issue which is the primary focus of the 
present paper. 
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6.4 Climate change politics 
6.4.1 New Zealand 
NZ’s GHG emissions profile differs radically from that of most other developed nations, 
with nearly half total emissions comprising methane and nitrous oxide from 
agriculture, followed by energy, industrial processes and product use, and waste 
(Figure 6.1). Net GHG emissions increased 111% between 1990-2012 to 49.4 MtCO2-e 
(MFE, 2014). Agriculture contributes approximately half of the country’s export 
earnings, with dairy comprising 55% of this total (NZ Government, 2015b). Three GHG 
emissions reduction targets below 1990 levels exist: an unconditional target of 5% by 
2020; a conditional target of 10-20% by 2020 providing a comprehensive global 
agreement is reached; and, gazetted under the 2002 Climate Change Response Act in 
2011, a target of 50% by 2050 (NZ Government, 2015a). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: NZ and UK net GHG emissions, percentage by sector 2013 
* Industrial processes and product use  
Source: (DECC, 2015; MFE, 2015a) 
 
Debate over climate change emerged in the late 1980s. Pressure groups such as the 
now-defunct Greenhouse Policy Coalition (representing a consortium of the country’s 
largest industrial GHG emitters) and agricultural lobby groups have played a key role 
in influencing government policy choices (Bullock, 2012; Barry and King-Jones, 2014). 
Reforming a framework established in the 2002 Climate Change Response Act, the NZ-
ETS was established in 2008. Agriculture was initially scheduled to enter the NZ-ETS in 
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January 2015, but due to intense opposition (Cooper and Rosin, 2014) was indefinitely, 
and controversially, excluded in 2012 (Mason, 2013).2  
 
Kelly (2010: 9) has identified three key factors contributing to what he terms a ‘major 
policy implementation deficit’ in NZ climate policymaking: the dominant role of 
business-focused interest groups opposing regulatory intervention; short-term 
discourses regarding protection of the country’s (land-based) economic 
competitiveness; and, an influential legacy of neo-liberal market-focused ideology. 
While NZ was a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol during its first commitment period 
(2008-2012), in 2012 the Minister of Climate Change, Tim Groser, announced that the 
then-Government would not sign up to a second period and would instead aim to 
participate in a new, as yet unidentified, convention (Associated Press, 2012). 
Explicitly scientific contestation about climate change has been mainly limited to the 
arguments put forth by the NZ Climate Science Coalition (NZCSC). The NZCSC has had a 
limited public profile, but in 2010 formed the NZ Climate Science Education Trust. This 
trust filed a statement of claim in the NZ High Court seeking to invalidate the official NZ 
temperature record kept by the state-owned National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research (NIWA), (NZCSC, 2010). The court case was won by NIWA, but 
its members remain active in public discussion about climate change (TVNZ, 2014).  
 
 
6.4.2 The United Kingdom 
In the UK, net GHG emissions decreased by 28% between 1990-2012 to 582.2 MtCO2-e 
(DECC, 2015). The vast majority of emissions are from carbon dioxide (82% in 2013), 
followed by methane (10%), nitrous oxide (5%) and fluorinated gases (3%). The 
energy sector accounts for the largest share of overall emissions, followed by transport, 
business, residential, and agriculture (Figure 6.1). A legally binding target of at least an 
80% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2050 exists as part of the 
2008 Climate Change Act (CCA), with an interim target of a 50% reduction by 2025. 
Within the CCA a series of five-yearly “carbon budgets” exist as a mechanism to ensure 
targets are met. However, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has warned that the 
lack of policies focused on the post-2020 period is causing uncertainty and ‘risks failing 
to meet legal obligations to reduce emissions’ (CCC, 2015). 
 
A review of UK climate change politics by Carter (2014) suggests that, following a 
period of limited public interest and vigorous opposition to policy action by business 
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interests, a window of opportunity opened between 2006-2010 allowing climate 
change to rapidly move up the political agenda during a period of “consensus politics”. 
However, Carter and Clements (2015) argue that climate change can no longer be 
understood as a valence issue in UK political discourse. Rather, that it has become 
increasingly positional and partisan, akin to the divided political debate evident in the 
USA (Guber, 2013; Hess, 2014). Indeed, such divisions were apparent in the last 
Coalition government, particularly between more right-of-centre elements of the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats (Macalister, 2014), with Carter (2014: 
429) observing ‘growing discontent [post-2010] among Conservative MPs, the wider 
party and the right wing press toward many of the Government’s emission reduction 
measures’. The most well-known body opposing climate action in the public UK debate 
is the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF) (Painter, 2011), established in 2009. 
The GWPF actively disseminates information about both the scientific and policy 
dimensions of climate change and its chairman, Nigel Lawson, is highly visible in the 
news media as a sceptical voice (Grundmann and Scott, 2014). 
 
 
6.5 Method 
Semi-structured interviews with 99 individuals occurred between November 2012 and 
March 2014. Interviewees were categorised as academic, policy, politician, scientist or 
other (Table 6.1). Within this number, 20 interviews were conducted with individuals 
further classified as sceptical voices3. Interviewees were asked whether they 
considered sceptical voices, “climate scepticism” or controversy about climate change 
in general (using, where possible, the language previously employed by the 
interviewee themselves), had an influence on contemporary (i.e. post-implementation 
of flagship policy) domestic policy decisions made about climate change. Interview 
data was analysed using thematic coding in NVivo10 (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013) and 
manually. Impact on policy decision-making was classified into three groups: direct, 
indirect and no impact. Indirect impact included influences that the respondent 
themselves thought was circuitous or removed directly from the direct policy-making 
process—for example, via influence on public opinion.  
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Table 6.1: Interviews 
   NZ UK Total 
Academic Social scientists working on climate change or related issues 7 5 12 
Other Media, NGO or industry representatives 10 11 22 
Policy 
Officials presently or previously working on climate change for 
state or city/regional-level policy departments, or independent 
policy advisory agencies 
17 10 27 
Politician 
Sitting members of Parliament; political party spokespeople on 
climate change, environment or energy; or city/regional-level 
politicians 
4 5 9 
Scientist 
Scientists working on climate change in a university department 
of physics, geography, earth sciences or environment; or for a 
government-funded climate-related organisation 
16 14 20 
 Total  54 45  99* 
* Including 20 interviewees classified as sceptical voices. 
 
 
6.6 Post-decisional logics of inaction 
A clear and consistent narrative emerged from the interview process. The majority of 
respondents in NZ, particularly policy officials, did not consider that sceptical voices 
exerted a direct impact on policy decision-making, yet the opposite was the case in the 
UK (Table 6.2). Two further findings are notable. First, if direct and indirect responses 
are collated, a substantial majority (87%) of UK respondents perceived that sceptical 
voices impacted policy decision-making yet it still did not become the dominant 
opinion in NZ. Second, taking just policy officials’ and politicians’ viewpoints into 
account, an even starker difference between the two contexts is evident. All bar one 
respondent in the UK considered sceptical voices to have either a direct or indirect 
impact on policy decision-making. In NZ, only eight politicians and policy officials 
considered sceptical voices to have either a direct or indirect impact on policy decision-
making, compared to 13 who did not. The following sub-sections examine these results 
in more detail, focusing on the logics of inaction evident in each country context. 
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Table 6.2: Perception of impact of sceptical voices on policy decision-making 
Case study Category Type of impact 
  Direct impact Indirect impact No impact 
NZ Academic 2 - 1 
 Other 1 5 3 
 Policy 2 4 11 
 Politician 2 - 2 
 Scientist 4 - 4 
 Total 11 (27%)* 9 (22%) 21 (51%) 
UK Academic 2 1 - 
 Other 3 4 3 
 Policy 8 1 1 
 Politician 2 1 - 
 Scientist 3 1 - 
 Total 18 (60%) 8 (27%) 4 (13%) 
* Percentages are based on 71 interviewees who directly gave an opinion. 
 
 
6.6.1 New Zealand: A dominant national interest story 
The overwhelmingly dominant post-decisional logic of inaction evident in NZ was the 
pre-eminence of the current national economic interest, centred on the protection of 
the country’s agricultural base in order to ensure the cost-competitiveness of dairy in 
the global marketplace. The indefinite exclusion of agriculture from requirements to 
surrender emissions units under the NZ-ETS in 2012 provides a concrete policy 
manifestation of this logic of inaction. As NZPolicy3 argued, “why are we taxing our 
cows when we're one of the more efficient producers, and no other country is taxing 
theirs?”. Disconnect between the initial policy ambition of the NZ-ETS and its current 
status was frequently highlighted by interviewees. NZPolicy9 noted that “our policy has 
effectively been watered down…the evidence becomes stronger it seems and our 
scheme gets weaker”, but also recognised that there were a number of “legitimate 
political and probably economic reasons why making our scheme weaker makes sense 
for NZ at the moment”. Moreover, the very existence of the NZ-ETS, as well as the 
exclusion of agriculture, has meant that climate change as a whole is regarded as 
having “disappeared, absolutely” from the political agenda of the Government because 
"politically the ETS has made it all go away" (NZPolicy2). The effectiveness of this logic 
of inaction is unsurprising, not least due to warnings issued following the NZ-ETS 
launch that unless ‘other countries include agriculture [in equivalent pricing 
mechanisms] the comparative advantage of NZ agriculture will diminish with little if 
any reductions in global emissions’ (Jiang et al., 2009: 78). Indeed, an important 
feature of the current national economic interest logic is that its underlying knowledge 
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claims have gone largely uncontested, in the sense that it is broadly accepted that the 
agricultural sector would incur substantive cost burdens from full participation in the 
NZ-ETS. 
 
The influence of the current national economic interest logic of inaction has been 
bolstered by two other factors. One is ongoing political uncertainty regarding the 
prospects of a binding international climate mitigation agreement. This uncertainty is 
important because NZ is unwilling to risk its national competitive advantage by making 
internationally unreciprocated policy commitments. Lobby groups are “using the 
political uncertainty to their advantage” (NZOther3), such as by making threats to 
move business offshore should more stringent policies be implemented. The second 
contributory factor is the demonstrative, symbolic political value of the NZ-ETS in 
maintaining NZ’s international credibility and legitimacy. Whereas NZ chose not to sign 
up to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, specifically citing its rationale 
as acting in the country’s best interests (Groser, 2012), the NZ-ETS, even in its current 
incarnation, is regarded as acting as a mollifying signal of enacted climate policy to the 
international community. NZPolicy6 explained that “it can appear to be a, ‘we'll try to 
get away with as little as possible, do just enough to politically hold some credibility 
around it, but only just enough’”. This desire for credibility is important as “NZ has a 
primary interest in being seen as a good global citizen” (NZPolicy17) in order to secure 
access to global trade deals. This post-decisional logic of inaction also rests on an 
explicit “fair share” (NZPolicy3) basis, with the phrase “Doing our fair share” one of the 
six main headlines on the NZ Government’s main climate change website (NZ 
Government, 2015a). The underlying argument is that the country “shouldn’t be trying 
to stay ahead of the pack when it’s costly” (NZPolicy1). 
 
In terms of the scientific basis for climate change policy, while there is seen to be a 
“very strong acceptance of climate change by ministers and ministries” (NZPolicy13), 
scientific rationales were not viewed as having a “conscious and open impact, an 
explicit impact on decision-making” (NZPolicy17). Critically, whereas scientific 
considerations were seen to contribute towards the rationale for policy development, 
they were regarded as being nearly absent from the policy implementation phase. 
Relatedly, while “the sceptic debate was quite strident” (NZPolicy2) at the formation 
stage of the NZ-ETS, it was largely seen as having “had its battles and lost” (NZPolicy3). 
Notable in this regard is the observation that the country’s largest agricultural lobby, 
Federated Farmers, has switched from questioning the scientific basis for climate 
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change towards a position of questioning the need for action. Politicians were also 
widely seen by respondents as being dismissive of sceptical voices, particularly those 
who frame their arguments in scientific terms and who are seen to be “running 
interference rather than being constructive” (NZPolicy1). Indeed, sceptical voices such 
as the NZCSC who openly base much of their opposition to climate policy on scientific 
grounds are seen as increasingly side-lined in terms of political credibility. While one 
such sceptical voice considered that “we might have had a bearing” (NZOther5) on 
reducing domestic policy ambition, the majority concurred with NZOther6 who 
considered their impact to be “fairly small”. The global financial crisis was also 
identified as a contributory factor in reducing the need for politicians to position any 
criticism of climate policy upon a foundation of scientific uncertainty. Thus, whereas 
scientifically-based scepticism exists in the NZ context, it is not regarded as a legitimate 
policy discourse, and does not act as an influential logic of inaction.  
 
 
6.6.2 The United Kingdom: The continued relevance of scientific doubt 
In stark contrast to the NZ context, sceptical voices were seen by the majority of 
respondents, particularly policy officials and politicians, as exerting direct influence on 
UK climate change policy decision-making at the implementation stage. While the CCA 
provides a solution of architecture, post-decisional political conservatism was clearly 
apparent, with the most notable post-decisional logic of inaction being the expression 
of scientific doubt. For example, UKPolicy3 identified “a highly-organised, very well-
funded group…whose job it is to try and undermine everything the climate science 
community is doing” and UKPolicy5 suggested that “most cabinet ministers remain 
unconvinced about climate science and warm to the GWPF’s position rather than the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment report”. However the pathway of influence for scientific 
arguments was recognised as complex. Whereas “very few UK politicians are out-and-
out climate denying” (UKPolicy5), scientific rationales are contributing to a “fog of 
distrust” (UKPolicy10) around the need to actively move forward on implementing 
policies which would achieve agreed carbon budgets and mandated emissions targets. 
It was thought unlikely that the CCA would be repealed or significantly altered in the 
near term, but this scientifically-based logic of inaction was clearly seen as contributing 
towards “not just a slowing down but blockages” (UKPolicy6) in terms of active policy 
implementation. Critically, scientifically-based arguments provide “a fig leaf for certain 
policy inaction” by “draining political capital…from mitigative action on climate 
change” (UKScientist14). Since the passing of the CCA in 2008, it was argued that UK 
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climate change policy “did backtrack…[as] the climate sceptics’ arguments came up and 
we didn't address them or just they became more vocal or people used them as an 
excuse to ignore it when they actually just didn't want to pay for action or change 
behaviours” (UKPolicy9). In contrast to the policy development stage, UKPolicy5 states 
that several years after the passing of the CCA “we barely use the word climate, and 
even in internal documents the word climate is rarely used”. UKPolicy4 provides a 
concrete example of the impact of this logic of inaction: 
It manifests itself in terms of the resources going into the CCA… You can soft 
peddle; you can really do the minimum. What we’ve seen compared to the first 
cycle of the climate change risk assessment and national adaptation programme 
and planning, the resource that went into that. We’re seeing this time round, just 
a fraction of that, a tenth of the resources.  
 
The role of individual political figures who are either not convinced of the veracity of 
climate science, or who use scientific arguments to justify particular policy positions, 
was also noted. In terms of direct influence on policymaking, Owen Paterson, former 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, was the most frequently 
mentioned individual. Paterson was seen to have “very little interest in climate change, 
putting it politely” (UKPolicy4) due to his scepticism of scientific knowledge claims 
such as the legitimacy of existing and forecast global warming measurements 
(Paterson, 2014). In addition to Paterson, it was also “widely thought that under the 
current political leadership of the Treasury, the former chancellor Lord Lawson has a 
disproportionate influence” (UKPolicy6). Groups such as the GWPF were deemed 
significant as “they are loud and they get a lot of airtime” (UKPolicy3), with 
interviewees recounting stories of politicians receiving emails from the GWPF 
“pointing to various different particular findings every day” which is “putting the 
centre of gravity a bit in a particular direction” (UKPolicy8). Lobby groups are “trying 
to push forward this message that not only is it not worth doing anything about 
climate, not only should we not subsidise uneconomic renewables but let’s forget 
climate change because it’s not an issue anymore” (UKPolicy1). These discourses are 
seen to make it difficult for politicians to make decisive decisions due to their 
successful casting of scientific doubt and, furthermore, impact the working processes of 
policy officials. For example, UKPolicy1 contended that sceptical voices “try to absorb 
as much of our time as possible before conferences of the parties and things like that… 
to keep us busy so that we’re not doing what we should be doing”. Impacts on policy 
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officials are important, particularly given recognition of their vital role in shaping and 
influencing policy on an ongoing basis (Page and Jenkins, 2005).  
 
Other, less dominant, logics of inaction were also present in the UK context. It was 
regarded as an “unhappy coincidence of timing that the financial crisis came” 
(UKPolicy9) at the same time as the CCA was passed, thus giving more relevance to 
immediate national economic interest arguments. As in NZ, costs are regarded as 
“bottom line politics” (UKPolicy4), influenced by, for example, linkages made in the 
media between rising household energy bills and subsidies for renewable energy 
policies (Doyle, 2015). Thus the national economic interest argument “intuitively 
strikes a chord with quite a lot of people and decision-makers, and businesses can 
forever cite them whether or not they have evidence” (UKPolicy8). The concept of 
fairness was also noted, as “why should British businesses suffer under environmental 
burdens no-one else has to bear?” (UKPolicy5). Critically however, unlike in NZ, these 
cost-based logics were seen to be explicitly predicated upon framings of scientific 
doubt, with a clear relationship between perceptions of policy necessity and opinion of 
the legitimacy of underlying scientific knowledge claims. In essence, the costs of so-
called “green” policies were able to be framed as unnecessary because the notion that 
the underlying science was uncertain achieved resonance with policy decision-makers. 
 
It is also important to mention that, while the majority of respondents considered 
sceptical voices to be influencing policy decision-making in the UK, there were 
differences regarding the strength of impact in terms of a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship. For example, UKPolicy8 considered the impact on government policy to 
be “far less than would be perceived or expected” and UKPolicy10 said they could not 
“see a clear line between that and decisions that get made”. A key reason for such 
opinions was the existence of the statutory obligations which form part of the CCA 
(including legal requirements to annually report progress on meeting emissions 
targets). Moreover, while several sceptical voice politicians considered that they 
“absolutely” (UKPolitician2) had an impact on policy and that this was increasing over 
time, the majority of non-politician sceptical voices were more reticent. For example, 
UKOther3 thought he had impact “only in a very small way” and UKOther5 perceived 
achieving “a little bit” of impact. The role of the media as a conduit for sceptical voices’ 
arguments (which are then reflected back to politicians via constituency members or 
opinion polls) was also highlighted, with UKPolicy10 arguing that information from the 
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GWPF “has most weight when it’s actually picked up…and put in the mainstream 
press”.  
 
 
6.7 Unravelling contrasting logics 
The above results provide evidence of influential, albeit contrasting, post-decisional 
logics of inaction in both NZ and the UK which have constrained the implementation of 
climate policy. The existence of the current national economic interest and cost-based 
logics apparent in NZ are not surprising, with the indefinite removal of agriculture 
from the NZ-ETS chiming with Bartram and Terry’s account of a long history of ‘goal 
deflation’ (2010: 31) in NZ climate change politics. Most recently, this has been 
apparent in the decision by the Government in 2015 to downgrade its emissions target 
to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, effectively adding an additional decade to the 
previous goal (MFE, 2015b). Likewise, evidence from the interviews points to a 
reduction in prioritisation and resourcing for the implementation of the CCA in the UK, 
echoing recent work which points to a cooling political appetite to aggressively pursue 
climate change policy (Carter, 2014; Carter and Clements, 2015; Bache et al., 2014).  
 
In NZ, despite goal deflation, climate change remains a topic of public concern, 
regularly ranking in public opinion polls as the most important environmental issue 
facing the world (Hughey et al., 2013). However, only 6% of the population thinks that 
climate change is the most important environmental issue facing NZ itself (Hughey et 
al., 2013). This suggests that for NZ, climate change exists largely as an external 
problem, strongly linked with outward-facing issues of trade, exports and international 
competitiveness. The dominant post-decisional logic of inaction, emphasising the 
current national economic interest, also has a clearly temporal aspect. It indicates an 
emphasis on short-term political considerations at the expense of longer-term 
consequences and suggests that the dominance of this post-decisional logic of inaction 
is strongly linked to high social discount rates for both environmental and economic 
factors. 
 
In the UK, political economic rationales such as debates about the cost implications of 
climate change policies were also present. Yet what is a much more puzzling result is 
that it was only in the UK that explicitly scientifically-based arguments were also 
regarded as holding cognitive authority as a post-decisional logic of inaction. This 
difference in terms of the salience of knowledge claims centred on scientific doubt may 
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be explained by several factors. One suggestion offered during the interview process 
was a lack of scientific knowledge amongst UK parliamentarians. However, more 
Members of Parliament (MPs) have a scientific background in the UK as do in NZ (8% 
in the UK in 2008 versus 4% in NZ in 2014) (Miller and Blackham, 2014; Goodwin, 
2015). Moreover, scientific training has also been shown to have no independent effect 
on UK MPs’ voting behaviour (Goodwin, 2015), limiting the persuasiveness of this 
rationale. Another, more compelling argument however is that there exists an 
“inherent distrust [not] of scientists, but of science-informed policy” (UKPolicy2) 
which, for many respondents, made climate change policy challenging to implement. 
Apposite in this regard is the “perfect storm” of science-based contestation about 
climate change that occurred in early 2010 (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). Within a matter 
of months, Climategate4 (particularly resonant in the UK due to its occurrence at the 
University of East Anglia), the political failure of the Copenhagen United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations and errors related 
to rates of glacial melt found in the IPCC (2007) report were all highlighted by the UK 
media (Hoffman, 2011; Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014) as well as by lobby groups 
such as the GWPF. The emphasis on epistemic uncertainty and scientific misconduct 
were key narratives that appeared to resonate strongly with both the UK public and 
policymakers (Nerlich, 2010; Grundmann, 2012). This is unsurprising given both 
recent public scientific controversies still fresh in the public consciousness such as the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis and the badger cull (Lodge and Matus, 
2014; Naylor et al., 2014), as well as previous evidence demonstrating the successful 
use of uncertainty and doubt by lobbyists in public scientific debates in the USA 
(Michaels, 2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). It has long been recognised that the 
strategic choices made by individuals or groups intending to influence policy need to 
be attuned to context in order to ensure receptiveness on behalf of decision-makers 
(Milbrath, 1960; Binderkrantz and Kroyer, 2012; De Bruycker, 2014). It seems likely 
that individuals disputing climate policy in the UK may have identified the successful 
use of scientifically-based arguments as a strategy which aligned well with the context 
of the domestic policy environment. Relatedly, the political acumen of lobby groups 
using scientifically-based arguments also appears to be much greater in the UK as 
compared to NZ. As indicated above, the GWPF directly and regularly contacts MPs to 
express its viewpoint, and, crucially, is chaired by a previous Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, suggesting a degree of insider credibility in the policy process. 
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A second contributory factor is the value placed on science within each context. The UK 
has a strong history of evidence-based policymaking, with explicit emphasis on the 
value of science as a decision-making input (Holmes and Clark, 2008). For example, the 
UK has a much more extensive network of chief scientific advisors compared to NZ 
(one per government department as compared to one for the whole of government), 
and indeed, as compared to many other Westminster-based systems of government 
(Lalor and Hickey, 2014). In terms of climate change in particular, the existence of the 
CCC which is legally mandated to provide scientific advice on the 2050 target, carbon 
budgets and emissions is also an influential element to consider. Given the importance 
accorded to science as a rationale for policy, it seems understandable that science 
would therefore be accorded equally significant weight as a mechanism with which to 
dispute policy. This relationship has been argued as particularly pertinent for 
environmental issues given their heavy reliance on scientific evidence (Demeritt, 2006; 
Jacques et al., 2008). While evidence-based policymaking is valued in NZ (Gluckman, 
2013), it may be possible that institutional structures and the centuries-long(er) 
history of scientific endeavour in the UK leads to a greater awareness and thus 
recognition of its ability to inform policy. It is however important to also recognise that 
debate exists regarding the continued value of science as an input into the UK policy 
process (Demeritt, 2000). Indeed, UKPolicy4 suggested that there has been a “drop-off 
in our value of science”, so it is possible that the prevalence and authority of 
scientifically-related knowledge contestation may concomitantly reduce over time. 
 
Finally, structural considerations are also likely to be relevant. As Figure 6.1 shows, the 
majority of NZ’s GHG emissions originate from a single source (the agricultural sector) 
whereas the UK emissions profile is more diverse. In NZ, a clear relationship exists 
between the inclusion of agriculture in the NZ-ETS and the country’s immediate 
economic performance (particularly in terms of international trade), such that the 
dominance of economic logics is understandable. Conversely in the UK, a more complex 
relationship exists between the myriad climate policies under the framework of the 
CCA, the different sectors that comprise the economy, and overall national economic 
performance. Critically, this complexity thus provides fertile ground for arguments 
predicated on scientific doubt, whereas in NZ, there is no need or space to invoke 
scientific arguments as the current national economic interest effectively crowds out 
other logics. This does not deny the well-documented relationship between political 
ideology and the use of scientific logics to argue for a reduction in regulatory burden 
(McCright and Dunlap, 2010), but helps to explain why in NZ, where ideological 
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opposition to climate change regulation exists in terms of free-market fundamentalism 
(Kelly, 2010), scientific uncertainty is a less powerfully resonant post-decisional logic 
of inaction. 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
There is growing recognition that the ambitions enshrined in an emerging body of 
climate mitigation legislation are not being fully realised during the actual 
implementation of accompanying policy (Ryan, 2015). Our goal in the present paper 
was to investigate this discrepancy through an analysis of 99 interviews in NZ and the 
UK. We introduced the concept of post-decisional logics of inaction to describe 
arguments or rationales used by actors in the climate change debate to dilute, delay or 
slow the implementation of formally adopted policy. We found two contrasting post-
decisional logics of inaction in the two case-study countries. The dominant logic in NZ 
centred on a largely uncontested (in terms of knowledge claims) national economic 
interest argument. Conversely, the most influential post-decisional decisional logic of 
inaction in the UK was that of scientific doubt, with national economic interest 
arguments only playing a secondary role.  
 
Our findings have wider implications for debates about knowledge controversy and the 
impact of controversy on policy decision-making (Sharman and Holmes, 2010; Marris 
et al., 2005; Suhay and Druckman, 2015). As revealed by the example of NZ, arguments 
which are used to roll-back on the implementation of climate policy are not necessarily 
predicated on the uncertainty, ambiguity or veracity of knowledge. That is, knowledge 
controversy is not always part of a political strategy to undermine climate mitigation, 
not least where there is limited ambiguity about the consequences of policy. Hence, a 
particular feature of the NZ case is that few disputed claims that including agriculture 
in the NZ-ETS would be costly, or that it would have significant consequences for the 
competitiveness of the country’s dairy exports. 
 
In other contexts, however, knowledge controversy may feature prominently. In the 
UK, scientific-based controversy has been used instrumentally by sceptical voices to 
create a “fog of distrust” in order to achieve a reduction in prioritisation and resourcing 
for the CCA, the country’s principal climate change policy. At one level, the success of 
this strategy is surprising, in that it is sometimes assumed that the scientific case for 
climate policy is now largely settled (Cook et al., 2013). Yet unlike in NZ, the national 
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economic interest case against implementing climate change policy is less clear-cut 
(Bassi and Zenghelis, 2014), creating a political space for controversy. Moreover, 
potential distrust about science-based policy provides more fertile ground for 
arguments based on scientific uncertainty to be deployed in order to achieve political 
goals. What this suggests is that, under particular conditions, the politics of knowledge 
may stretch beyond the oft-discussed science-policy interface at the early policy 
formulation and adoption phase (Wesselink et al., 2013). Where ambiguity can be 
effectively exploited, science-based knowledge controversy may also continue to shape 
policy decision-making during subsequent implementation.  
 
Of note, there was very little evidence that policy-based knowledge controversy 
significantly impacted the implementation of climate policy in either context, even 
though several interviewees acknowledged its existence in the UK. These included a 
number of sceptical voices who, as well as casting doubt over the science of climate 
change, actively sought to challenge policy-based knowledge (e.g. about the cost or 
effectiveness of particular policies, such as financial support mechanisms for 
renewables). Again, this likely reflects the receptiveness of the domestic environment 
to scientific uncertainty, as opposed to policy uncertainty. Regardless of the true 
underlying reason, however, our findings indicate that scientific and policy aspects of 
knowledge controversy do not necessarily hold the same salience. 
 
Indeed, a key insight to emerge from the present study is that the politics of knowledge 
and post-decisional logics of inaction are far from universal across space, but are place-
based in that they are embedded in particular economic, political and cultural contexts. 
Arguments which are effective in undermining, diluting and delaying the 
implementation of climate policy do not hold universal purchase. Whereas Painter 
(2011) argued that climate change scepticism was an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, even 
in two Anglo-Saxon countries with a number of political and cultural similarities, the 
resonance of different rationales for policy decision-making have been highly context-
dependent. While similar logics were noted in both case study locations (economic 
interest arguments were made in the UK, and scientific arguments were expressed in 
NZ, although the latter with less political acumen), our findings suggest that place is 
primarily important because it determines the cognitive legitimacy and weight 
accorded to different logics amongst publics and decision-makers. 
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A further implication of the paper is that it is important to recognise that the political 
contestation of climate change continues well beyond the legislative adoption stage. A 
highly charged post-decisional politics was apparent in both NZ and the UK. In NZ, the 
NZ-ETS can be interpreted as symbolic policy, designed to signal NZ’s commitment to 
international action on climate change. This has meant political resolve for 
comprehensive “all-sectors, all-gases” implementation has proven weak in the face of a 
narrative which portrayed clear-cut, negative economic consequences of extending the 
NZ-ETS to agriculture (Bullock, 2012). In the UK, the CCA was enacted on the back of an 
optimistic wave of consensus politics (Carter, 2014), with the legislation leaving many 
of the difficult decisions regarding how to achieve the constituent targets to future 
governments. The ensuing economic recession, combined with latent opposition to 
climate change policy amongst influential members of the Conservative party of the 
ruling Coalition, created a space for arguments predicated on scientific uncertainty. 
These, in turn, have created an instrumental rationale to downgrade commitment to 
resourcing and implementing the CCA. 
 
In identifying these post-decisional logics of inaction, we conclude that scholars (and 
applied policy analysts) need to be more attentive to what happens when climate 
policies are put into effect. In other words, the passing of legislative action may prove a 
misleading indicator of actual commitment to, and subsequent action on, climate 
mitigation. 
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6.9 Notes 
1. This paper uses “sceptical voice” (Painter, 2011; Howarth and Sharman, 2015) in 
an effort to move away from the problematic labelling constructs evident in the 
climate debate. The emphasis on the idea of a “voice” re-focuses on the human (the 
“who” someone is, rather than the “what”) whilst also recognising the need for a 
pragmatic descriptor. 
2. NZ-ETS agriculture participants have been required to report on-farm biological 
emissions since 2012 but are not required to surrender emissions units. The 
Government has stated that such an obligation will only occur if ‘there are 
economically viable and practical technologies available to reduce emissions’ and if 
NZ’s ‘trading partners make more progress on tackling their emissions in general’ 
(NZ Government, 2015a). 
3. Identified from sources such as Sharman’s (2014) list of climate sceptical blog 
authors and Painter’s ‘list of sceptics ‘mentioned’ more than once in 10 UK national 
newspapers’ (2011: 128). 
4. Climategate refers to the unauthorised release of over 1,000 emails and documents 
from the University of East Anglia in 2009. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7 Section 
7.1 Introduction 
Debate about climate change offers countless possibilities for investigation and 
examination. Building on an initial curiosity regarding how decisions are made about 
climate change within the context of contentious public debate, and drawing from the 
literature examining public scientific controversies (Engelhart and Caplan, 1987; 
Martin and Richards, 1995; Pinch, 2001), this thesis has come to conceptualise climate 
change as, fundamentally, a controversy about knowledge. In so doing, it has attempted 
to make explicit the underlying ‘politics of knowledge’ (Beck, 1992: 51; see also 
Grundmann and Stehr, 2003; Grundmann, 2007; Grundmann, 2013) that are at play 
within the climate change debate. Knowledge has been a central topic of concern 
within the social science literature, particularly within the STS and SSK traditions for 
many years (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Jasanoff, 1987; Gibbons et al., 1994; Barnes et al., 
1996). It has also been recognised as a critically important component of controversial 
public debates involving science, as claims and counter-claims are assembled in order 
to influence scientific conclusions and policy decision-making (Martin and Richards, 
1995; van Eeten, 1999; Sarewitz, 2004; Young and Matthews, 2007; Wynn and Walsh, 
2013; Naylor et al., 2014). Climate change provides an excellent lens with which to 
examine knowledge controversy due to its nature as an issue of unprecedented 
complexity and “wickedness” (Rittel and Webber, 1973). It is also globally politically 
relevant and encapsulates much that is debated within the literature on science 
studies, such as expertise, opinion formation, and values.  
 
However, despite substantial consideration of the communication and psychology of 
doubt about climate change (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff and 
Mansfield, 2008; Huntingford and Fowler, 2008; Anderson, 2009; Akerlof et al., 2012; 
Painter and Ashe, 2012; Spence et al., 2012; Boykoff, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2013; 
Grundmann and Scott, 2014; Clayton et al., 2015), there has been a lack of attention 
within the literature to understanding conflict over climate change at the ‘individual 
and organizational levels of analysis’ (Hoffman, 2011: 5). This research has therefore 
combined existing theoretical conceptions of knowledge and public scientific 
controversies with a detailed examination of the specific form, value and impact of 
controversy over climate change. Five separate research questions were identified 
under two sub-topics, all of which contributed towards achieving the overarching aim 
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of investigating climate change as a knowledge controversy. Each question formed a 
guiding framework for an individual research paper (Table 7.1). This section, Part 4 of 
the thesis, draws together these five papers and, with reference to the literature in 
which this research is situated, presents the main findings of this thesis as a whole. It 
begins with a discussion of each sub-topic, before identifying cross-cutting conclusions 
which reflect on the topics of knowledge, controversy, science and policy more broadly.  
 
Table 7.1: Sub-topics, research questions and individual papers of this thesis 
Sub-topic Research question Chapter and title of individual research 
paper 
The relationship 
between the form of 
the climate change 
debate and the 
value placed on 
particular 
knowledge claims  
(Part 2 of this 
thesis) 
 
Where is knowledge 
contested? 
2. Mapping the climate sceptical 
blogosphere 
How does the framing of the 
climate change debate 
contribute towards knowledge 
contestation? 
3. Labelling opinions in the climate 
debate: A critical review 
How does the valuing of 
knowledge claims contribute 
towards rationales for debate 
participation? 
4. Climate stories: Why do climate 
scientists and sceptical voices 
participate in the climate debate? 
The impact of 
knowledge 
contestation 
(Part 3 of this 
thesis) 
How does knowledge 
controversy impact the 
production of scientific 
knowledge? 
5. The impact of controversy on the 
production of scientific knowledge 
How does knowledge 
controversy impact policy 
decision-making? 
6. Post-decisional logics of inaction: 
The impact of climate controversy 
on policy decision-making 
 
 
7.2 Summary and discussion of main findings 
7.2.1 The form and value of knowledge contestation 
The first three individual research papers (comprising Part 2 of this thesis) aimed to 
investigate the relationship between the form of the climate change debate and the 
value placed on particular knowledge claims. Understanding where controversy exists 
and how it is framed allows for an appreciation of how different types of arguments 
and rationales become resonant and valued within controversial situations. Moreover, 
whilst offering insights in and of themselves, these papers also provided an important 
foundation for the research investigating the impact of knowledge contestation in Part 
3 of this thesis.  
 
The first individual research paper, Chapter 2: Mapping the climate sceptical 
blogosphere, examined the location of knowledge contestation in the climate change 
debate. Specifically, it was motivated by the observation that much of the contestation 
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about climate change either appeared to originate from, or be actively discussed 
within, the online environment (Schäfer, 2012); however, that very little was known 
about its composition or why such environments appeared to occupy such positions of 
importance within the climate change debate. Despite suggestions that online 
environments can take the form of self-referential and polarising “echo chambers” 
(Edwards, 2013; Williams et al., 2015), other research has indicated that they may be 
playing an increasingly important role in public debate, particularly in controversial 
situations (Farrell and Drezner, 2008; Hsu and Lin, 2008). This research therefore 
addressed an important gap in the literature by identifying both the climate sceptical 
blogosphere itself (a network of 171 blogs) and via social network analysis, its three 
most central sites. However, in addition to identifying the form of a previously 
unknown (to the academic literature) location of knowledge contestation within the 
context of climate change, it also uncovered another more critical and pertinent finding 
as regards knowledge contestation, namely that the blogs identified as the most central 
focused on the scientific element of the climate change debate. This scientifically-
focused framing encompassed either direct challenges to mainstream climate science 
or critiques of the conduct of the actors or institutions involved within the science 
system. The conclusion that the climate sceptical blogosphere remains preoccupied 
with framing climate change as an active scientific controversy is important because it 
highlights the critical role of knowledge and expertise in perpetuating controversy in 
different spatial locations. Despite the increasing accessibility to and dispersed nature 
of knowledge in contemporary society (Gibbons et al., 1994; Stehr, 1994; Castells, 
2000; Nowotny et al., 2003), this research directly contributes to the literature on 
controversies by arguing that the ability to wield cognitive authority in a contested 
domain not only remains highly valued but that it is also strongly topic and context-
dependent. In the climate sceptical blogosphere, value is placed on commanding 
scientific information, and critiquing scientific practice and process. Legitimacy is thus 
influenced by knowledge regarding the practice of science, rather than needing to be 
underpinned by formal markers of authority valued within mainstream knowledge 
networks such as qualifications or professional appointments.  
 
The second and third papers, Chapter 3: Labelling opinions in the climate debate: A 
critical review and Chapter 4: Climate stories: Why do climate scientists and sceptical 
voices participate in the climate debate?, were jointly motivated by a desire to 
understand the antagonism and polarisation evident within the climate change debate, 
clearly visible during the research carried out for Chapter 2. While hostility is not 
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unsurprising in cases of public scientific controversy, what appeared however to be 
particularly distinct and noteworthy about the case of climate change was the 
dramatically polarised nature of the discussion, with the debate played out in the 
public domain as two distinct and separate camps at opposing ends of a spectrum. 
Drawing inspiration from the rhetorical elements of frame analysis (Goffman, 1974), 
Chapter 3 addressed an important gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the labels employed within the climate debate such as “denier” or 
“alarmist”. It examined how such labelling constructs were employed and understood 
within the academic literature and argued that the focus on typologies was diverting 
attention away from understanding the underlying motivations and rationales evident 
within the climate change debate. In addition to a critical review of the literature, it 
also identified a number of problematic issues with the use of labels in the context of 
climate change, such as how their binary format at opposing ends of a hostile spectrum 
may be serving to exacerbate polarisation and group identity formation. These findings 
are directly relevant to the notion of knowledge controversy because they highlight 
how rhetorical strategies may influence the very nature of the debate itself. Labelling 
constructs prioritise who one is (with all the surrounding connotations and 
assumptions which are linked to that label) rather than necessarily what is being 
argued or why that position is held. The value of knowledge claims thus becomes 
inextricably linked to the messenger, with labels serving to isolate and exclude claims-
makers from constructive dialogue due to the category label to which they have been 
assigned (Canales, 2000; Jacques, 2012). This research provides an important 
theoretical contribution to the thesis, particularly in terms of the links made between 
science studies and theories within psychology, sociology and geography. Critically, it 
also argues that a lack of attention has been paid to the contextual aspects of labels, 
resulting in an inadequate appreciation of the power present in these discursive terms 
in different spatial environments. 
 
Chapter 4 built on the need identified at the end of Chapter 3 for further research into 
the underlying motivations and rationales behind climate change opinions. Specifically, 
it addressed the rationales behind different actors’ involvement in the climate change 
debate in order to understand how the valuing of different knowledge claims may 
contribute towards debate participation. Based on 22 interviews with climate 
scientists and sceptical voices about climate change it addressed two important gaps in 
the literature: why key participants become drawn into, or choose to become involved 
in, contentious public scientific controversies, and how the paradigms in which they 
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operate may contribute towards the antagonistic nature of the debate itself. These 
actors are differentiated from the general public by their status as holders of relevant 
expertise (be this self-designated or otherwise), with the allocation of expertise 
deemed critical as a way to legitimise actors’ cognitive authority within contested 
domains. This research showed however that it is not solely due to different 
interpretations of knowledge, or even an explicit desire to see their own evidence 
prevail, that alone causes debate participation. Instead it found a more nuanced and 
complex picture whereby multiple factors in addition to the “politics of knowledge”, 
including moral rationales, together influence debate participation. These include a 
sense of duty, equity, and a heroic desire to be of use to society. In addition to 
identifying multiple factors influencing debate participation, this research provides a 
valuable contribution to the literature by highlighting the potential misalignment of 
actors and their roles in engaging in public debate over climate change and the 
opportunity for a renegotiation of the actor-subject interaction in public discourse. 
Importantly, it also argues that critical self-reflexivity and a focus on overlaps between 
both manifest and latent rationales for debate participation may be valuable 
mechanisms to reduce polarisation and antagonism in the climate debate.  
 
 
7.2.2 The impact of knowledge controversy 
The third part of this thesis examined the impact of knowledge controversy within the 
context of climate change, with Chapter 5: The impact of controversy on the production 
of scientific knowledge, focusing on the impact on the production of scientific 
knowledge and Chapter 6: Post-decisional logics of inaction: The impact of climate 
controversy on policy decision-making, examining the impact on policy decision-
making. The key motivation behind these chapters was that while much of the 
literature addressing controversy about climate change has focused on describing 
arguments or investigating how such arguments are communicated via the media, a 
critical gap remained in terms of understanding whether, and if so, how, such 
controversy actually matters. Chapter 5 was specifically inspired by the observation 
that whereas many, mostly anecdotal accounts of scientific controversy were available, 
little rigorous empirical research had been carried out to understand how knowledge 
controversy may concretely influence science itself. Interviews were conducted with 
63 climate scientists, academics working in related social science fields, and sceptical 
voices, and initially focused on identifying impact on the practice of science. The 
research found that whereas the majority did not identify impact on scientific practice 
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(the “doing” of science), the vast majority did identify impacts, such as increased 
caution or disruption, on the more expansive notion of scientific agency (defined 
essentially as the ability of actors to carry out the practice of science). The puzzle of 
this finding was thus not so much about explaining the types of impacts identified 
(despite recognising the contribution of this research in terms of identifying these 
influences on scientific agency), but how scientists were able to so clearly differentiate 
between impacts on agency and practice. Gieryn’s (1983; 1999) theory of boundary 
work was employed to explain this conundrum, with the paper arguing that scientists’ 
ability to distinguish between these two types of impact can be seen as a performative 
process aimed at maintaining the epistemic authority of science as a distinct form of 
knowledge production. The key theoretical contribution made in this research is the 
identification of an important relationship between controversy and boundary work, 
specifically that the greater the impact of controversy (as perceived by scientists), the 
less fluid and contingent the boundary between scientific agency and practice. The 
paper also directly contributes towards an extension of the concept of boundary work 
by arguing that it is a more active and explicit process under conditions of controversy 
as scientists protect their cognitive authority. In making these conclusions it links 
theoretical conceptions of scientific practice and agency with existing literature on 
scientific controversy to provide new insights into scientific behaviours and also 
emphasises the importance of boundary work as a theoretical lens within science 
studies. Chapter 5 also commented on the implications of the findings regarding 
impact, such as increased caution, for epistemological norms and the social value of 
science. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 used the full corpus of 99 research interviews carried out for this 
thesis with politicians, policy officials, climate scientists, academics, and others to 
investigate the impact of knowledge controversy on policy decision-making. Noting 
that an important gap in the literature existed regarding the post-decisional politics 
influencing climate policy decision-making, this paper identifies the motivational logics 
undermining the implementation of climate policy, or which are used by decision-
makers to justify inaction. It provides three key contributions to knowledge, the first of 
which is identifying how knowledge controversy about climate change impacts public 
policy decision-making during the implementation phase. The second is the provision 
of new insights into the way that knowledge controversies play out across space. 
Finally, the third is the identification of context-specific post-decisional logics of 
inaction which influence the effectiveness of existing climate change policies. In the 
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first case study, NZ, the research identified an overwhelmingly dominant post-
decisional logic of inaction of the current national economic interest, whereas in the 
second case study, the UK, arguments based on notions of scientific doubt were found 
to be a more important influence on policy decision-making. This research highlights 
the strongly post-decisional nature of climate change policy-making and emphasises 
the importance of being attentive to knowledge controversy even after policies have 
been enacted. Critically, the finding that the impact of controversy is different in 
different locations emphasises the importance of being aware of the temporal and 
spatial nuances that come into play once policies are implemented.  
 
 
7.2.3 Cross-cutting conclusions and reflections 
While each individual paper comprising this thesis makes distinct individual 
conclusions and contributions to the literature, some cross-cutting conclusions and 
reflections are also possible. This section identifies four main conclusions arising from 
an integrated analysis of the research contained within this thesis. 
 
The first cross-cutting conclusion refers to the overarching conceptual framework of 
this research and contends that knowledge controversy is a defining feature of the 
climate change debate. This may seem like an obvious conclusion given the vast 
literature examining various facets of the claims and counter-claims inherent in 
disputes over climate change, much of which has been referenced throughout this 
thesis (Martin and Richards, 1995; Nowotny et al., 2001; Sarewitz, 2004; Berkhout, 
2010; Jankó et al., 2014), but the explicit conceptualisation of climate change as, 
fundamentally, a knowledge controversy is an important distinction to make. While 
this research has shown that in certain cases, knowledge contestation may not 
necessarily be the dominant rationale behind climate change decision-making and 
opinion formation, such as the current national economic interest logic of inaction 
dominant in NZ shown in Chapter 6, or some of the more values-based rationales 
behind the opinions described in Chapter 4; reflecting on the content of this thesis as a 
whole, knowledge, and specifically, contestation over knowledge, is a fundamental 
connective theme. More often than not, disputes over, or value accorded to, particular 
knowledge claims, as well as contestation regarding the authority and influence 
conferred to holders of such claims have been found to be core, underlying 
characteristics of the climate change debate. For example, in Chapter 2, the ability to 
command a certain type of knowledge was shown to be an influential factor in 
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determining the centrality of blogs within the climate sceptical blogosphere, and in 
Chapter 3, how particular individuals were labelled was argued to be a significant 
contributory factor to how knowledge claims come to be subsequently valued within 
the climate change debate. In Chapter 5, knowledge controversy was shown to have 
important impacts on the agency of climate scientists and in Chapter 6, knowledge 
controversy invoking scientific doubt was found to be a dominant feature of the UK 
climate change policymaking environment. In coming to this conclusion, the intent is 
not to downplay the importance of values or worldviews as integral elements of 
disputes over climate change (Hulme, 2009; Corner et al., 2015; Suhay and Druckman, 
2015), particularly given the recognised interplay between values and assessment of 
knowledge claims shown by authors such as Kahan et al. (2011), Douglas (2009) and 
others. Rather the purpose is to direct critical attention towards the myriad ways in 
which knowledge claims are assembled within the climate change debate, as well as 
their potentially significant influence on processes of science and policy.  
 
The next two conclusions are related by their focus on the spatial nature of knowledge 
controversy. The second cross-cutting conclusion is that there is a relationship between 
the location of knowledge contestation and the dominant framing of knowledge claims, 
arguments and rationales. While focused on the form/value and impact of knowledge 
contestation respectively, both Chapter 2 and 6 found that in certain locations and 
contexts, scientifically-framed arguments were more prevalent and were thus argued 
to hold greater cognitive authority than those related to political factors. In Chapter 2 
the emphasis placed on scientific knowledge was found to be related to the central 
blogs’ success in positioning themselves as gatekeepers and interpreters in an 
alternative knowledge network running parallel to the mainstream academic 
environment. In Chapter 6, scientifically-based arguments were clearly seen to be 
influencing post-decisional logics of inaction in the UK policymaking environment (and 
were also shown in the rationales underlying debate participation by UK-based 
individuals in Chapter 4), but were not seen to be playing an important role in the NZ 
context. This conclusion—that different framings of knowledge have different values in 
different contexts—highlights the importance of paying attention to the micro-
components of a controversy and suggests that extrapolating conclusions across 
geographic locations is unwise without understanding place-specific nuance. 
Furthermore, despite suggestions that robust support exists for comprehensive climate 
change policy at the national level (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2015), this research also 
shows that scientifically-based disagreement is still an influential framing in certain 
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contexts. This conclusion supports arguments within the existing literature that the 
ability to make authoritative scientific knowledge claims is a critical element of 
knowledge controversies due to their ability to convey legitimacy and influence 
(Jasanoff, 1987; Martin and Richards, 1995; Demeritt, 2006; Gulbrandsen, 2008; 
Grundmann, 2009; Suryanarayanan and Kleinman, 2013; Collins, 2014), but it also 
suggests that the climate change debate is likely to include some form of scientifically-
based dispute for the foreseeable future. While arguments and strategies may shift 
according to the perception of certainty on particular topics—which also highlights 
interesting questions regarding the making of authoritative knowledge (Hampel, 
2014)—the complexity of climate change, particularly as regards comprehensive 
understanding of the relationships between systemic cause and effect, means 
contestation over scientific knowledge claims are unlikely to fully disappear in this 
context.  
 
The third conclusion is that impacts of knowledge controversy are context-specific and 
place-based. Chapters 5 and 6 show that whereas in NZ knowledge controversy does 
not influence policy decision-making or scientific practice, it is influencing scientific 
agency. Conversely, in the UK, knowledge controversy is influencing both policy 
decision-making and scientific agency, albeit in different ways. Place is critical to 
consider as the impact of knowledge controversy is shown as markedly distinct in the 
two case study locations, particularly in terms of policy decision-making. This research 
has therefore shown that the specific impact of knowledge controversy is strongly 
tempered by both national context and what the anticipated implications of such 
impact may be, i.e. admitting to being influenced by controversy can also be seen as an 
active decision which has implications for perceived cognitive authority.  
 
In making the above conclusions, this thesis clearly situates itself not just as immersed 
in STS and SSK, but also as a geographical text. Being aware of the relevance of 
spatiality is important because it enables the research contained within this thesis to 
contribute to the ongoing ‘conversations between geography and science and 
technology studies’ (Whatmore, 2009: 587) on the topic of knowledge controversy. It 
also means that it follows in the footsteps of a small but vibrant strain of scholarship 
examining the spatial nature of knowledge controversies, including by Livingstone 
(2003), Powell (2007) and Mahony (2014a; 2014b). It advances this body of work 
through the identification of differentiated impact on scientific practice and agency, 
and the concept of post-decisional logics of inaction. It also emphasises the importance 
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of understanding the role of framing as a communication and analytical device within 
knowledge controversies. 
 
Finally, the fourth cross-cutting conclusion is that performative processes are critical 
elements of knowledge controversies. Chapter 3 clearly shows that the language used in 
controversial situations can be understood as performative—antagonism and 
polarisation are co-constructed by rhetorical choices—thus contributing towards a 
new angle on knowledge controversies that brings together rhetorical understandings 
with existing work within science studies (Ceccarelli, 2011). Language and framing are 
therefore clearly shown to be critical factors influencing knowledge controversies. 
Taken together with Chapter 2, Chapter 4 also highlights an important point regarding 
the way in in which actors involved in a controversy choose to express their arguments 
and rationales. Whereas underlying worldviews and values are critically important 
(Hulme, 2009), the explicit framings made by actors within controversial situations are 
also worth identifying as they can reflect the value that individuals place on particular 
elements within a debate—even if it is a purely instrumental framing intended to gain 
influence or authority (Grundmann, 2007). Finally, Chapter 5 explains the ability of 
scientists to distinguish between impacts on scientific agency and practice as a 
performative boundary-making process. The key finding that boundary work is more 
active and explicit under conditions of controversy is particularly important because it 
can also be understood as a strategic defence mechanism for the retention of cognitive 
authority. The engagement in boundary work of those operating within a dominant 
paradigm is thus likely to have implications not only for the continued influence of 
particular epistemic paradigms, but also for the way in which expertise (both internal 
and external to the dominant paradigm) is valued. This research therefore also 
contributes to wider understandings of the extension of expertise, such as those 
concerning post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Ravetz, 2011; Ravetz, 
2012; Turnpenny, 2012; Bernstein et al., 2014), as well as supporting arguments that 
contend that defining questions of interest and associated experts/ise is a ‘value laden 
and political act’ (Demeritt, 2006: 467). As indicated above, it also reaffirms the notion 
of controversy as an excellent framework with which to examine the making and 
unmaking of authoritative scientific knowledge (Hampel, 2014).  
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7.3 Limitations and further research 
While this thesis makes a number of contributions towards increasing understanding 
of knowledge controversies, as with any research project, limitations exist which are 
suggested to form the basis of future enquiry. First, a clear extension of this research 
would be to undertake a larger-scale survey in order to test the wider 
representativeness of the results contained within, particularly, Chapters 5 and 6. 
While every effort was made to reach message saturation during the interview process, 
it is possible that a different sub-section of views may not have been captured. In 
addition to verifying conclusions and identifying further themes or opinions, a larger 
survey may be useful in providing participants with a greater degree of confidence in 
the anonymity of their responses. Encouraging candour, particularly when 
interviewees are discussing details of practices within their current workplaces, or 
when interviewees are in positions of power, is challenging despite guarantees of 
anonymity (Pelz, 1959; Welch et al., 2002). Nonetheless, given the complexity of this 
research topic, and especially the way in which critical self-reflexivity was able to be 
investigated during the in-depth in-person interview process, a survey may necessarily 
be regarded as a complementary, rather than standalone research method in this 
context.  
 
Second, it would have been desirable to conduct more than one interview with each 
research participant. This is useful in order to validate the interpretations made during 
the analysis phase of the research, as well as to capture any additional reflections from 
participants post-interview (Baxter and Eyles, 1997), particularly given the long 
duration between the beginning of the interview process (November 2012) and the 
submission of this thesis (September 2015). While all interviewees were encouraged to 
continue contact via email, and some did send additional thoughts, larger scale revisits 
were impossible due to time and resource constraints. Follow-up research involving 
further interviews or verification of findings via alternative methods would also benefit 
from the increased technical and theoretical knowledge gained as part of this research 
process. 
 
Third, as explained in Chapter 1, this thesis is based on the premise put forward by 
Painter (2011) that controversy about climate change may be largely understood as an 
Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. Accordingly, research was carried out predominantly in NZ 
and the UK (excluding the blog-based research in Chapter 2). Especially given the 
conclusion that impacts of knowledge controversy are context and place-specific, it is 
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therefore expected that many of the findings contained within this thesis would likely 
be different had alternative case study locations been chosen. However, this does not 
diminish the value of the conclusions of this work. For example, the concept of post-
decisional logics of inaction presented in Chapter 6 is universally applicable and 
provides a rich vein of potential further research, especially due to the nature of such 
logics as inherently place-based and context-dependent.  
 
Finally, a number of other research directions are possible based on the large amount 
of data collected as part of the interviews carried out in NZ and the UK. First, despite 
policy officials having long been recognised as forming an integral part of the decision-
making environment within particular political systems (Ham and Hill, 1984; Kingdon, 
1995) there is a notable gap within the literature in terms of providing first-hand 
accounts of policy officials’ experiences, particularly in the context of knowledge 
controversies. The dataset created during this research project of 27 interviews with 
policy officials involved with climate change policymaking provides important insights 
into this process and is suitable for further analysis. Second, a substantial amount of 
data was collected regarding the topic of expertise; specifically how individuals 
practically determine the legitimacy of knowledge as a basis upon which to form 
opinions and make decisions. Future research analysing such assessments under 
conditions of controversy (for example, which specific conventions and markers of 
expertise are deemed appropriate) is thus a possible line of enquiry. Third, many of the 
interviewees directly suggested that blogs played an important role as regards 
influencing policy decision-making processes. Therefore an extension to the research 
contained within Chapter 2 could employ this information to further analyse their 
influence beyond the online environment. This could be combined with process tracing 
(Collier, 2011) to determine the influence of arguments either emerging from or 
dominant within online environments to other forms of media which currently 
dominate public science communication channels such as television (Horrigan, 2006; 
Eurosurveillance Editorial Team, 2013; Castell et al., 2014). 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to investigate climate change as a knowledge 
controversy. In so doing, it has emphasised the value of being attentive to geography 
and context, arguing that a relationship between the location of knowledge 
contestation and the dominant framing of knowledge claims, arguments and rationales 
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exists, and also that the impacts of knowledge controversy are context and place-
specific. It has also contended that performative processes are critical elements of 
knowledge controversies. It has provided novel methodological contributions to the 
literature by applying social network analysis to the climate sceptical blogosphere and 
via the incorporation of sceptical voices within the interview corpus. It has been 
empirically novel in its examination of the direct impact of knowledge controversy on 
processes of science and policy in the UK and NZ, and has provided conceptual 
advancement in the form of extensions to the theory of boundary work and through the 
introduction of the concept of post-decisional logics of inaction. 
 
Knowledge controversies are an increasingly ubiquitous feature of contemporary 
society as access to information increases and evidence is assembled to support 
opposing points of view (Jasanoff, 2004). However, while this thesis has suggested 
some avenues aimed at diffusing the antagonism inherent within the climate change 
debate, it does not intend to imply that knowledge controversies themselves are 
necessarily normatively negative and thus need to be “solved”, or that certain types of 
expertise are more or less “correct”. Indeed it seems inevitable that there will always 
be different interpretations of evidence and associated assessments of relevant policy 
responses (Kahan et al., 2011; Nisbet, 2011). Instead, this thesis has emphasised the 
importance of being critically attuned to, and cognisant of, the myriad different ways 
knowledge shapes contentious situations. This is a fascinating field of scholarship with 
countless potential future research avenues. It is also deeply practically relevant and it 
is hoped that the findings of this thesis are of use to those working in public scientific 
controversies today and in the future. 
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8 Section 
I. Introduction 
This methodological annex provides information on the interviews that contributed to 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis and is structured into three main parts:  
1. An examination of the interview data collection process for Chapter 5 (on the 
impact of controversy on the production of scientific knowledge) and Chapter 6 
(on the impact of climate controversy on policy decision-making), including the 
interview questions and the data collected;  
2. A discussion of the methods used to analyse the interview data for Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6; and, 
3. A description of the interview data collection and data analysis processes for 
Chapter 4 (on why climate scientists and sceptical voices participate in the 
climate debate). Chapter 4 is discussed independently because it used a 
partially separate methodological process.  
 
This annex aims to provide a fully transparent account of the methods used (Baxter 
and Eyles, 1997) for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis that is balanced with the 
guarantees of anonymity provided to interview participants (detailed below). It is 
considered critical that deductive disclosure of individuals is avoided (Kaiser, 2009). 
Therefore, while detailed information on interview processes and data analysis is 
provided, information on participants is included solely in example or aggregate 
format. Interviews were carried out in two case study locations (as described in 
Section 1.2.1 in Chapter 1). Chapter 4 solely used interviews from the UK, and Chapters 
5 and 6 used interviews from both case study locations. Where processes differed in 
each location (for example, with different interview protocols), it is identified in each 
section below.  
 
 
II. The data collection process for Chapters 5 and 6 
This section describes the sample frame, recruitment process, ethical assurance and 
consent forms, temporal phasing and interview protocols for the interview research 
carried out for Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
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a. Actor groups 
Based on an initial review of the literature on the phenomenon of “climate scepticism” 
(see for example Antilla, 2005; Carvalho, 2007; Malone, 2009; Hoffman, 2011), five key 
groups of actors who were involved in the climate change debate were identified as 
important contributors of knowledge to the specific research questions for Chapters 5 
and 6: 
 
Table A.6: Interview actor groups 
Actor group Rationale for inclusion (role in the climate change debate) 
Climate scientist Producers of climate change knowledge 
Non-climate scientist 
academic 
Those who study the contested climate change knowledge 
process 
Other (e.g. media, industry 
representatives) 
Those who interpret information or contribute to climate 
discourses 
Policy official (i.e. civil 
servants) 
Mediators and translators of knowledge into the policy-making 
process 
Politician Final decision-makers 
 
It is important to note that these actor groups are not mutually exclusive—on the 
contrary, their boundaries are blurred. For example, policy officials in certain 
circumstances may also act as “final” decision-makers in the sense that they close down 
certain policy avenues and open up others. However, for the purposes of identifying 
relevant interviewees, formal employment role was prioritised. A further category of 
actors known as “sceptical voices” was also identified (see note 3 from Chapter 1 of this 
thesis on page 26). Sceptical voices were identified at the outset of this research as 
actors who create or disseminate dissenting viewpoints that either challenge 
mainstream climate science or the need to enact mitigation or adaption-based climate 
policies. This additional category of actor was overlaid on the five main actor groups as 
it was recognised that this categorisation by viewpoint was not mutually exclusive of 
formal employment role.  
 
Interviewing the entire population of each of these actor groups in each case study 
location was beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, for each of the five actor 
groups, a sample frame of approximately 20 interviewees was identified, equating to 
approximately 100 interviews. This number was considered to be at the upper bounds 
of what was feasible for an individual research project of this scale and approach.  
 
At the outset of the research the three actor groups of climate scientists, policy officials 
and politicians were deemed to be of a higher priority than certain other actor groups. 
Appendix A. Interview methodology 
204 
This was due to the focus of Chapter 5 on the impact of controversy on the production 
of scientific knowledge (specifically the actions of climate scientists), and the focus of 
Chapter 6 on the policy-making process. Groups that were considered of lower 
importance included non-climate scientist academics who were chosen largely for their 
ability to provide comment and discussion on the climate change debate in both case 
study locations. However, as anticipated at the outset of this research, obtaining 
interviews with politicians was problematic (Hertz and Imber, 1993) which influenced 
the relatively lower number of politicians interviewed. Twenty of the total number of 
interviews were conducted with those additionally categorised as sceptical voices. The 
final number of interviews per category is provided in the below table: 
 
Table A.7: Interviews 
 Category Description NZ UK Total 
Climate 
scientist 
Scientists working on climate change in a university 
department of physics, geography, earth sciences or 
environment; or for a government-funded climate-related 
organisation 
16 14 30 
Non-climate 
scientist 
academic 
Social scientists working on climate change or related 
issues 7 5 12 
Other Media, NGO or industry representatives 10 11 22 
Policy official 
Officials presently or previously working on climate change 
for state or city/regional-level policy departments, or 
independent policy advisory agencies 
17 10 27 
Politician 
Sitting members of Parliament; political party 
spokespeople on climate change, environment or energy; 
or city/regional-level politicians 
4 5 9 
 Total  54 45  99* 
* Including 20 interviewees classified as sceptical voices. 
 
The below country-specific sections provide further detail on the organisations and 
other groups within which these interviewees were located. These include the major 
political parties and public-sector organisations responsible for climate change policy 
and science in each country, as well as well-known individuals publicly identified as 
sceptical voices. For example, interviews were obtained with individuals working for 
the UK Met Office and NIWA in NZ; key research centres for climate change science in 
each of the two case study countries. Access was also obtained with policy advisors in 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in the UK, and the Ministry for 
the Environment in NZ. These organisations are among the main bodies responsible for 
shaping, informing, and enacting public policy decisions regarding climate change in 
the UK and NZ. 
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Every effort was made to ensure that a representative sample of interviewees was 
obtained (for example, across different types of climate science or climate policy, or at 
different levels of seniority). However, as noted in the introduction above, a list of 
named individuals (or a list of all organisations to which interview participants belong) 
is not provided. Despite this research not involving vulnerable individuals (the subject 
of much of the research into anonymity and confidentiality in research interviews), 
given the very nature of this research topic as a public scientific controversy, it was 
considered especially important that anonymity was guaranteed to interview 
participants (Wiles et al., 2006). Providing named research sources would likely have 
compromised the willingness of certain interview participants to disclose information 
(particularly as regards whether or not they had been influenced by other actors 
within this controversy) and it was considered important to encourage responses that 
were as candid as possible. Given that guarantees of anonymity were given to 
interview participants, it is also critical that these continue to be honoured (BSA, 2002; 
Grinyer, 2002). Finally, while not uniquely attributed to named individuals, the 
generous use of direct quotes in the chapters of this thesis is intended to let the 
interview participants’ voices speak “through” the analysis, and provide transparency 
to the reader within the recognised bounds of confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
An initial list of potential interviewees of approximately 50 people was identified. This 
included well-known individuals, such as those who appear on Painter’s ‘list of sceptics 
‘mentioned’ more than once in 10 UK national newspapers’ (2011: 128) as identified in 
Note 3 in Section 6.9. It also included incumbent politicians responsible for climate 
change policy in each case study location. As noted above, the list additionally included 
organisations that were prominent in climate change science (such as the UK’s Met 
Office and NZ’s NIWA), in policy-making (such as the Department for Energy and 
Climate Change in the UK and the Ministry for the Environment in NZ), and those 
directly and specifically engaged in the climate change debate (such as the GWPF and 
the NZCSC). This list was collated from academic sources (such as from Painter (2011) 
as mentioned above), from named individuals and organisations frequently appearing 
in media articles, and from searching via other sources such as LinkedIn or publicly-
available organisational charts (used predominantly for identifying policy officials).  
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b. Pilot interviews 
An initial interview protocol (set of interview questions) of 12 pilot questions was 
created focusing largely on the issue of the impact of climate scepticism (given the 
initial focus of this research as explained in Chapters 1 and 7) and which were targeted 
predominantly at climate scientists. Nine individuals across the climate scientist and 
other actor categories were identified directly from the list above (five interviews) and 
via snowball sampling (four further interviews) to participate in these pilot interviews.  
 
Snowball sampling was also used as the dominant method to identify further 
interviewees in all categories throughout the entire research process. This sampling 
method was chosen because of the difficulty of obtaining interviews within certain 
actor categories (such as with politicians as noted above). Obtaining direct 
introductions facilitated access to a greater number of interviewees than might 
otherwise have been possible. While this approach provides challenges in terms of 
potential bias (Baxter and Eyles, 1997), this was weighed against the need for access, 
particularly in terms of “hidden” populations such as lower-tier policy officials 
(Shaghaghi et al., 2011). The pilot interviews were conducted in the UK in November 
and December 2012. All but one of the interviews (conducted via Skype) were carried 
out face-to-face and lasted an average of 52 minutes. Four were conducted in Exeter, 
and the remainder were conducted in London.  
 
 
c. Interview protocol 
Subsequent to the pilot interviews, the question framework was further developed and 
five separate interview protocols were created. These interview protocols included a 
mix of questions from seven main categories as shown in the table below. The 
interviews were semi-structured based on these questions, although flexibility within 
each interview was considered important in order to pursue unexpectedly relevant 
responses. While some interviewees were unable to respond to every question asked, 
every effort was made to ensure that interviewees had, as far as possible, a clear 
understanding of the intent behind each question.  
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Table A.8: Interview framework categories 
  Actor 
group 
    
Category of 
question 
Example question* Climate 
scientist 
Non-
climate 
scientist 
academic 
Other Policy 
official  
Politician 
Introductory 
 
Can you tell me about 
your job; what you do 
on a day-to-day basis? 
     
Uncertainty 
and expertise 
How much certainty 
do you think is 
required when making 
policy decisions about 
climate change?   
     
Climate 
scepticism 
How receptive do you 
think politicians are to 
information coming 
from those people 
labelled as ‘climate 
sceptics’?   
     
Decision-
making 
Where would you say 
your role fits in terms 
of the policy decision-
making process to do 
with climate change in 
NZ/the UK?   
     
Personal 
opinion 
What do you 
personally think about 
climate change?  
     
Science How do you think 
scientific expertise on 
climate change is 
valued in NZ/the UK? 
     
Information How do you get most 
of your information 
about climate change; 
and how do you 
determine its validity? 
     
* Note that the exact question used may be different to that presented here as each interview 
protocol (and thus the precise wording of each question) was specific to each actor category. 
The precise wording of each actual question asked in each interview also varied by interview. 
 
For those identified as a sceptical voice, a further set of questions were developed as a 
separate interview protocol and which focused predominantly on questions related to 
perceptions of their impact on science and policy processes. For example, the following 
question, and follow-up questions, were included:  
“1) Do you think that you are making an impact on the public discourse about 
climate change in NZ/the UK?  a) What about on the decisions made by policy-
makers, or the way climate science is done in this country?  b) What precisely, 
giving concrete examples, would you say this impact consists of?” 
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d. NZ interviews 
Between January to April 2013, 54 interviews were conducted in NZ. Interviews lasted 
an average of 47 minutes. Six were conducted via Skype or telephone, with the 
remainder face-to-face. Three interviews were conducted jointly (face-to-face), with 
two individuals participating in each interview. Twenty one were conducted in 
Auckland, 30 were conducted in Wellington (or via Skype/telephone with Wellington-
based individuals), with the remaining three interviews conducted with individuals 
located elsewhere in the country.  
 
As with the pilot interviews, NZ interviews were identified firstly from the initial list of 
50 interviewees (key individuals and organisations), then snowball sampling was used 
both in advance and whilst in NZ to organise additional interviews. Interviews 
occurred with individuals from public sector organisations such as the Ministry for the 
Environment, from the major political parties, from key science institutions such as 
NIWA and the University of Auckland, and with well-known sceptical voice 
organisations such as the NZCSC. As Table 8.2 shows, more interviews were carried out 
in NZ than in the UK. This was a factor of the ease through which snowball sampling 
yielded further interviews and the fact that message saturation in terms of receiving 
the same information from multiple different parties (Mason, 2010) occurred earlier in 
the UK interviews than in NZ. 
 
For the pilot interviews and the NZ interviews, interviewees were verbally informed 
that they would be guaranteed anonymity as part of this research project. As noted 
above, this means that a list uniquely identifying interview participants is not provided 
as part of this annex. This is because by providing a list that is of value in terms of 
identifiable information would necessarily breach this guarantee of anonymity. For 
example, given the small nature of the interview population in NZ, providing the name 
of an organisation would easily identify the individual who would have been 
interviewed (as in many cases only one person works on the topic of climate change 
within an organisation). Interviewees were also informed that should the researcher 
wish to use a direct quote and there was any doubt whether the use of that direct quote 
would mean they would be able to be uniquely identified, they would be contacted to 
give their express permission. It was not considered that any direct quotes used in this 
thesis from the pilot or NZ interviews would directly identify any individual uniquely.  
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In March 2011, prior to the entire interview process commencing, the LSE’s Research 
Ethics Review checklist1 was completed and no ethical issues were identified. 
Subsequent to the NZ interviews, and in light of a freedom of information/subject 
access request in regards to another student’s work, a decision was taken to further 
submit a Research Ethics Review Questionnaire to the LSE’s Research Ethics 
Committee. The rationale was to verify that every aspect of the research conformed to 
the principles and best practice of ethical research. The committee agreed in July 2013 
that appropriate ethical safeguards were in place. However, arising from this process 
and the issue related to the other student’s work, a decision was also taken to use 
signed consent forms for the UK interviews. These consent forms are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
e. UK interviews 
Between August 2013 and May 2014, 35 further interviews were conducted with UK 
participants, with the final UK interview conducted in written format. Five were 
conducted via Skype or telephone, with the remainder face-to-face. All interviews were 
conducted individually and lasted an average of 55 minutes. 19 were conducted in 
London (face-to-face) with the remainder conducted with individuals in other parts of 
the UK such as Oxford, and one in Europe (the latter via Skype). 
 
As with the UK, interviews were identified firstly from the initial list of 50 interviewees. 
Snowball sampling was subsequently used. This approach was especially important 
within the category of policy official because named individuals (and contact details in 
particular) were challenging to identify independently of interviewee 
recommendation. Interviews occurred with individuals from public sector 
organisations such as the Department of Energy and Climate Change, and the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, from the major political parties, 
from key science institutions such as the University of East Anglia and the Met Office, 
and well-known sceptical voice organisations such as the GWPF. As noted above, the 
UK interviews included the use of signed consent forms which provided written 
assurance of anonymity. Hence a list of interview participants is not provided as part of 
this annex. Also, as with the NZ interviews, interviewees were informed that should the 
                                                             
1 See 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/researchAndDevelopment/researchDivision/policyAndEthics/ethicsGui
danceAndForms.aspx for the latest version of this guidance. 
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researcher wish to use a direct quote and there was any doubt whether the use of that 
direct quote would mean they would be able to be uniquely identified, they would be 
contacted to give their express permission. It was not considered that any direct quotes 
used in this thesis from the UK interviews would directly identify any individual 
uniquely. 
 
 
III. The data analysis process for Chapters 5 and 6 
All 98 oral interviews2 were transcribed verbatim. A naturalised transcription style (i.e. 
that which omits “ums” and “ers”) was followed (Bucholtz, 2000); however, where 
false sentence starts were considered relevant to the content of the discussion, they 
were retained. All interviewees were given an option to receive a copy of their 
transcript and 11 interviewees made use of this option. Fourteen interviews were 
transcribed directly by the researcher, and the remainder were transcribed by third 
parties (who had signed confidentiality agreements) and were then double checked by 
the researcher to ensure accuracy. 
 
All 99 transcripts were imported into NVivo and a largely inductive thematic coding 
process was followed (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Whereas certain codes were 
deductively identified based on the structure of the interview protocols (e.g. 
“uncertainty”), the majority were the result of a careful reading and re-reading of the 
interview transcripts. An extensive list of inductive codes was developed during a first 
round of analysis in NVivo. Where individual codes were identified as particularly 
relevant for answering the main research questions of each paper, the interview 
excerpts to which this code had been applied were exported from NVivo and 
subsequently hand-coded using paper and pen. For example, for Chapter 6, an 
important code within the NVivo analysis was “impact on policy”. Interview excerpts to 
which this code had been applied were then printed out, and hand-coded used the 
coding structure of “yes”, “no” and “indirect”. This hand-coding was used to quantify 
elements within the transcripts (see for example Table 6.2 in Section 6.6 of Chapter 6). 
Hand-coding was used in order to get a closer appreciation of the text and to provide a 
different way of engaging with the research material (MacMillan, 2005).  
 
                                                             
2 One interview was already in written format. 
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Hand-coding was also used to allow a more reflective way of engaging with the 
interview data. In Chapter 5, a key overarching deductive code identified in NVivo was 
“impact on scientists”. These coded pieces of text from interviews with climate 
scientists were exported from NVivo and hand-coded to identify the types of impacts 
experienced. Each piece of text was examined to uncover firstly the impact on scientific 
practice (which was quantified using a yes/no categorisation system) and then further 
examined to inductively identify other types of impacts which were then iteratively 
honed into a typology of impact. The below table shows six examples (three from each 
case study) of the outcome of this process, including the categories used to identify 
impacts on scientific agency. These data were triangulated in two main ways: with the 
“impact on scientists” text coded within other interview transcripts, for example with 
non-climate scientist academics (data triangulation), and also with existing literature, 
such as the impacts identified by Kempner (2008) (methodological triangulation) 
(Farmer et al. 2006). While such triangulation methods do not eliminate bias, other 
methods such as the use of multiple coders (Hruschka et al., 2004) were unavailable. 
However, constant referral back to the original interview transcripts was employed to 
ensure selection bias on behalf of the researcher (e.g. in terms of choosing which 
excerpts to code) was minimised. 
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Table A.9: Example coding process for Chapter 5 
Code Impact of SV Other impact 
  On own science Other   Category of impact 
NZ 
Scientist 
1 
No "They don't have an 
impact on how we do our 
science" 
Yes Greater focus 
on 
communication 
Greater focus on communication: "...but they have an impact on what we think 
about and how we provide explanations for the science, the findings that 
emerge... I think what it's really turned the climate science community to is 
thinking about how we communicate climate science" 
NZ 
Scientist 
10 
Yes "Yes, I think it must do. 
The only simple answer 
to that question" 
Yes Delay; 
Defensive 
Delay: "I don't think it stops response. I think that it becomes a delay in 
response because it easily creates that little addition to the problem, which is 
that there'll be these back-room discussions well, "Yeah, but so-and-so keeps 
saying this. We can't ignore can we? Maybe we need to be a bit more careful 
about...It just creates that bit of inertia" Defensive: "We're the climate scientists 
and people are attacking us, so we have become defensive, and we're in our 
tower and we're going to put out the walls around us"  
NZ 
Scientist 
11 
No "No" "…no it doesn't 
affect the way I do my 
work" 
Yes Greater focus 
on 
communication; 
Distraction; 
Certain types of 
SV can 
accelerate 
research 
Greater focus on communication: "…that has an impact on how I communicate 
things. I go and read some of this stuff deliberately to find out what the thinking 
is" Distraction: "Some of the newspapers get letters to the editor quite often and 
I get contacted quite often by editors. Could you respond to this and that and the 
other thing. Yeah, you can spend your whole life doing tht kind of thing. It's 
strange really" Can accelerate research: "Some of the research that's been done 
by some of the more prominent climate scientists, sceptics, Dick Lindzen and so 
on, has induced other groups to do that kind of process. To do work. To look at 
whether their ideas are right. Follow up research, observational campaigns, the 
whole bit. So yeah, it has had an effect on the science, on the research effort, but 
not a huge effect" "It has certainly spurred some people into doing some things 
that may well have been done eventually, but have been accelerated" 
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Code Impact of SV Other impact 
  On own science Other   Category of impact 
UK 
Scientist 
4 
No "I don't think it's had any 
impact on the way I do 
science, no" "So from that 
perspective, the way I 
work has changed but 
only in responding to the 
climate sceptics. But the 
core part of my job I don't 
think has changed 
particularly because of 
climate sceptic views" 
Yes Awareness of 
being a target; 
Caution; 
Defensive; 
Reluctance to 
publicly engage; 
More 
transparency 
Awareness of being a target: "I think the one thing about Climategate was that it 
made me realise, and up to then I didn't quite realise, how much pressure other 
scientists were under. And I think Climategate revealed that. If anything it 
revealed the amount of pressure that other scientists were being questioned 
about other things and the amount of insults and so on there were" Caution: "So 
if anything's different, I'm a little bit more cautious about how I communicate... 
I'll be a bit more careful about what I say but I don't try to hide anything or I 
don't make any effort to not say anything in emails because I'm worried that 
somebody might misconstrue it. No more than I would have normally I guess. I 
just try to be careful about making sure that everything I write is as clear as 
possible" Defensive: "it has made people a little bit more defensive... So you tend 
to be a little bit more cautious and I suspect the whole community in climate in 
particular are the same" Reluctance to publicly engage: "They may be a little bit 
more nervous especially about dealing with the media, are they going to be 
misinterpreted? Because certainly some media outlets are better than others as 
far as the way they interact with scientists and how they report what they say. 
That's always been the case but I think climate, because of the contention and 
the debate about various aspects of it, and the impacts, that you want to make 
sure you don't oversell the science or even undersell the uncertainties and so 
on" More transparency: "it seems to have focused people's minds more towards 
the sharing of data and enabling more open access to data whenever possible. 
Hopefully that would have been heading in that direction anyway, but I think it's 
made some people think, if we're going to do that anyway maybe we should 
push the agenda forward and try to do it sooner" 
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Code Impact of SV Other impact 
  On own science Other   Category of impact 
UK 
Scientist 
5 
No "I don't think on how I do 
science" "I don't think 
personally it's either 
made any difference to 
the way I do science or 
the way I'd advise a 
policymaker, because I do 
try and be sceptical" 
Yes Certain types of 
SV can 
accelerate 
research; 
Caution; More 
transparency; 
Defensive 
Certain types of SV can accelerate research: "I‘d rather spend time actually 
improving the science than chasing a whole lot of sceptical arguments which 
may or may not have any foundation. Unless if... I mean, some...somebody like 
Dick Lindzen, for example, particularly in the early days, made some very 
pertinent criticisms of modelling and some of things that we’d done, and if you 
look back you can... I can see where, along with my colleagues, we’ve responded 
to that. And that’s been helpful" Caution: "It might change how I communicate 
them, and I...and I think one of the downsides is that, you know, particularly 
with Climategate and emails coming out, although I’d always be very careful 
what I wrote in emails anyhow! It does make you think twice because 
sometimes you’ll just write something off and there’s danger it can be 
misconstrued" More transparency: "one of the things we have tried to do is to 
make sure that where we can we have released the data and I think that's 
something that has improved" Defensive: "it has to some extent made me 
defensive"  
UK 
Scientist 
7 
No "Absolutely none" "They 
can write any crap they 
like about me and my 
science and The Sun and 
many of the papers have 
and it does not affect my 
day to day work at all 
because I'm a scientist 
and I do exactly what I 
do" "I think it affects how 
people interact with 
media and the public. I 
don't think that it 
influences how people do 
their science" "My 
viewpoint is that I don't 
think it has, I don't think 
it has a perceivable effect 
on how people do 
science" 
Yes Caution; 
Defensive; 
Greater focus 
on 
communication 
Caution: "We're very, very careful about how we write press releases to make 
sure that, which unfortunately means that sometimes you're not quite as open 
as you could be" Defensive: "it means that you write them in a very defensive 
way, you make sure that all your press releases are written so that they cannot 
be misconstrued" Greater focus on communication: "I think it may have a 
perceivable effect on how people write up their science” 
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IV. The interview process for Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 is discussed separately in this annex as both the interview process and the 
data analysis differed slightly to that of Chapters 5 and 6. Twenty-two interviews were 
conducted for Chapter 4: 11 with sceptical voices and 11 with climate scientists. The 11 
sceptical voice interviews overlapped with those of the sceptical voices identified in 
Table 8.2 above (they were conducted with the same individuals during the same 
interview, but used a separate interview protocol and consent process). These 
interviews were conducted by Ms Amelia Sharman. The 11 climate scientist interviews 
did not overlap with those of the climate scientists identified in Table 8.2 above (they 
were conducted with a separate list of individuals) and were conducted by Dr Candice 
Howarth from Anglia Ruskin University. Interviews occurred between September 2013 
and February 2014 and lasted an average of 60 minutes. 
 
Section 4.2 in Chapter 4 describes the interview themes, sources of interviewees, and 
analytical method (thematic and descriptive coding).  Both the climate scientists and 
sceptical voices were asked the same questions from the same interview protocol. 
These included placing their opinion and that of a dominant other on the visual 
spectrum, commenting on whether they thought it was useful to be vocal about their 
point of view, and their opinions on labels used to categorise points of view within the 
climate change debate. As with the other UK-based interviews for Chapters 5 and 6, all 
22 interviewees were provided with a consent form and were guaranteed anonymity. 
All were transcribed by a third party and checked by each interviewer to ensure 
accuracy. 
 
The interviews were analysed using a two part process. First, broad thematic codes 
were deductively applied in NVivo using the interview protocol. These included codes 
such as “origin story” describing what inspired an interest in climate change and 
climate science, “own opinion rationale” describing what they saw as the rationale(s) 
behind their own opinion about climate change, and “experience of labelling” 
describing any incidences of times they have or have not been labelled within the 
climate change debate. Second, more specific analytical codes were inductively 
determined from the data and applied by hand to printed sections of interview text. 
These included “a-ha moment”, “role of personal values” and “natural environment” 
underneath “origin story”, and “has been labelled” and “hasn’t been labelled” 
underneath “experience of labelling”. Data were triangulated using interviewer 
triangulation, whereby each interviewer checked the application of codes across a 
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sample of the interviews conducted and analysed by the other author (Farmer et al., 
2006).  
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
This annex has provided a detailed discussion of the interview methods and analytical 
approach for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. It has outlined the data collection 
process for the 99 interviews carried out in both case study locations (NZ and the UK) 
and across all three chapters. It has also described the analytical approaches taken, 
focusing largely on inductive and deductive thematic coding of interview transcripts. 
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